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This dissertation explores two ways culture shapes the meaning of personal preferences. Decades 
of research has built on two assumptions about the role of personal preferences in decision 
making: 1) preferences that come quickly to mind are useful for making decisions and 2) 
behaviors reflect one’s personal preferences. However, studies supporting both assumptions were 
conducted in cultural contexts that emphasize an independent self-construal. In these contexts, 
people are socialized to form preferences that express their individuality and act in a way that 
fulfills their personal goals. In cultural contexts where an interdependent self-construal is 
emphasized, fitting in and adjusting to others’ needs is prioritized. In these contexts, people need 
to be responsive to norms as they make decisions. Informed by cross-cultural perspectives, we 
theorize and test the ideas that, for interdependents, 1) personal preferences that come quickly to 
mind can reduce one’s readiness to act and 2) information about others’ preferences may be 
more persuasive than information about others’ actions. Together, this dissertation suggests ways 
that cultural theories and attitude theories can expand productively by considering the deeper 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Two people are deciding what to eat for dinner. Both people have a preference that 
comes quickly to mind. What would the accessibility of their preferences signal for the 
person eating alone versus the person making dinner plans with a group of colleagues? 
Who would feel better about deciding what to eat?  
 
A young man in India sees two online advertisements for headphones. One ad claims its 
headphones are Most Loved, whereas the second ad claims its headphones are Best 
Sellers. Across the globe, an American man sees the same online advertisements. Which 
message would be more persuasive to each consumer?  
  
 The above scenarios relate to two classic domains in the literature on attitudes and 
decision making: the impact of attitude accessibility on coping with decision demands and the 
impact of consensus cues in persuasion. Decades of research have established that having readily 
available preferences facilitates decision making (Fazio, Blascovich, & Driscoll, 1992; Fazio, 
Powell, & Williams, 1989). An adjacent body of research has shown that information 
communicating social consensus can positively influence product evaluations (Bearden & Etzel, 
1982; Calder & Burnkrant, 1977; Hellofs & Jacobson, 1999).  
 These literatures share two culturally contingent assumptions. First, their research 
suggests that one’s personal preferences are paramount in decision making. It follows, then, that 
personal preferences that come quickly to mind should be beneficial for coping with decision 




people’s behaviors reflect their personal preferences. Thus, social consensus information that 
communicates others’ preferences (e.g., Most Loved) or behaviors (e.g., Best Seller) should be 
equally persuasive.  
 In Western cultural contexts (e.g., U.S.), where the studies supporting these two 
literatures were conducted, these assumptions hold. People raised in these cultures are socialized 
to develop preferences that are stable across contexts, express those preferences to establish 
uniqueness from others, and behave in ways that are consistent with personal preferences (Kim 
& Drolet, 2003, 2009; Kim & Sherman, 2007; Savani, Markus, & Conner, 2008). In these 
contexts, accessible preferences make decisions easier (Blascovich et al., 1993; Fazio et al., 
1992, 1989), and people often perceive behavior as a reflection of internal attributes such as 
preferences, beliefs, and values (Bem, 1972; McGuire, 1968). In contrast, in non-Western 
cultural contexts (e.g., China and India), people are socialized to prioritize others’ views over 
personal preferences and to behave in ways that yield to group norms (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Riemer, Shavitt, Koo, & Markus, 2014; Savani, Morris, & Naidu, 2012). 
 This dissertation proposes that culturally distinct assumptions regarding the relationship 
between attitudes and behavior provide a theoretical basis to investigate new questions regarding 
accessible attitudes and consensus cues. For instance, when and for whom could accessible 
preferences be less beneficial for coping with decision demands? Further, when and why would 
consensus cues about others’ behaviors (e.g., Best Seller) be less persuasive than consensus cues 
about others’ attitudes (e.g., Most Loved)? 
 The dissertation is organized as follows. This remainder of this chapter reviews the 
culture and decision making literature with a focus on its implications for accessible attitudes and 




making and tests the hypotheses in six studies. Chapter 3 presents hypotheses for the 
persuasiveness of behavioral and attitudinal consensus cues and tests the hypotheses in five 
studies. The appendices contain pretests and additional studies to support the studies in Chapters 
2 and 3. Together, this research aims to contribute to the understanding of culture’s influence on 
attitudes, information processing, and persuasion.   
 
CULTURE AND DECISION MAKING 
 
Culture can be defined as a set of meanings shared by people in a given place at a given 
time (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 2012). The constructs of individualism and collectivism capture 
the broadest spectrum of cultural differences across nations and within nations (Maheswaran & 
Shavitt, 2000; Shavitt & Barnes, 2019). People in individualistic cultures view themselves as 
independent from others and tend to prioritize personal goals over in-group goals (Hofstede, 
1980). In contrast, people in collectivistic cultures view themselves as socially embedded with 
others and tend to prioritize in-group goals over personal goals. Thus, a key distinction between 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures is the extent to which people view themselves as 
distinct from or interconnected with others. 
Individualism and collectivism represent cultural values shared by people at varying 
societal levels. For example, an entire country can be described as individualistic or collectivistic 
(e.g., people from the United States and Australia are predominantly individualistic whereas 
people from India and China are predominantly collectivistic; Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, 1994; 
Triandis, 1995). Specific regions within a country can be more individualistic or collectivistic 




from states in the Southern U.S. are predominantly collectivistic; Vandello & Cohen, 1999). 
Further, different ethnicities within a country or region can be individualistic or collectivistic 
(Lalwani & Shavitt, 2013; Torelli, 2006; Torelli & Shavitt, 2010). Individualism and 
collectivism can also distinguish between people at different levels of socio-economic status 
within a country, region, or ethnicity (e.g., people with higher SES are predominantly 
individualistic whereas people with lower SES are predominantly collectivistic; Hofstede, 1980; 
Stephens, Fryberg, & Markus, 2011) 
Although individualistic and collectivistic cultural tendencies can characterize entire 
groups of individuals (i.e., cultural syndrome; Triandis, 1996), there is also wide variation at the 
individual level (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Further, it is widely acknowledged that individuals 
draw upon multiple selves at various times (Aaker, 1999; Mandel, 2003; Suh, 2002; Triandis, 
1989). Therefore, to the extent that individualism and collectivism represent distinct views of the 
self (i.e., a self that is distinct or interconnected with others), one self-construal may be more 
salient at any given time.  
When thought of in this way, individualism and collectivism are commonly regarded in 
terms of their differing self-definitions: independent and interdependent self-construal, 
respectively (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Self-construal is a useful construct in 
the study of culture because unlike the more stable predictors of cultural orientation (e.g., 
ethnicity), self-construal can be situationally primed (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Oyserman & 
Lee, 2007, 2008; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). These ideas are consistent with concepts 
such as idiocentrism and allocentrism (Triandis, 1995), private and collective self (Greenwald & 




The distinction between independent and interdependent self-construals affects decision 
making in numerous ways. For instance, independents often pursue personal goals such as 
exercising personal agency (Ryan & Deci, 2000) through the choices they make (Kim & Markus, 
1999; Simpson, White, & Laran, 2017), activities on which they persist (Briley, Rudd, & Aaker, 
2017; Iyengar & Lepper, 1999), and the brands to which they connect (Escalas & Bettman, 
2005). In contrast, interdependents tend to pursue the interpersonal goal of maintaining social 
harmony (Duclos & Barasch, 2014; Kim & Drolet, 2003; Kim & Sherman, 2007). 
Normative-Contextual Model of Attitudes 
Independent and interdependent self-construals are also associated with distinct models 
of attitudes. Attitudes, defined as evaluations of a target along a positive–negative continuum, 
are functional for guiding behavior across cultures (Riemer et al., 2014). However, the 
conceptual underpinnings of attitude theorizing, as developed by scholars in the West (Allport, 
1935; Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956), are based upon Western assumptions about 
agency and personal goal fulfillment. Hence, in contexts where an independent (vs. 
interdependent) self-construal is predominant, preferences follow a person-centric model 
(Riemer, et al., 2014) wherein attitudes are personal to the individual (Ajzen, 1988; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1995). For example, attitudes in Western contexts (e.g., U.S.) are often considered to be 
personal and invariant across situations (Eagly, 1992). In this way, attitudes in the West are often 
seen as self-expressive and are used by others to predict one’s future behavior (Berger, 2013; 
Katz, 1960; Smith et al., 1956).  One implication of these cultural assumptions is that scholars 
considered attitudes to be functional to the extent that they fulfilled personal goals and enhanced 
personal rewards (Fazio, 2000). That is, the theoretical assumptions underlying the attitude 




In contrast, a normative-contextual model of attitudes has been theorized to describe the 
functioning of attitudes in non-Western contexts (Riemer et al., 2014). The normative-contextual 
model draws upon decades of cross-cultural research suggesting that perceived norms are often 
more predictive of behavioral outcomes than are personal preferences (Chan & Lau, 2001; Eom, 
Kim, Sherman, & Ishii, 2016; Kim & Drolet, 2009). This is because in non-Western contexts, 
collectivistic values and interdependent self-construals prioritize fitting in and adjusting to 
others’ needs. Instead of relying on personal preferences, people need to be responsive to norms 
as they make decisions. Therefore, the theoretical assumptions underlying the normative-
contextual model cohere with the goals of the interdependent self. 
In the sections that follow, I build on the normative-contextual model of attitudes 
(Riemer et al., 2014) and its supporting evidence to propose implications for two classic domains 
in attitude research: The impact of attitude accessibility on coping with decision demands, and 
the impact of consensus cues in persuasion. I propose that, for interdependents (vs. 
independents), personal preferences that come quickly to mind can get in the way of decision 
making because they increase the perceived need to justify one's preferences to others.  
Moreover, I argue that, for interdependents, others’ expectations and approval often drive 
decision making. Because interdependents (vs. independents) are familiar with adjusting their 
behaviors to fit in, and because they therefore tend to attribute the causality of others’ actions to 
situational factors, consensus cues describing others’ actions (e.g., “best selling brand”) may 
provide more information about the impact of norms rather than about what people personally 
like. Instead, consensus cues may be persuasive to the extent that they communicate information 





Culture and the Role of Norms in Decision Making 
 I propose that, for interdependents, normative and contextual factors matter more than 
personal preferences in decision making. A robust stream of research supports the idea that 
norms based on others’ attitudes are more functional than personal preferences in interdependent 
cultural contexts (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Chan & Lau, 2001; Eom et al., 2016; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Park, 2001; E. Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998; Triandis, 1989; Ybarra & 
Trafimow, 1998). For instance, students primed with an interdependent (independent) self-
construal weighted subjective norms (personal attitudes) about condom use during sex more 
heavily in their behavioral intentions (Ybarra & Trafimow, 1991). Further, in a culture 
characterized by a predominant independent self-construal (i.e., U.S.), personal preferences were 
stronger predictors of green behavior than norms about others’ opinions. In contrast, in a culture 
characterized by a predominant interdependent self-construal (i.e., China), knowing others’ 
opinions toward a “greener world” was a stronger predictor of actual green behavior than 
personal attitudes toward a “greener world” (Chan & Lau, 2001; Eom et al., 2016). 
 Whereas independents may be prepared to make decisions based on their personal 
preferences, interdependents may still seek normative or contextual validation to decide with 
confidence. Compared to an independent self-construal, an interdependent self-construal makes 
salient the needs of others and one’s interpersonal harmony with others (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). Therefore, consumers with salient interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal may 
rely on inputs that make decisions easy to justify to others (Briley, Morris, & Simonson, 2000; 
Chang & Hung, 2018; Hong & Chang, 2015; Wu, Moore, & Fitzsimons, 2019). Hong and Chang 
(2015) demonstrated that consumers primed with an independent self-construal were more likely 




cognitive) attributes. In contrast, those primed with an interdependent self-construal were less 
likely to rely on their personal feelings and chose options that were superior on cognitive 
attributes. For example, independents chose an apartment described to have a nice view, whereas 
interdependents chose an apartment described to have access to public transportation. Instead of 
choosing what would make themselves feel good, interdependents were more likely to choose 
something that was more likely to garner others’ approval. Similarly, when the self was made 
salient using a mirror manipulation, consumers primed with an interdependent (vs. independent) 
self-construal were more likely to prefer an apartment they could justify relative to one that was 
personally appealing (Chang & Hung, 2018, Experiment 2). 
Implications for Attitude Accessibility 
 The above discussion suggests that, for interdependents (vs. independents), personal 
preferences that are more accessible in memory are less likely to facilitate decision making. For 
interdependents, ideal decisions are those that agree with normative and contextual information. 
A highly accessible personal preference that is not obviously consistent with norms and contexts 
can therefore interfere with adaptive decision making, leading to lower readiness to act.  
 Attitude accessibility is a common indicator of attitude strength that reflects the objective 
quickness with which an attitude is activated from memory (Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 
1982; Zanna & Fazio, 1982). Attitudes can become more (vs. less) accessible due to a number of 
factors: having direct experience with the attitude object (vs. not; Berger, 1992; Fazio et al., 
1982; Fazio, Herr, & Olney, 1984), repeatedly expressing one's attitude (vs. not; Berger, 1992; 
Berger & Mitchell, 1989; Descheemaeker, Spruyt, Fazio, & Hermans, 2017; Fazio et al., 1982; 
Holland, Verplanken, & van Knippenberg, 2003; Powell & Fazio, 1984; Roskos-Ewoldsen & 




Young & Fazio, 2013), or activating one's attitude via an evaluative task (vs. a non-evaluative 
task such as categorization; Berger, 1992; Descheemaeker et al., 2017; Fazio et al., 1982; 
Posavac, Sanbonmatsu, & Fazio, 1997; Sia, Lord, Blessum, Thomas, & Lepper, 1999). 
 According to the person-centric model, attitudes that are highly accessible provide a 
“ready-aid” (Smith et al., 1956) to manage and cope with decisions (Fazio, Ledbetter, & Towles-
Schwen, 2000; Katz, 1960; Riemer et al., 2014). Extensive research conducted in independent 
cultural contexts showed that more (vs. less) accessible attitudes facilitate decision making by 
directing attention (Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1992); resisting external influence (Bassili & 
Fletcher, 1991; Holland et al., 2003; Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007), and reducing the 
stress-related effort to decide (Fazio et al., 1992, 1989; Fazio & Williams, 1986; Powell & Fazio, 
1984). 
 For example, American participants who rehearsed their attitudes toward abstract 
paintings (vs. not), thus manipulating attitude accessibility, had lower diastolic blood pressure 
and spent less time deciding between the same paintings in a later task (Fazio et al., 1992). In 
another example, Dutch participants who rehearsed (vs. not) their attitudes toward political 
policies reported greater feelings of confidence about their preferences (Holland et al., 2003). 
The authors concluded that, echoing prior research (Blascovich et al., 1993; Fazio et al., 1992; 
Fazio & Powell, 1997), attitude rehearsal, and thus attitude accessibility, was beneficial because 
it decreased the effort to respond to an attitude-relevant stimulus. 
 This stream of research supports the notion that, in independent cultural contexts where 
people make decisions based on personal preferences, accessible attitudes are useful in decision 
making. However, in interdependent cultural contexts where people make decisions based on 




norms and contexts can be less useful for coping with decisions. In contrast to an independent 
self-construal, an interdependent self-construal prioritizes directing one’s attention to others and 
the context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), 
incorporating external information into one’s own views (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Park, 
2001), and making decisions that are justifiable to others (Chang & Hung, 2018; Hong & Chang, 
2015). 
 In interdependent contexts, learning that a highly accessible personal preference does not 
fit into situational norms can be particularly uncomfortable. People with a salient interdependent 
self-construal attach greater importance to meeting others’ expectations and achieving 
harmonious interpersonal relationships with them (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). 
For interdependents, a highly accessible personal preference can signal the possibility that one’s 
preference is not compatible with situational norms and needs to be justified to others. Thus, in 
contrast to independents, interdependents may feel less confident and less at ease with a decision 
based on a highly accessible preference. 
 We propose that, for interdependents, more (vs. less) accessible preferences can signal 
that one is not ready to make a decision, making salient the need to justify one’s preferences, 
instead of facilitating decision making by reducing effort. Justifying one's preferences to others 
is effortful. Past research suggests that people consider more information and process 
information more carefully when they feel pressure to justify their views to others (Chaiken, 
1980; Huber & Seiser, 2001; Simonson, 1989; Tetlock & Boettger, 1994; Tetlock & Kim, 1987). 
For example, participants who were told that they would be held accountable for their views (vs. 
not), thus manipulating the need to justify, used more effortful processing to form impressions of 




letter justifying a hiring decision to an authority (vs. not), spent over twice the amount of time 
making their decision and gave more reasons supporting their decision in verbal thought 
protocols (Huber & Seiser, 2001). 
 Taken together, prior literature suggests that interdependents (vs. independents) may be 
predisposed to feel the need to justify themselves to others. As a result, we predicted that they 
will exert greater justification effort when holding more (vs. less) accessible preferences because 
an aspect of the self is salient that may not agree with situational norms and contexts. This is in 
contrast to attitude accessibility research in independent cultural contexts where having more (vs. 
less) accessible attitudes facilitates decision making via reduced effort. Next, we examine the 
implications of a normative contextual model of attitudes for interdependents’ responses to 
consensus cues reflecting others’ attitudes versus others' actions. 
Others’ Preferences Are More Persuasive than Actions 
We propose that, to interdependents, others’ attitudes (vs. others’ behaviors) are more 
persuasive in decision making. People with a predominant interdependent (vs. independent) self-
construal are more familiar with adjusting their behavior to social constraints. To 
interdependents, internal factors such as personal preferences, emotions, and desires “must 
instead be constantly controlled and regulated to come to terms with the primary goal of 
interdependence” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 227). The practice of controlling one's internal 
states to fit in can be seen in a number of consumer outcomes. For example, interdependents’ 
(vs. independents) are generally more likely to resist impulsive purchases (Kacen & Lee, 2002; 
Zhang & Shrum, 2009), exercise more patience in retail contexts (Chen, Ng, & Rao, 2005), and 




The extant literature suggests that, compared to independents, interdependents perceive a 
greater distinction between their attitudes and behaviors. In independent cultures (e.g., U.S.), 
people are socialized to develop preferences that are stable across contexts, express those 
preferences to establish uniqueness from others, and behave in ways that are consistent with 
personal preferences (Kim & Drolet, 2003, 2009; Kim & Sherman, 2007; Savani et al., 2008). In 
these contexts, people often perceive behavior as a reflection of internal attributes such has 
preferences, beliefs, and values (Bem, 1972; McGuire, 1968). In contrast, in interdependent 
cultural contexts (e.g., China and India), people are socialized to prioritize others’ views over 
personal preferences and to behave in ways that yield to group norms (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Riemer & Shavitt, 2011; Savani et al., 2012). Therefore, in interdependent contexts, 
behaviors are less likely to follow attitudes. 
Findings from the causal attribution literature suggests that interdependents (vs. 
independents) are also more likely to also separate others’ attitudes from their overt behaviors 
(Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000; Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 
2001; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994). For example, Chinese (vs. 
American) people were more likely to make situational attributions for others’ behaviors, 
whereas Americans (vs. Chinese) were more likely to make dispositional attributions (Morris & 
Peng, 1994). Similarly, Japanese (vs. American) people were less likely to infer that another 
person’s underlying attitude matched the attitudinal position of an essay that they were forced to 
read (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004), further suggesting that more interdependent (vs. independent) 
people are less susceptible to correspondence bias favoring dispositional attributions. A parallel 
investigation found that Indians were less likely than Americans to assume a connection between 




relatively automatic for interdependents (Knowles et al., 2001) and are driven by their relative 
sensitivity to the power of the situation (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Gilbert & Malone, 1995).  
If interdependents (vs. independents) are more likely to distinguish others’ attitudes from 
their behaviors, which are they more or less likely to be influenced by? We propose that, to 
interdependents, others' attitudes are more influential because they are more engaging and more 
closely linked to internal factors than others’ behaviors. Supportive evidence comes from 
research distinguishing descriptive norms (i.e., what most people do) from injunctive norms 
(Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; i.e., what most people approve; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 
1990; Jacobson, Mortensen, & Cialdini, 2011; Savani et al., 2012). For example, when people 
saw an injunctive norm that others approved of volunteering extra time in an experiment 
(attitudinal information) versus a descriptive norm that others chose to volunteer (behavioral 
information), they reported a greater focus on interpersonal aspects of the self by including 
others in their self-descriptions (Jacobson, Mortensen, & Cialdini, 2011), suggesting that 
injunctive norms engaged the interdependent self.   
A related stream of research suggests that interdependents maintain their personal 
preferences even when their behavior conforms to others’ expectations (Riemer & Shavitt, 2011; 
Savani et al., 2012). In one study, people from an interdependent culture (i.e., India) were primed 
to think about workplace authority figures (vs. not) and saw a set of professional development 
course options. When asked to evaluate which classes to take, their choices differed between 
conditions, but their preferences did not (Savani et al., 2012, Study 3), suggesting that the 
situational norm may have influenced how Indians acted, but not their preferences (Cialdini, 
Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). By contrast, Americans’ choices were driven by personal preferences 




Implications for Consensus Cues  
The present review suggests that, for interdependents, attitudinal and behavioral 
consensus cues may have distinct influences on product evaluations. A consensus cue is a 
statement that describes a majority of individuals’ orientation toward an object (Freling & Dacin, 
2010). For example, a product may be shown with an attitudinal consensus cue such as, “Four 
out of five students prefer X brand of toothpaste.” Similarly, the same product could be shown 
with a behavioral consensus cue such as, "Four out of five students bought X brand toothpaste.”  
Prior research has focused largely on attitudinal consensus cues and shown that 
consumers use such cues to inform their product evaluations under certain circumstances 
(Bearden & Etzel, 1982; Burnkrant & Cousineau, 1975; Hellofs & Jacobson, 1999). For instance, 
consumers more favorably evaluated a brand of coffee when it was shown with attitudinal 
consensus information about others’ preferences (vs. not; Burnkrant & Cousineau, 1975). The 
otherwise positive relationship between consensus cues and product evaluation has been 
qualified by numerous consumer variables including personal relevance (Chaiken, 1980; 
Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983) expectations (West & 
Broniarczyk, 1998), knowledge (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 2002), and connectedness to others 
(Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Chang, 2012; David, 2016; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Wang, 
Zhu, & Shiv, 2012). For example, consumers who are connected to others via greater 
collectivism (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997), fear (Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & 
Kenrick, 2006; Griskevicius et al., 2009), less loneliness (Wang et al., 2012), or secure 
attachment style (David, 2016) tend to incorporate attitudinal consensus cues into their product 
evaluations more than consumers who are less connected to others (more individualistic, lonely, 




construal, consensus cues are more likely to be diagnostic in product evaluations (Feldman & 
Lynch, 1988). 
Research on dual process models of persuasion (Elaboration Likelihood Model and 
Heuristic—Systematic Model) shows that, for most individuals, peripheral cues such as 
consensus information about others’ opinions are persuasive when people are not motivated to 
process the information (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Maheswaran & 
Chaiken, 1991; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1986; Petty et al., 1983). For example, studies have 
demonstrated that cues of attitudinal consensus (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991) or endorser 
attractiveness (Petty et al., 1983) only influenced product evaluations when people thought that 
the product would not (vs. would) be available to them.  
Later research qualified this perspective and asserted that consumer goals play a 
fundamental role in determining how cues will be processed (Shavitt, Swan, Lowrey, & Wänke, 
1994). That is, consumers might carefully process endorser attractiveness in a restaurant 
advertisement when they have the goal to make a good impression on others compared to when 
they have the goal to experience tasty foods. Shavitt and colleagues (1994) manipulated 
consumers’ social impression goals (vs. sensory experience goals) before showing participants a 
restaurant ad with attractive or unattractive endorsers. When participants thought the restaurant 
was not available to them (low motivation), restaurant evaluations differed as a function of 
endorser attractiveness for participants primed with sensory experience goals (vs. social 
impression goals). These findings are similar to those in traditional dual process model research 
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In contrast, when participants thought the restaurant 
would be available on their campus (high motivation), restaurant evaluations differed as a 




sensory experience goals). These findings demonstrate that distinct consumer goals can 
determine the degree to which a cue is processed carefully on the route to persuasion.  
Similarly, interdependent and independent self-construals elicit distinct goals for fitting 
in versus standing out from others that can make different types of consensus cues more or less 
personally relevant. Compared to independents, interdependents are more attentive to and 
influenced by others’ expectations and approval (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). For independents, 
consensus information about what others approve is less personally relevant. In contrast, for 
interdependents, consensus information about what others approve is more likely to be 
personally relevant (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997). For example, Chinese (vs. American) 
consumers perceived a consensus cue (81% of consumers are satisfied with the product) to be 
more relevant (Aaker & Sengupta, 2000), and the consensus cue overshadowed attribute 
information even though the two pieces of information were incongruent (Aaker & Maheswaran, 
1997). These findings suggest that consensus cues are consistent with the interpersonal goals that 
characterize an interdependent self-construal (e.g., gaining others’ approval) and are therefore 
relevant in decision making (Shavitt et al., 1994). 
This review suggests that, for interdependents (vs. independents), there is a theoretical 
basis to expect differences in the persuasiveness of attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues. In 
culturally independent contexts, people seek to separate themselves from others and are more 
likely to assume that one’s behavior reflects underlying attitudes. Therefore, to independents, 
attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues should be similarly influential on product evaluations. 
In contrast, in culturally interdependent contexts, people seek approval from others and are less 




consensus information about others’ attitudes (vs. behaviors) may be more indicative of what 





CHAPTER 2: CULTURAL SELF-CONSTRUAL AND ACCESSIBLE ATTITUDES IN 
DECISION MAKING 
 Do people always feel more prepared to choose when they have top-of-mind personal 
preferences? Extensive research suggests that having attitudes or preferences that are readily 
accessible in memory facilitates choice (Fazio, Powell, & Williams, 1989) and word of mouth 
recommendation (Berger & Schwartz, 2011) by increasing the readiness to act (Blascovich et al., 
1993; Fazio et al., 1992; Fazio & Powell, 1997; Holland et al., 2003; Katz, 1960; M. B. Smith et 
al., 1956). For instance, when their attitudes were made more accessible, people felt greater 
certainty in their attitudes and were less likely to change them (Holland et al., 2003). In addition, 
political campaigns often invest millions to influence voters’ preferences in favor of their 
candidate with the expectation that  this practice is usually effective (Fazio & Williams, 1986; 
for a supplemental study examining this question, see Appendix A). The role of attitude 
accessibility in coping with decision demands (Blascovich et al., 1993; Fazio et al., 1992; Fazio 
& Powell, 1997) and in facilitating choice (Fazio et al., 1989; Fazio & Williams, 1986) is well 
established and, indeed, is central to the attitude literature.   
However, this important work emerged from a Western sociocultural emphasis on 
individual agency and on choosing based on what one personally wants. That is, in the Western, 
more independent cultural contexts in which attitude theories were developed and past studies 
were conducted (i.e., North America and Western Europe), personal preferences serve as critical 
decision guides, and choosing based on those preferences is considered natural and desirable 
(Riemer et al., 2014). In these contexts, accessible personal preferences are well positioned to 
facilitate choice. What role will accessible preferences play in cultural contexts that prioritize 




A growing body of recent research suggests that, in more interdependent contexts, 
personal preferences play a different role. Compared to more independent people, more 
interdependent people are less likely to nurture personal preferences (Miller, Bersoff, & 
Harwood, 1990), are less likely to behave in accordance with their personal preferences (Chan & 
Lau, 2001; Eom et al., 2016; Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002; Savani et al., 2008, 2012; 
Savani, Wadhwa, Uchida, Ding, & Naidu, 2015), and are less likely to be satisfied or motivated 
by choosing according to their personal preferences (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; Kitayama, Snibbe, 
Markus, & Suzuki, 2004). Instead, more interdependent people are socialized to yield to others’ 
views, sometimes at the expense of what they personally want (Kim & Markus, 1999; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). How would an interdependent context affect the way people respond to their 
accessible preferences? 
In these contexts, having personal preferences that readily spring to mind may signal that 
one’s personal wants are too salient. This might not be as desirable in contexts where one is 
expected to be attentive to others’ needs and preferences. Attitude accessibility may signal that “I 
know what I like,” but this may give rise to concerns about how one’s preference fits with what 
others think. Thus, with highly accessible personal preferences, one may feel the need to think 
more about others’ views before acting in order to ensure that one is considerate enough. Highly 
accessible preferences may therefore reduce one’s feelings of readiness to act, as well as the 
likelihood of acting on one's preferences.  
 This research is the first to examine the role of accessible preferences in decision making 
in culturally diverse contexts. To understand the distinct role of accessible personal preferences 
in interdependent settings, these studies thus consider a broader set of cultural and decision 




congruity of one’s preferences with others’ views is in question. Thus, this research contributes 
to the understanding of one of social psychology’s most fundamental concepts, attitude 
accessibility, among more diverse participant populations in more diverse decision-making 
settings. Across six studies, examining a variety of outcomes and attitude domains, we show that 
the role of more (vs. less) accessible preferences in the readiness to act depends on cultural self-
construal. In so doing, these findings suggest ways that both cultural theories and attitude 





To assess whether accessible preferences will play a similar role facilitating decisions in 
a broader set of cultural contexts, it is important to consider how sociocultural factors influence 
one’s goals and self-views. People with independent and interdependent self-construals differ in 
their definitions of self and their degree of focus on others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In 
Western cultures, such as the United States, people tend to emphasize an independent self-
construal, viewing the self as separate and distinct, and prioritizing personal goals over group 
goals. In contrast, in non-Western cultures, such as India, people tend to emphasize an 
interdependent self-construal, viewing the self as embedded within a social network of important 
others and prioritizing group goals over personal goals (Miller et al., 1990; Miller, Das, & 
Chakravarthy, 2011; Savani et al., 2008). Although the terms Western and non-Western 
distinguish individuals based on regional differences, our conceptual focus also includes 




established that individuals can access both an independent and interdependent self-construal in 
memory (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Briley et al., 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Trafimow et 
al., 1991; Triandis, 1989). Moreover, prior research has documented correspondence between 
effects based on situational primes of self-construal and based on differences in national culture 
(Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, 
De Bouter, & Van Knippenberg, 2003; Zhang, Feick, & Price, 2006). Therefore, our theorizing 
applies to Western and non-Western sociocultural contexts as well as to cultural and situational 
settings where an independent or interdependent self-construal is predominant. 
The differences in goal priorities that we have described affect a wide range of behavioral 
outcomes. For example, more independent people often pursue the goal of exercising personal 
agency (Ryan & Deci, 2000) through the choices they make (Kim & Markus, 1999; Savani et al., 
2008) and the activities on which they persist (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). In contrast, more 
interdependent people tend to pursue the interpersonal goal of maintaining social harmony and 
are less motivated to self-express (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; Kim & Drolet, 2003; Kim & 
Sherman, 2007; Triandis, 1989),  
We argue that independent and interdependent self-construals lead to different roles for 
accessible attitudes in decision making. On one hand, having accessible preferences increases 
felt readiness to act when an independent self-construal is salient. For more independent people, 
accessible attitudes signal that one is prepared to choose. On the other hand, having accessible 
attitudes decreases felt readiness to act when an interdependent self-construal is salient. For more 






Independent Self-Construal and Accessible Attitudes 
 When an independent self-construal is salient, attitudes are useful to the extent they serve 
personal goals (Fazio, 2000). An independent self-construal is characterized by prioritizing 
personal goals and directing one’s attention toward the self versus others (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Singelis, 1994). In independent cultural contexts (e.g., the U.S.), attitudes are considered 
to be personal, self-expressive, and invariant across situations (Eagly, 1992; Katz, 1960; Smith et 
al., 1956). Thus, an attitude’s accessibility in memory should help to reduce the “energy-
consuming sometimes painful process of process of figuring out de novo how he shall relate 
himself to it [the attitude object]” (Smith et al., 1956, p. 41).  
 Accessibility refers to the strength of the association in memory between an attitude 
object and one’s evaluation of it (Fazio et al., 1982). The stronger the association, the more 
quickly the evaluation springs to mind in response to a query or in the presence of the object 
(Fazio, 1995). Attitudes can be chronically accessible in memory, as indexed by response latency 
to attitudinal inquiry, or situationally made more accessible through repeated preference 
expression or rehearsal. Accessibility is distinct from other dimensions of attitude strength such 
as attitude certainty because accessibility need not include a judgment about correctness or 
confidence in the attitude (e.g., Bassili, 1993). That is, although accessibility and other indicators 
of attitude strength can be related (see Petty & Krosnick, 1995; Rucker & Petty, 2004; Tormala 
& Rucker, 2007), an attitude can be more accessible without being stronger on other dimensions. 
Indeed, accessibility is a central index of attitude strength (Roese & Olson, 1994) that precedes 
other meta-attitudinal outcomes (Bassili, 1993; Holland et al., 2003; Petrocelli et al., 2007). 
A rich and important stream of research has shown that more accessible preferences 




1993; Fazio et al., 1992, 1989; Fazio & Powell, 1997; Holland et al., 2003). In one key example, 
U.S. participants who rehearsed their attitudes toward abstract paintings (vs. not), thus 
manipulating attitude accessibility, took less time deciding between the same paintings in a later 
task (Fazio et al., 1992). These findings suggested that simply holding more accessible attitudes 
improved decision making by reducing the effort needed to make decisions. In another example, 
attitude accessibility, indexed by the response latency to indicate one’s attitude, mediated the 
relationship between attitude rehearsal and attitude confidence (Holland et al., 2003). In line with 
prior research, Holland et al. suggested that attitude rehearsal, which increases attitude 
accessibility, is beneficial to the individual because it decreases the thinking required to respond 
to an attitude-relevant stimulus, increasing the readiness to act.  
 Culturally independent samples and isolated decision making contexts are common 
themes in prior accessibility research. Indeed, past accessibility research may have been 
intentionally designed without social contexts because norms and social influence are considered 
exogenous to one’s true attitude in independent contexts (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Converse, 
1974; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974). However, certain contexts can increase the need to consider 
others (e.g., Hong & Chang, 2015). For example, asking participants to choose for others (vs. 
themselves) led more independent people to prefer a more justifiable laptop (i.e., one that 
dominated on utilitarian attributes such as battery life) versus a less justifiable laptop (i.e., one 
that dominated on hedonic attributes such as visual appeal). In contrast, more interdependent 
people preferred the more justifiable laptop regardless of whether they were asked to choose for 
others or themselves, presumably because they are more likely to take others into consideration 
even in private decisions (Hong & Chang 2015, Study 4). Together, these findings help derive 




(vs. less) accessible preferences enhance readiness for independents. However, in social 
contexts, more (vs. less) accessible preferences do not enhance readiness for independents. 
Formally, we hypothesize: 
 
H1A:  For more independent people, more (vs. less) accessible preferences increase felt 
readiness to act in isolated contexts. 
 
H1B:  For more independent people, more (vs. less) accessible preferences may not 
increase felt readiness to act in social contexts. 
 
Interdependent Self-Construal and Accessible Attitudes 
 An interdependent self-construal is characterized by prioritizing interpersonal concerns 
and directing one’s attention toward others in the social environment (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). More interdependent people also form personal preferences, but preferences alone are 
incomplete drivers of action. One also needs to consider the normative context. In interdependent 
cultural contexts (e.g., India), attitudes are expressive of one’s embeddedness with others and 
modulated across situations (Cialdini, Wosinska, Barrett, Butner, & Gornik-Durose, 1999; 
Petrova, Cialdini, & Sills, 2007; Riemer et al., 2014).  
 For people in interdependent cultural contexts, one’s preferences are more likely to guide 
behavior when they are clearly congruent with others’ views (Riemer et al., 2014). Indeed, 
people in interdependent contexts are often discouraged from acting solely according to their 
personal preferences, and instead, are socialized to be also attuned to normative and contextual 
expectations (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Morling et al., 2002; Savani et al., 2008, 2012). In one 
example, participants from India and the U.S. were primed to think about workplace authority 
figures (vs. not) before evaluating and choosing a set of professional development courses. For 




not, suggesting that Indians held personal preferences but that they did not drive choice (Savani 
et al., 2012).   
In another example, perceived social norms, compared to personal preferences, were 
stronger predictors of green behavior in Japan and China, whereas personal preferences, 
compared to perceived social norms, were stronger predictors in the United States (Chan & Lau, 
2001; Eom et al., 2016). These findings also demonstate how attitude measures can and typically 
do capture one’s own personal preferences independent of subjective norms (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1974), making it possible to study personal preferences using the same measures across cultural 
contexts. For example, there was no correlation between personal preferences for a “greener” 
world and perceived social norms for green behavior among Chinese, Japanese, or U.S. 
participants (Chan & Lau, 2001; Eom et al., 2016), suggesting that people respond to attitudinal 
inquires with their personal preferences, independent of subjective norms, across cultural 
contexts. 
What are the implications for how preference accessibility will affect interdependents? 
Existing theorizing would predict that increasing the accessibility of interdependents’ 
preferences would enhance the readiness to act (Fazio, 1995; Fazio et al., 1989; Fazio & 
Williams, 1986). However, prior accessibility research, as well as attitude research more broadly 
(Riemer et al., 2014), typically focused on culturally independent samples (from the U.S. and 
Western Europe) operating in individual decision making contexts.  
We make a different prediction. We propose that, for interdependents, the accessibility of 
a preference can decrease the readiness to act, particularly in contexts in which the prevailing 
norms are unclear or are incongruent with one’s preference. Instances of actual or potential 




independents, because of the anticipated disruption of group harmony (Hoshino-Browne et al., 
2005; Kitayama et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As a result, having a highly accessible 
personal preference that does not clearly fit into prevailing norms threatens one’s ability to 
sufficiently consider others. In these situations, we suggest, interdependents will feel less 
prepared to act, and will be less likely to act, when they hold more (vs. less) accessible 
preferences. Moreover, interdependents are likely to take others into account regardless of 
whether they decide in isolated or social contexts (e.g., Hong & Chang, 2015). Therefore, more 
(vs. less) accessible preferences should decrease felt readiness to act for interdependents in 
isolated or social contexts. 
In contrast, a less accessible preference, by definition, presents a less salient interpersonal 
concern. Less accessible preferences, even if they are norm-incongruent, are less likely to get in 
the way of maintaining harmony, and thus, having less (vs. more) accessible preferences may 
give interdependents more flexibility to adapt to the social context (Cooper & Aronson, 1992). 
Taken together, we formally hypothesize: 
 
H2:  For more interdependent people, more accessible preferences decrease felt 
readiness to act in isolated or social contexts. 
 
 
Considering Others’ Views 
Previous research, conducted in independent cultural contexts, showed that having more 
accessible preferences reduces the need to think, increasing the readiness to act (e.g., Fazio et al., 
1992). In contrast, we propose that when an interdependent self-construal is salient, having more 
(vs. less) accessible preferences signals that more thinking may be required to act. Past work 




feeling that I know what I like), but may not increase its appropriateness (Petrocelli et al., 2007). 
However, in interdependent contexts, the emphasis on fitting in and attending to others’ views 
may heighten the concern that a highly accessible preference is normatively inappropriate. 
Interdependents with readily accessible preferences may therefore think more about others to 
ensure their preferences fit in. As a result, they will feel less prepared to act on their preferences.  
Our prediction, though counterintuitive from the perspective of the attitude literature, 
builds upon prior cultural psychology findings. Research suggests that, for more interdependent 
people, drawing attention to the self can actually activate behaviors that reflect greater thinking 
about others (Briley et al., 2000; Chang & Hung, 2018; Hong & Chang, 2015; Lalwani & 
Shavitt, 2009). For example, when asked to imagine choosing a laptop for themselves, 
interdependents (vs. independents) preferred alternatives that they could easily justify to others 
(Hong & Chang, 2015). In another example, when more interdependent people were led to think 
about themselves and their own self-presentation goals, they focused more on how they could 
present themselves as normatively appropriate to others (Lalwani & Shavitt, 2009). Other 
people’s views are thus a critical reference point for more interdependent people. 
For more independent people, by contrast, the accessibility of one’s personal preferences 
should not affect the consideration of others’ views for two reasons. First, compared to more 
interdependent people, more independent people are more self-focused and less attentive to 
others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Second, prior work in culturally independent settings (e.g., 
U.S.) suggests that having highly accessible personal preferences reduces the overall thinking 
required to act (Blascovich et al., 1993; Fazio et al., 1989; 1992). Thus, we expect preference 






H3:  For more independent people, more accessible preferences would not affect the 
consideration of others’ views. 
 
H4:  For more interdependent people, more accessible preferences increase the 
consideration of others’ views. 
 
H5: For more interdependent people, but not independent people, the consideration of 
others’ views mediates the relationship between attitude accessibility and felt 
readiness to act. 
 
Downstream Consequences 
The previous discussion suggests a number of downstream consequences relating to the 
relationship between accessible attitudes and felt readiness to act. This research focuses on two 
such consequences that reflect a sense of readiness to act and have been associated with 
accessible attitudes in prior research: choice deferral and word-of-mouth recommendations.  
Choice Deferral. Choosing often causes stress. Past research has attributed choice 
deferral to decisional conflict or uncertainty (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Dhar, 1996, 1997; 
Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). According to this perspective, choice deferral 
occurs because consumers do not have clearly defined preferences and, thus, do not feel 
equipped to decide between alternatives. Small differences in attractiveness among the available 
options can increase uncertainty. This suggests that as one’s preferences become more clearly 
defined, choice deferral should decrease (Dhar & Simonson, 2003). Related research 
demonstrated that consumers whose attitudes had been made more accessible through rehearsal 
(vs. not) were more likely to make choices based on those attitudes (Fazio et al., 1989; Fazio & 
Williams, 1986). However, our theorizing suggests that, for interdependents, having more 
accessible attitudes may not increase the likelihood of making choices based on those attitudes. 





H6: For interdependents, more accessible preferences increases choice deferral. 
 
 Word of Mouth Recommendations. Word-of-mouth (WOM) communication is another 
instantiation of a felt readiness to act. Prior work suggests that the accessibility of a product in 
memory motivates WOM about that product (Berger & Schwartz, 2011). However, if 
interdependents with more accessible attitudes feel a lower readiness to act, as we theorize, then 
they should also be less likely to make a recommendation based on their preference when it is 
more accessible.  
 
H7: For interdependents, having more accessible preferences decreases the likelihood 
of including one’s preference in a WOM recommendation. 
 
The next sections present 6 studies designed to test the predictions outlined here.  
Overview of Studies 
Study 1 showed that, in an isolated decision making setting, more accessible preferences 
increased Americans’, but decreased Indians’, felt readiness to cope with a decision between two 
options. Study 2 showed that, in a social decision making setting, more accessible personal 
preferences were associated with increased thinking about others—an indicator of the 
consideration of others’ views—for interdependents, but not independents. For interdependents, 
this measure mediated the relationship between attitude accessibility and felt readiness to act. 
Study 3 built upon the first two studies by replicating the effect of attitude accessibility on felt 
readiness to act using manipulations of both key independent variables: attitude accessibility and 
self-construal. Study 4 provided additional support for our theorization by showing that 




time and writing more when asked to recommend their restaurant preference to an imagined 
client group.  
Two additional studies examined downstream consequences that reflect a felt readiness to 
act on one’s attitudes. Study 5 showed that more accessible attitudes increased choice deferral 
among interdependents, but not independents. Finally, Study 6 revealed WOM as downstream 
consequence and identified norm relevance as a relevant boundary condition. we showed that 
interdependents with more accessible preferences were more likely to give recommendations that 
corresponded with their preferences in a situation with low (vs. high) norm relevance. That is, 
when fitting in with norms was not a relevant concern, interdependents were more likely give 
recommendations that corresponded with their accessible preference. However, when fitting in 
with norms was a relevant concern, attitude accessibility did not affect the likelihood of 
recommending one’s preference. 
Study 1: Accessible Attitudes Increase Decision Comfort for Americans, Decrease Decision 
Comfort for Indians 
 Study 1 tested H1A and H2. We measured attitude accessibility using participants’ 
response latencies to attitudinal inquiries (Fazio et al., 1989). We used nationality to 
operationalize interdependent (India) and independent (U.S.) self-construal. Past work suggests 
that, compared to Americans, Indians are more interdependent and attentive to norms (Lalwani 
& Shavitt, 2013; Monga & John, 2007; Savani et al., 2015). Second, we used common soft drink 
brands as attitude objects and used a validated measure to assess participants’ felt readiness to 
act: decision comfort. Decision comfort reflects a consumer’s affective sense of ease or 
contentment with a choice (Parker, Lehmann, & Xie, 2016). Therefore, it is conceptually similar 




et al., 1992, 1989; Fazio & Williams, 1986; Holland et al., 2003), we tested H1A and H2 in an 
isolated decision making context. We predicted that Americans with more accessible soda 
preferences would indicate more decision comfort to choose between two soft drink brands (i.e., 
Coca-Cola and Pepsi), but Indians with more accessible soda preferences would not.  
 Participants and Design. Three hundred and two participants (163 in U.S., Mage = 36.5, 
42% male; 139 in India, Mage = 31.5, 61% male) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(Rocklage & Fazio, 2018) and completed the study for money. The experiment was administered 
in English because all Indian respondents were proficient in English. The study used a measured 
accessibility  2 (country: U.S. vs. India) between-subjects design. 
 Procedures and Measures. Participants began the study by completing a brief survey 
about their prior soft drink consumption. For instance, participants indicated which of the 
following brands they had consumed at any point in their lives (Coca-Cola Classic, Sprite, Pepsi, 
Mountain Dew, Fanta, 7-Up, Minute Maid, Schweppes Ginger Ale). Next, they rated their 
relative preferences for four soft drink pairs after three filler preferences to calibrate their 
response latencies. Their preference for Coca-Cola versus Pepsi was the focal attitude (i.e., 1 = 
definitely prefer Coke, 7 = definitely prefer Pepsi). We captured their response latency on all 
preference measures to calculate attitude accessibility.  
 Next, all participants were asked to imagine that they were buying a soft drink for their 
home. On the same page, participants indicated their decision comfort to choose between Coca-
Cola and Pepsi using a five-item measure adapted from Parker, Lehmann, and Xie (2016) ( = 
.65; e.g., “I would be comfortable choosing one over the other,” 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). To 
establish correspondence with the readiness measure used in later studies, we also collected 




intelligent, and prepared; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much; see Appendix B.1). The items from both 
constructs load on the same factor and the results of this study do not change substantially if 
decision comfort is replaced with readiness.  
Participants also completed some filler judgments of decision comfort and felt readiness 
to choose between candy bars (i.e., Snickers and Twix). These measures were used to explore 
whether the effects of attitude accessibility to products in one category (i.e., soft drinks) carried 
over to judgments in a related category (i.e., candy bars). Finally, participants completed 
demographic measures, read a debriefing statement, and received payment for their participation. 
Results 
 Following past research (Fazio et al., 1989), we computed participants’ relative attitude 
accessibility using their own distribution of latencies. We calculated a z-score of the response 
latency to the focal preference (i.e., Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi) relative to that subject’s average and 
standard deviation of the latencies to the other soft drink preference pairs. This procedure helped 
to distinguish between individuals who a) had a more accessible Coke vs. Pepsi preference, 
relative to the other drink preferences, and b) those with the tendency to respond quickly to any 
inquiry.  
Previous research has found a relation between attitude accessibility and attitude 
extremity (Downing, Judd, & Brauer, 1992; Fazio et al., 1982, 1989; Fazio & Williams, 1986; 
Powell & Fazio, 1984). However, we did not observe such a correlation in the present data (r = 
.006, p = .92). Nevertheless, we compared analyses with and without extremity as a covariate to 
ensure that the effects of attitude accessibility were not due to attitude extremity. 
Decision Comfort. We predicted that, over and above any effect of attitude extremity, 




between Coca-Cola and Pepsi, but that Indians with more accessible soda preferences would not. 
First, we ipsatized the decision comfort index ( = .65) within each country to minimize cultural 
differences in response style (Batra, Zhang, Aydinoğlu, & Feinberg, 2017; Baumgartner & 
Steenkamp, 2001; Lalwani, Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006). We regressed the decision comfort index 
on the attitude accessibility z-score, country, and their interaction. The analysis revealed a main 
effect of attitude accessibility ( = .22, se = .09, p = .016) that was qualified by the anticipated 
accessibility  country interaction ( = -.49, se = .13, p < .001; See Figure 2.1). For Americans, 
attitude accessibility was associated with greater decision comfort (b = .22, se = .09, p = .016), 
supporting H1A. In contrast, for Indians, attitude accessibility was associated with lower 
decision comfort (b = -.27, se = .09, p = .003), supporting H2. The effects did not change when 
attitude extremity was included as a covariate (interaction: p < .001), suggesting that extremity is 
not an alternative explanation of the effect.  
 
Figure 2.1 Decision Comfort as a Function of Measured Accessibility and Country in Study 1 
 
 
Readiness. We predicted that Americans with more accessible soda preferences would 




























accessible soda preferences would not. Again, we ipsatized the readiness index ( = .77) within 
each country. We regressed the readiness index on the attitude accessibility z-score, country, and 
their interaction. The analysis revealed a marginal accessibility  country interaction ( = -.13, se 
= .07, p = .064). For Americans, attitude accessibility was directionally, but not significantly, 
associated with greater readiness (b = .11, se = .10, p = .276). In contrast, for Indians, attitude 
accessibility was directionally, but not significantly, associated with lower readiness (b = -.15, se 
= .10, p = .127). The interaction effect on readiness did not reach statistical significance when 
attitude extremity was included as a covariate (interaction: p = .122).  
Exploration of Carryover Effects. Prior research suggests that the effects of attitude 
accessibility to one product can carry over to related products (Descheemaeker et al., 2017). 
Significant effects of attitude accessibility in one category on felt readiness in another category 
would suggest a general tendency for accessible attitudes to affect the consideration of others’ 
views and readiness to act. We tested for this possibility by regressing participants’ decision 
comfort between candy bars on their z-scored soft drink accessibility, country, and their 
interaction. The analysis revealed an accessibility  country interaction ( = -.31, se = .13, p = 
.017). No other effects were significant (ps > .39). For Indians, attitude accessibility was 
associated with lower downstream decision comfort (b = -.23, se = .09, p = .013). In contrast, for 
Americans, attitude accessibility was not associated with downstream decision comfort (b = .08, 
se = .09, p = .39). The same regression on readiness to choose between candy bars revealed no 
significant effects (ps > .10).  
These results suggest that, for interdependents, having more accessible attitudes in one 






 Study 1 provides initial evidence that the benefit of accessible attitudes depends on 
cultural self-construal. Replicating past work (Blascovich et al., 1993; Fazio et al., 1992, 1989), 
American participants (i.e., those with a predominantly independent self-construal) indicated 
greater decision comfort when their preferences were more accessible. Building on past work, 
we find the opposite pattern for Indians (i.e., those with a predominantly interdependent self-
construal). That is, Indians indicated lower decision comfort when their preferences were more 
accessible.  
Moreover, we observed that the implications of having accessible preferences can carry 
over to a related product category for interdependents. Past work suggests that the effects of 
attitude accessibility to one product can carry over to related products (Descheemaeker et al., 
2017). However, we show that the effect may also depend on cultural self-construal. The effect 
of attitude accessibility on decision comfort between soft drinks carried over to decision comfort 
between candy bars for interdependents. This was not the case for independents. This is 
consistent with the idea that, for interdependents, having more accessible attitudes may raise a 
general concern to consider others’ views (see Appendix B.2 for a supplemental study testing the 
role of situational norms). To test this, we examine whether having more accessible attitudes 
increases interdependents’ consideration of others’ views via increased attention to others in 
Study 2. In later studies (Study 5 and Appendices B.3), we explore the possibility of carryover 
effects in related decision contexts.   
Study 2: Accessible Attitudes Decrease Felt Readiness to Act When Choosing for Others 
Study 2 tested whether having more accessible attitudes in a social decision making 




The study’s design builds upon the first study by examining the role of attitude accessibility in 
social contexts where people imagined choosing for themselves or others. First, we manipulated 
self-construal among participants in the same cultural context (i.e., the U.S.) to increase the 
confidence that the results are attributable to differences in interdependent versus independent 
self-construal. Second, and in line with prior work priming self-construal (e.g., Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996; Lee et al., 2000; Mandel, 2003), self-construal was manipulated by giving 
participants explicit instructions to think about others versus the self. Third, we sought to 
generalize our findings to another set of familiar and mundane attitude objects (salty snacks). For 
the reasons already outlined, we expected that for those whose interdependent self-construal was 
primed, having more accessible attitudes would decrease their felt readiness to act. 
Thinking about others in a social context should require little effort for interdependents 
(e.g., Riemer & Shavitt, 2011). However, interdependents with more accessible attitudes may 
feel the need to shift their attention from themselves and pay more attention to others. To shed 
light on this possibility, we tested the extent to which, for interdependents, having more 
accessible preferences increased how much they think about others (H4). Moreover, we tested 
the extent to which, for interdependents, thinking about others mediated the relationship between 
attitude accessibility and felt readiness to act (H5) 
However, the expectations for those whose independent self-construal was primed were 
less clear. For independents, having more accessible attitudes might signal greater felt readiness 
to act, as shown in prior literature (e.g., Fazio et al., 1992) and in Study 1. Yet, because Study 2 
examines the function of attitude accessibility in a context in which others’ attitudes are made 
salient, it does not parallel the conditions of past work and, thus, the effect of accessibility may 




independents’ need to justify their preferences (Hong & Chang, 2015) and, thus, decrease felt 
readiness to act. Thus, we made the conservative hypothesis that, for independents, having more 
accessible snack preferences would not increase felt readiness to act in this social context (H1B). 
In addition, having more accessible snack preferences should not affect the degree to which 
independents think about others (H3) and, thus, would not mediate the relationship between 
attitude accessibility and felt readiness to act (H5). 
Participants and Design. One hundred and eighty U.S. adults (Mage = 36.6, 47% male) 
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and participated for money. The experiment used 
a 2 (self-construal: independent vs. interdependent)  attitude accessibility (measured) between-
subjects design.  
Procedure and Measures. Using a procedure developed and validated by prior work 
(Powell & Fazio, 1984), we measured attitude accessibility by asking participants to indicate 
whether various salty snacks (e.g., sunflower seeds) were “good” or “bad.” Each trial involved 
the presentation of the name of a snack with the words “Good” and “Bad” below. Participants 
were instructed to use the “L” and “A” keys on their keyboard to select the “Good” and “Bad” 
buttons, respectively. We programmed the study to record response latencies from page onset to 
response. Before continuing with the focal snacks, we ensured participants understood the 
procedure with a series of three unrelated practice trials. Then, 11 focal snacks were presented in 
randomized order and response times were recorded.  
Next, we administered the pretested self-construal manipulation (see Appendix B.4). 
Participants in the interdependent (independent) condition were asked to think about snacks they 
would bring for the group (themselves) to enjoy at an upcoming social gathering. Afterwards, 




in Study 1 and also rated their felt discomfort on three items (defensive, uptight, and tense; see 
Appendix 2.1). Finally, participants rated the extent to which they were thinking about others 
when deciding what snacks to bring (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).  
Results  
Readiness. In this and subsequent analyses, we analyzed felt readiness with felt 
discomfort as a covariate. However, the results do not change when discomfort is removed from 
the analyses. First, to test whether the effect of having accessible attitudes toward snacks differed 
as a function of self-construal, we regressed felt readiness to act ( = .67) on participants’ 
average response latency toward all snacks ( = .60; mean-centered and reciprocally-
transformed), self-construal condition, and their interaction. The analysis revealed a main effect 
of self-construal ( = .46, se = .16, p = .004) that was qualified by the expected accessibility  
self-construal interaction ( = -6.07, se = 2.50, p = .016; see Figure 2.2). Spotlight analysis 
revealed that in the interdependent condition, participants reported a greater sense of readiness 
when their attitudes were less (vs. more) accessible (Mlow accessibility = 5.74, Mhigh accessibility = 5.15;  
= -4.80, se = 1.70, p = .005), supporting H2. In contrast, in the independent condition, attitude 
accessibility had no effect on readiness (Mhigh accessibility = 5.07, Mlow accessibility = 4.91; t < 1, ns), 
supporting H1B. The results were similar when discomfort was removed as a control variable ( 










Figure 2.2 Felt Readiness to Act as a Function of Measured Accessibility and Primed Self-
Construal in Study 2 
 
 
Thinking About Others. Our theorization suggests that for interdependents, having more 
accessible preferences can shift their attention from themselves and to thinking about others. To 
test this possibility, we regressed participants’ average response latency toward all snacks, self-
construal (dummy-coded: 0 = independent, 1 = interdependent), and their interaction on the 
thinking about others item. The analysis revealed an attitude accessibility  self-construal 
interaction ( = 9.32, se = 4.27, p = .031; see Figure 2.3) and no other significant effects (ps > 
.19). Spotlight analyses at ±1SD about the mean of attitude accessibility suggest that participants 
primed with an interdependent self-construal reported thinking more about others when their 
attitude accessibility was higher (vs. lower; Mhigh accessibility = 5.20, Mlow accessibility = 4.46;  = 5.93, 
se = 2.91, p = .043), supporting H4. In contrast, participants primed with an independent self-
construal condition did not differ in their thoughts about others as a function of attitude 




























Figure 2.3 Thinking About Others as a Function of Measured Accessibility and Primed Self-
Construal in Study 2 
 
 
Moderated-Mediation. Given that the interaction between attitude accessibility and self-
construal predicted felt readiness to act and thinking about others, we tested whether thinking 
about others mediated the effect of attitude accessibility on readiness and whether self-construal 
moderated this relation. A significant pathway from attitude accessibility to felt readiness to act 
through thinking about others would provide support to our conceptualization. That is, in the 
interdependent condition, having more accessible personal preferences may have led participants 
to think more about the congruity of their personal preferences with others’ views. As a result, 
thinking about others would mediate the effect of attitude accessibility on felt readiness to act for 
those in the interdependent, but not the independent, condition.  
We submitted the data to a moderated mediation model using Hayes (2018) PROCESS 
macro for Model 7 with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. Attitude accessibility was the independent 
variable, self-construal was the moderator, thinking about others was the mediator, felt readiness 

























interdependent condition, attitude accessibility indirectly reduced readiness through thinking 
about others ( = .668, Boot SE = .434, 95% CI: .06, 1.95). The indirect effect did not emerge for 
those in the independent condition ( = -.35, Boot SE = .33, 95% CI: -1.25, .13). The index of 
moderated-mediation was significant (index = 1.02, Boot SE = .569, 95% CI: .19, 2.66), 
supporting H5 (see Figure 2.4). These results suggest that when interdependents had more 
accessible personal attitudes were selecting a snack for their friends, their consideration of 
others’ views increased. This, in turn, reduced their felt readiness to cope with the upcoming 
situation.  
Figure 2.4 Moderated-Mediation in Study 2 
 
Discussion 
Consistent with Study 1, these results provide converging evidence that the benefit of 
accessible attitudes depends on cultural self-construal. Importantly, the current study suggests 
that when an interdependent self-construal is salient, having more accessible personal 
preferences is associated with less felt readiness to cope with the situation. Moreover, this study 
also suggests that for interdependents, having more accessible personal preferences can increase 
the consideration of others’ views. Moderated-mediation analysis further suggest that, in the 
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attitudes with felt readiness to act. In contrast, when an independent self-construal was salient, 
the accessibility of one’s personal attitude did not affect felt readiness to act. 
The results from this study extend the previous study in several ways. First, we 
manipulated salient self-construal among participants within the same cultural context (i.e., the 
U.S.), such that the results could be more confidently attributed to differences in interdependent 
versus independent self-construal. Second, we examined the role of attitude accessibility in a 
social decision making context. The findings suggest that for independents, having more 
accessible preferences does not increase felt readiness to act in social contexts. This is in contrast 
to the positive effect of more accessible preferences on felt readiness to act in isolated contexts. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that for interdependents, having more accessible preferences 
decreases felt readiness to act in isolated (Study 1) and social contexts (Study 2). Finally, we 
generalized the findings in Study 1 to another category of mundane objects (i.e., common 
snacks).  
In summary, Study 2 suggests that the accessibility of one’s personal attitude can reduce 
felt readiness to act when one has to be concerned with others’ preferences. In such an 
interdependent context, the results suggest that highly accessible personal preferences actually 
make others more salient, as one needs to consider the congruity of one’s preferences with those 
of others. This, in turn, leads interdependents to feel less ready to cope with the situation.  
Study 3: Accessible Attitudes Lower Felt Readiness to Act When Interdependents Learn 
That Friends Disagree 
The objectives of Study 3 were fourfold. First, we demonstrate that the effects revealed in 
Study 2 were not specific to choosing for others but emerge with a more standard manipulation 




snacks for others (vs. for the self) activated additional constructs beyond self-construal. 
Therefore, participants in Study 3 completed a more conventional self-construal manipulation. 
Participants read sentences containing pronouns that were either first-person singular (e.g., I, me, 
my; independent condition) or third-person plural (e.g., we, us, our; interdependent condition) 
and counted the pronouns, a standard manipulation of self-construal (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).   
Second, we used attitude rehearsal to manipulate attitude accessibility and establish the 
causal role of attitude accessibility in affecting felt readiness to act (Fazio et al., 1992, 1982; 
Powell & Fazio, 1984). That is, people reported their attitudes either six times (high 
accessibility) or once (low accessibility) before indicating their felt readiness to act. Third, we 
used less familiar and more controversial attitude objects (product policies), as controversial 
policies were the focal attitudes used in prior research (e.g., death penalty, Powell & Fazio, 1984; 
Schuette & Fazio, 1995). Policies for autonomous cars and brain implants were chosen as the 
focal and filler attitude objects based on a pretest showing that the two technologies were seen as 
equally positive, desirable, and innovative (see Appendix B.5). 
Fourth, we sought to test our reasoning in a context with specific situational norms and to 
ensure that others’ views were salient to all participants. In Study 2, thinking about others was a 
function of the interaction between attitude accessibility and the self-construal manipulation. In 
the current study, we induced norm-incongruity across all conditions by asking participants to 
imagine that the majority of their friends held an opposing view. Because instances of actual 
norm-incongruity are likely to be a source of discomfort for interdependents, we expected to 
conceptually replicate the results from Study 2 such that in the interdependent self-construal 




act (H2). Further, we expected that for participants in the independent self-construal condition, 
accessibility may not affect readiness (H1B). 
Method 
Participants and Design. One hundred and eighty-three U.S. adults (Mage = 35.9, 55% 
male) on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participated in the main experiment for money. This 
experiment used a 2 (accessibility: high vs. low)  2 (self-construal: independent vs. 
interdependent) between-subjects design.  
Procedure and Measures. The study consisted of two parts. In the first part, self-construal 
was primed using the pretested pronoun manipulation (see Appendix B.6). Next, participants 
were randomly assigned to attitude accessibility conditions modeled after prior work (Fazio et 
al., 1982; Powell & Fazio, 1984; Schuette & Fazio, 1995). Participants reported their general and 
specific attitudes five times toward one of two product policies, either for the focal object or the 
filler object. Half of the participants (high attitude accessibility) rated their opinions about 
whether an autonomous car should swerve to save its passengers or to save pedestrians when 
both were in danger (e.g., Autonomous cars that are programed to always save the pedestrians 
are, -3 = not a good idea, 3 = a good idea). The other half of participants (low attitude 
accessibility) rated their opinions about whether policy should favor the doctor or patient when 
brain implants have side effects. Attitudes were recorded on 7-point scales (negative/positive, 
very undesirable/very desirable, not innovative at all/very innovative, bad/good).  
All subjects then rated their views on the autonomous car policy using the following 
instructions:  
Consider a situation in which the passengers of an autonomous car -- a 
vehicle that can operate itself without human input -- and pedestrians' lives 





After all participants indicated their binary preference for autonomous cars, they were 
asked to imagine having a conversation with a group of friends about autonomous cars. We 
programmed the study to induce norm-incongruity by asking all participants to imagine that their 
friends in the conversation held the opposite opinion than they did. For example, participants 
who indicated that they preferred autonomous cars to save pedestrians were asked to imagine 
that their friends preferred autonomous cars to save passengers.  
All participants then completed the same felt readiness to act and felt discomfort 
measures used in Study 2. Finally, all participants indicated whether the study instructions asked 
them to imagine that their friends thought autonomous cars should save passengers or 
pedestrians (binary item) as a check on the norm-incongruity induction. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks. An accessibility  self-construal ANOVA on the transformed 
response latencies revealed the expected main effect of accessibility condition (Mhigh accessibility = 
.10, Mlow accessibility = .08; F(1, 179) = 4.62, p = .033). No other effects were significant (Fs < 1). 
To check the effectiveness of the norm-incongruity induction, we conducted a chi square 
analysis, which revealed that the majority of participants (87%) correctly remembered that the 
majority of their friends opposed their preference ((1) = 96.78, p < .001). 
Readiness. We predicted that the effect of attitude accessibility on felt readiness to act 
would depend on self-construal. As in Study 2, we analyzed felt readiness with felt discomfort as 
a covariate. However, the results do not change when discomfort is removed from the analyses. 
The results from an attitude accessibility  self-construal ANCOVA on the felt readiness to act 
index ( = .76) revealed the expected interaction (F(1, 178) = 4.66, p = .032; see Figure 2.5). In 




act for participants primed with an interdependent self-construal (Mhigh accessibility = 4.23, Mlow 
accessibility =  4.80; F(1, 178) = 5.84, p = .017). In contrast, in the independent condition, there was 
no difference in felt readiness to act between high versus low accessibility conditions (Mhigh 
accessibility = 4.64, Mlow accessibility =  4.50; F < 1, ns), supporting H1B. The results were similar, 
albeit marginally significant, when discomfort was removed as a covariate (F(1, 179) = 3.76, p = 
.054). We also examined whether participants’ binary preference for autonomous car safety 
protocol affected readiness by including it as a covariate. It was a nonsignificant factor (p = .952) 
and did not affect the significance of the focal interaction (p = .033), suggesting that felt 
readiness to act was influenced by the accessibility of participants’ preferences, not the 
preferences themselves. 
Figure 2.5 Readiness as a Function of Manipulated Attitude Accessibility and Self-Construal 
in Study 3 
 
The graph is based upon ANCOVA adjusted means controlling for discomfort at the mean. 
 
Discussion 
Consistent with our prior studies, these results further support the notion that the effects 


























drawn from Studies 1 and 2 by using manipulations of both key independent variables. We 
showed that when an interdependent self-construal was primed, manipulated attitude 
accessibility reduced felt readiness to act. Building on Study 2, Study 3 induced an incongruent 
situational norm across all conditions and revealed that this salient norm-incongruity reduced felt 
readiness for interdependents, but not independents.  
For interdependents, we have shown that having more accessible attitudes increases 
interdependents’ attention to others (Study 2). In the next study, we shed additional light on how 
shifting an interdependent’s attention from the self to others is effortful. Further, we explore 
whether the increased consideration of others’ views brought on by more accessible preferences 
in one task can increase the tendency to use a decision making strategy that prioritizes more 
justifiable, utilitarian choices in a subsequent task (Hong & Chang, 2015).  
Study 4: Accessible Attitudes Increase Consideration of Others’ Views for Interdependents 
 The primary objective of Study 4 was to show that having accessible attitudes can 
increase the consideration of others’ views among interdependents. We have argued that 
interdependents with more accessible preferences also feel a greater need to consider others’ 
views. In this study, consideration of others’ views was captured by measuring the time 
participants spent writing a recommendation for their preferred restaurant. This reasoning is 
consistent with prior research suggesting that the time spent performing a task indicated more 
difficulty making the decision (Fazio et al., 1992; Huber & Seiser, 2001) and more effortful 
processing (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). For example, participants who were told that they would be 
held accountable for their views (vs. not), thus manipulating the need to justify, used more 
effortful processing to form impressions of others (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). Similarly, participants 




not), spent over twice the amount of time making their decision and gave more reasons 
supporting their decision in verbal thought protocols (Huber & Seiser, 2001). We suggest that 
accessibility could decrease consideration of others’ views when an independent self-construal is 
salient, but that accessibility increases consideration of others’ views when an interdependent 
self-construal is salient because interdependents (vs. independents) feel a greater need to shift 
their attention from their accessible preference to others’ needs.  
 The study was designed to make participants’ preferences more salient, prime 
interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal, and instruct participants to recommend their 
preference to an imagined client. Thus, participants with a salient interdependent (vs. 
independent) self-construal would be recommending a preference that had been made more 
accessible. We tacitly measured participants’ consideration of others’ views by recording their 
task latency while writing the recommendation as well as the character length of the 
recommendation.  
 Moreover, prior work (Descheemaeker et al., 2017) suggests that the effects of having 
more accessible preferences may carry over into subsequent decisions, and our studies (i.e., 
Study 1 and Appendix B.3) suggest that this may be true for interdependents, but not 
independents. Therefore, we again explored whether attitude accessibility and self-construal 
influenced subsequent decision making. Specifically, we examined whether interdependents with 
more accessible preferences would show a greater tendency to choose options that dominated on 
utilitarian attributes (e.g., performance) compared to options that dominated on hedonic 
attributes (e.g., appearance) or popularity. Prior research suggests that interdependents’ (vs. 
independents) relative propensity to feel the need to justify their decisions to others manifests in 




attributes (Hong & Chang, 2015). We explore whether having more accessible preferences 
increases interdependents’ consideration of others’ views and increases the tendency to use a 
decision making strategy that prioritizes more justifiable, utilitarian attributes.  
Method 
 Participants and Design. 326 adults (Mage = 37, 103 women) recruited from MTurk 
participated in the study for money. The study used a 2 (attitude accessibility: high vs. low)  2 
(self-construal: interdependent vs. independent) between-subjects design. Seven participants did 
not follow the instructions and were removed from the analyses, leaving a usable sample of 319 
participants. 
 Procedure and Measures. The study consisted of three parts. First, participants read that 
we were interested in their personal opinions about some restaurants. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to rehearse preferences about two lunch restaurants (high accessibility) or two 
coffee shops (low accessibility). Those in the high accessibility condition rated Chipotle 
Mexican Grill and Qdoba Mexican Eats on three, seven-point semantic differential scales each 
(bad/good, dislike/like, disapprove/approve). Then, they rated their relative preference between 
Chipotle and Qdoba (1 = definitely prefer Chipotle, 7 = definitely prefer Qdoba) and between 
Starbucks and Dunkin (1 = definitely prefer Starbucks, 7 = definitely prefer Dunkin). 
Participants in the low accessibility condition rated Starbucks and Dunkin on the same three 
semantic differential scales, rated their relative preference between the two coffee shops, and 
rated their relative preference between the two restaurants. We collected the response latency on 
the relative preference between restaurants because it was the focal preference. 
 Second, participants completed an ostensible verbal processing test to verify their 




validated prime (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). All participants were asked to read a story about a 
visit to the city and were instructed to count the pronouns in the study. The stories were identical 
except that the story in the independent condition used first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, me, 
my) and the story in the interdependent condition use third-person plural pronouns (e.g., us, our). 
We validated this manipulation in a pretest (Appendix B.6). 
 Third, participants were told that the next part of the study was meant to examine 
imagination and visualization techniques. On the next page, participants were asked to imagine 
that they were a part of a travel management organization and that a client group emailed a 
request for a lunch recommendation. The email is below. 
Hi there- 
Thanks again for all of your hard work with my visit! I 
really appreciate it and are looking forward to exploring the 
city after my meeting. One question remains in my group: 
where should I go for lunch? 





 On the next page, participants were asked to write an email response to Kevin 
recommending Qdoba/Chipotle. The study was programmed to display the restaurant that the 
participant preferred in the relative preference task. Thus, all participants were asked to 
recommend their preference. Response time and recommendation length were captured on this 
page to capture participants’ consideration of others’ views. We also examined third-person 
pronoun use in the recommendations as an additional measure of the degree to which participants 
were thinking about others as they wrote their recommendations (Pennebaker, 2011; E. C. Wu et 
al., 2019). 
 After writing the email, participants read about the second part of the imagination study, 




would see three options of shoes, sports cars, and restaurants and that they should imagine 
themselves in the market for these goods. The choice sets were designed so that one option 
dominated on a more justifiable utilitarian attribute (e.g., performance), whereas the other 
options dominated on more hedonic (e.g., appearance) or normative attributes (e.g., popularity). 
A pretest confirmed that participants thought that choosing the utilitarian options would be more 
justifiable than choosing either the hedonic or the normative options in each set (see Appendix 
B.3).  
In the main study, participants were asked to choose the one option in each set that they 
would be most likely to purchase. We collected their response latencies on each page to capture 
another tacit measure of their consideration of others’ views. To assess whether participants felt 
coerced during the email task, we asked participants to report their levels of reactance to the 
email task (i.e., “How much did you consider the decision to be interfering, intrusive, forced 
upon you, unwelcomed” 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely;  = .94) (Hong & Faedda, 1996). Finally, 
participants provided demographic information, read a debriefing statement, and received 
payment. 
Results 
 Manipulation Check. Following prior work (Fazio et al., 1989), attitude accessibility was 
computed as 1/(1+x) where x was the response latency on the relative preference between 
Chipotle and Qdoba. Higher values on this transformed value indicate faster response latency. 
Note that because there were not several attitude objects as in Studies 1 and 2, there was no need 
to compute a relative attitude accessibility score. As expected, an independent samples t-test on 
the transformed preference latency revealed that the manipulation was successful (Mmore accessible 




was computed by taking the absolute value of the relative preference value minus the scale 
midpoint (4). Extremity was not correlated with the raw (r = -.037, p = .512) or the transformed 
(r = .032, p = .575) response latencies. 
Email Task Latency. Time spent writing the email was the indicator of participants’ 
consideration of others’ views. We performed the same linear transformation on participants’ 
task latency as their preference latency (i.e., 1/[1+x]) and analyzed this value with an 
accessibility  self-construal ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 315) 
= 7.71, p = .006) and no other effects (Fs < 1). Follow-up analyses revealed patterns consistent 
with our theory (see Figure 2.6). Independents indicated significantly quicker latencies when 
they had more accessible preferences (Mmore accessible preferences = .023, Mless accessible preferences = .017; 
F(1, 315) = 4.11, p = .044), consistent with past research (Fazio et al., 1992). In contrast, 
interdependents with more accessible preferences indicated marginally slower latencies (Mmore 
accessible preferences = .017, Mless accessible preferences = .023; F(1, 315) = 3.62, p = .058), consistent with 
H4. These findings suggest that interdependents with more accessible preferences were more 
likely to consider others’ views in the email recommendation, whereas independents with more 
accessible preferences were less likely to consider others’ views. Attitude extremity was not a 
significant covariate (p = .848) and the effects were unchanged when extremity was included in 
the model, suggesting that the effects were driven by the accessibility of participants’ 








Figure 2.6 Email Task Latency as a Function of Measured Attitude Accessibility and 
Manipulated Self-Construal in Study 4 
 
 
Email Length. To check the robustness of the effect on email task latency, we also 
checked whether interdependents wrote longer recommendation emails as a function of attitude 
accessibility. In prior work, participants who were told they would need to write a letter 
justifying a hiring decision to an authority (vs. not), spent more time writing and wrote more 
(Huber & Seiser, 2001). Email length is, thus, another indicator of the consideration of others’ 
views. An ANOVA on the number of characters used in the email recommendation yielded a 
significant main effect of accessibility (F(1, 315) = 4.56, p = .033) and a marginal effect self-
construal (F(1, 315) = 3.68, p = .056) that were qualified by a significant accessibility  self-
construal interaction (F(1, 315) = 3.95, p = .048; see Figure 2.7). Follow-up analyses revealed 
that interdependents with more accessible preferences wrote longer emails (Mmore accessible preferences 
= 175.5 characters, Mless accessible preferences = 128.3 words; F(1, 315) = 8.17, p = .005). In contrast, 
independents’ email length was unaffected by accessibility condition (Ms = 174.7 vs. 173; F < 1, 
ns). Attitude extremity was not a significant covariate (p = .249) and the effects did not change 






























































Figure 2.7 Email Length as a Function of Measured Attitude Accessibility and Manipulated 
Self-Construal in Study 4 
 
 
Third-Person Pronoun Use. To further assess the degree to which participants considered 
others’ views when they recommended their preferred restaurant, we analyzed participants’ use 
of 3rd-person pronouns in their recommendations (Pennebaker, 2011; Wu et al., 2019). Two 
independent coders counted the number of 3rd person pronouns (e.g., they) in each 
recommendation. There was high agreement between coders (r = .96, p < .001) and any 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. An ANOVA revealed an accessibility by self-
construal interaction (F(1, 315) = 5.56, p = .019) and no other significant effects (ps > .14). 
Follow-up analyses revealed that interdependents included more 3rd-person pronouns when their 
preferences were made more accessible (Mmore accessible = .51, Mless accessible = .27; F(1, 315) = 7.01, 
p = .009). For independents, 3rd-person pronoun use was not affected by accessibility (Ms = .22 
vs. .34; F < 1, ns).  
Reactance. To rule out the potential influence of reactance, we conducted an accessibility 
 self-construal ANOVA on the reactance index ( = .94). The analysis yielded no significant 
effects (all ps > .13). Further, the accessibility  self-construal interactions on email task latency 




























entered as a covariate. This suggests that the effects on participants’ consideration of others’ 
views were not driven by feelings that making the recommendation was forced on them. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Downstream Decision Making. We have shown that having more accessible attitudes 
increases interdependents’ attention to others and the time spent writing recommendations based 
on their preferences. Next, we explored whether having more accessible attitudes also affected 
participants’ tendency to use a subsequent decision making strategy that prioritized more 
justifiable, utilitarian attributes. First, on the task of choosing between sets of shoes, cars, and 
restaurants, we coded each of the decisions as 1 if they chose the option that dominated on the 
utilitarian attribute and 0 if they chose one of the other options. The decision-making tendencies 
for the three goods were correlated (rshoes-cars = .21, rshoes-restaurant = .18, rcars-restaurant = .24, all ps < 
.01). Therefore, we summed them (min = 0, max = 3) to reflect a justifiable decision making 
tendency. We analyzed the summed index with the same two-way ANOVA as described above. 
The analysis revealed a marginal accessibility  self-construal interaction (F(1, 315) = 3.85, p = 
.051). 
 Follow-up analyses suggest that having accessible preferences influenced 
interdependents’, but not independents’, subsequent decision making (see Figure 2.8). For 
participants primed with an interdependent self-construal, having more accessible preferences 
increased justifiable decision making (Mmore accessible preferences = 2.03, Mless accessible preferences = 1.67; 
F(1, 315) = 4.65, p = .032). In contrast, participants primed with independent self-construal did 
not show a difference in justifiable decision making tendency across attitude accessibility 




covariate (p = .176) and the effects did not change substantially when extremity was included in 
the model (interaction: p = .042).  
Figure 2.8 Downstream Decision Making a Function of Measured Attitude Accessibility and 
Manipulated Self-Construal in Study 4 
 
 
Downstream Decision Making Latency. We also captured participants’ time spent making 
the decisions. A significant interaction on this measure would suggest that interdependents, but 
not independents, with more accessible preferences spent more considering others’ views for 
each decision. The ANOVA on the transformed (1/[1+x]) sum of decision making latencies 
yielded a marginal effect of attitude accessibility (F(1, 315) = 2.76, p = .097) that was qualified 
by a marginal attitude accessibility by self-construal interaction (F(1, 315) = 3.33, p = .069). 
Follow-up analyses revealed patterns that were also consistent with our theory (see Figure 2.9). 
Interdependents with more accessible preferences indicated slower decision making latencies 

























































independents did not show a difference in decision making latency across attitude accessibility 
conditions (Ms = .033 vs .040; F < 1, ns). As before, attitude extremity was not a significant 
covariate (p = .412) and the effects were not substantially changed when extremity was included 
in the model (interaction: p = .078). 
Figure 2.9 Downstream Decision Making Latency a Function of Measured Attitude 
Accessibility and Manipulated Self-Construal in Study 4 
 
  
 Moderated Serial Mediation. According to our theory, more accessible preferences 
should induce greater consideration of others’ views when an interdependent self-construal is 
salient. The interactive effect on email task latency could also spill over into interdependents’ 
consideration of others’ views in subsequent tasks (Descheemaeker et al., 2017). If this were the 
case, then the accessibility  self-construal interaction on email task latency should also increase 
decision decision making latency in the subsequent choice sets. Furthermore, the increase in 
consideration of other others’ views should manifest in more justifiable decision making 
tendency among interdependents. To test this conceptual model, we conducted a moderated 











































in Hayes (2018). In the model estimated by this analysis, attitude accessibility condition (low = 
0, high = 1) was the manipulated independent variable, recommendation latency was the first 
mediator, decision making latency was the second mediator, justifiable decision making was the 
dependent variable, and self-construal (independent = 0, interdependent = 1) was the 
manipulated moderating variable. The analysis revealed the following results (see Figure 2.10). 
Figure 2.10 Moderated Serial Mediation Analysis in Study 4 
 
 
 As noted earlier, there was a significant accessibility condition by self-construal 
interaction on recommendation latency ( = -.011, se = .004, p = .006). For independents, more 
accessible preferences led to faster recommendation latency ( = .006, t = 2.03, p = .044). For 
interdependents, more accessible preferences led to marginally slower recommendation latency 
( = -.006, t = -1.90, p = .058). Next, recommendation latency had a significant positive 
influence on decision making latency ( = 1.01, t = 10.98, p < .001).  Decision making latency 
had a significant negative influence on justifiable decision making ( = -6.39, t = -3.41, p = 
.001). In other words, slower decision making latencies predicted the tendency to select options 
that dominate on easier-to-justify utilitarian attributes. 
 Third, and importantly, the index of moderated mediation for the serial indirect effect 




= .161), indicating that the interactive effect of accessibility and self-construal on justifiable 
decision making was serially mediated by recommendation latency and decision making latency. 
Namely, the accessibility → recommendation latency → decision making latency → justifiable 
decision making pathway was significant and positive when an interdependent self-construal was 
salient ( = .036, Boot SE = .023, LL = .006, UL = .093), but was insignificant when an 
independent self-construal was salient ( = -.037, Boot SE = .024, LL = -.093, UL = .003). The 
results were similar when the number of 3rd-person pronouns was included as a serial mediator 
before recommendation latency (index of moderated serial mediation: .0012, Boot SE = .0036, 
LL = .0000, UL = .0132). Together, these results confirm the moderated serial mediation and 
suggest that for interdependents, having more accessible attitudes can activate a general concern 
for the views of others, which can carry over into subsequent decisions. 
Discussion 
 Study 4 shows that the consideration of others’ views can mediate the relationship 
between attitude accessibility and decision making. For interdependents, having more accessible 
preferences increased the time spent and characters written in a word-of-mouth recommendation 
of one’s preference. Exploratory analyses suggest that, for interdependents, the additional time 
spent in the recommendation task spilled over into subsequent decision making scenarios and 
increased their justifiable decision making. Namely, interdependents spent more time choosing 
between alternatives and eventually settled on more justifiable options that dominated on 
utilitarian attributes (e.g., performance) instead of options that dominated on hedonic (e.g., 
appearance) or normative (e.g., popularity) attributes. In contrast and consistent with past work 
(Fazio et al., 1992), for independents, more accessible preferences decreased the time spent and 




independents, the slower recommendation latencies did not spill over into subsequent decision 
making. The moderated serial mediation analysis revealed that, for interdependents, the 
interactive effect of self-construal and attitude accessibility influenced recommendation latency 
and, in turn, decision making latency and increased justifiable decision making in downstream 
decisions.  
Study 5: Accessible Attitudes Increase Choice Deferral for Interdependents 
Thus far, we have shown that having accessible attitudes can reduce interdependents’ felt 
readiness to cope with decision demands in social contexts. In addition, the results suggest that, 
for interdependents, more accessible attitudes increased the consideration of others’ views, and 
the consideration of others’ views mediated the relationship between attitude accessibility and 
readiness to act. Increased consideration of others’ views was reflected in their increased 
attention to others (Study 2) and increased time spent on a word-of-mouth recommendation of 
one’s preference (Study 4). Further, in Study 4, the increased consideration of others’ views on 
the recommendation task influenced the decision making latency on subsequent decision making 
tasks and increased interdependents’ tendency to choose justifiable, utilitarian options.  
Our goal in Study 5 was to take these findings a step further by demonstrating that, for 
independents, having more accessible attitudes can lead to choice deferral. Choice deferral is the 
putting off of a choice until a later date. Past research has attributed choice deferral to decisional 
conflict or uncertainty (Bettman et al., 1998; Dhar, 1996, 1997; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Tversky 
& Shafir, 1992). Thus, we expected that, if more accessible attitudes make interdependents feel 
less confident and less ready to act, then interdependents with more accessible attitudes should 




self-construal using another validated method (Mandel, 2003) and used a different attitude object 
(i.e., virtual assistant data policy). 
Method 
Participants and Design. One hundred and sixty-six undergraduates at an American 
university (Mage = 20.5, 57% male) completed the study for class participation credit. The study 
used a 2 (attitude accessibility: high vs. low)  2 (self-construal: interdependent vs. independent) 
between-subjects design. 
Procedure and Measures. To begin, participants were randomly assigned to pretested 
conditions designed to prime self-construal (see Appendix B.7). Following Mandel (2003), 
participants in the independent condition were asked to recall something nice that they purchased 
for themselves and describe how they personally benefitted from it. Participants in the 
interdependent condition were asked to recall something nice they purchased for a friend or 
family member and describe how the recipient benefitted from it. All participants then explained 
how they personally felt about buying the gift for themselves or for others.  
Following the self-construal prime, the main study design was similar to Study 3 but used 
different product policies. Participants reported general and specific attitudes five times to one of 
two policies. Half of the participants repeatedly expressed their personal attitudes toward the 
focal policy: whether personally sensitive data collected from a voice assistant (e.g., Amazon 
Alexa) should be shared with authorities. The other half of participants repeatedly expressed 
their personal attitudes toward the filler policy: whether an investment portfolio should have a 
large proportion of cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin). Attitudes were recorded on a set of 7-point 
scales (negative/positive, very undesirable/very desirable, not innovative at all/very innovative, 




All subjects then indicated who they thought should have access to the personal data 
collected from a voice assistant (0 = only the user, 1 = both the user and the appropriate 
authorities). Thus, subjects in the low attitude accessibility expressed their attitudes toward the 
focal voice assistant data policy once. In contrast, participants in the high accessibility condition 
expressed their attitudes a total of six times. The response latency on this last item served as the 
attitude accessibility manipulation check.  
Next, participants were asked to imagine the same casual get-together scenario with a 
close group of friends as in Study 3. As in Study 3, we programmed the study to induce norm-
incongruity by asking all participants to imagine that people in the conversation held the opposite 
opinion as they did. For example, if a participant felt that only the user should have access to the 
voice assistant data, then they read that most people in the group believed that both the user and 
the appropriate authorities should have access.  
On the next page, participants were asked to imagine a choice scenario that was adapted 
from prior work on choice deferral (Dhar, 1996; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999). They read that during 
the conversation with their friends, someone showed them three voice assistants from a local 
electronics store. They were told that the store had three brands of voice assistants on sale and 
that the sale ended that day. The alternatives were described by a list of their characteristic 
features taken from various online retailers. The pretested set was constructed such that each 
alternative was best on one dimension out of three, but identical on the remaining attributes (see 
Appendix B.9).  
Results 
Manipulation Check. An accessibility  self-construal ANOVA on the transformed 




accessibility = .10; F(1, 162) = 27.2, p < .001), suggesting that the attitude accessibility manipulation 
was successful. No other effects were significant (Fs < 1).  
Choice Deferral. We predicted an attitude accessibility  self-construal interaction on 
choice deferral such that the effect of attitude accessibility on choice deferral would depend on 
self-construal. To assess the effects of attitude accessibility and self-construal on choice deferral, 
we conducted a binary logistic regression, regressing choice deferral (0 = made choice, 1 = 
deferred choice) onto attitude accessibility condition (-1 = low, 1 = high), self-construal prime (-
1 = independent, 1 = interdependent), and their interaction. As predicted, the interaction was 
significant ( = .51, se = .23, p = .026; see Figure 2.11). Follow-up analyses showed that for 
participants primed with an interdependent self-construal, attitude accessibility marginally 
increased choice deferral (probabilitylow accessibility = 9.1%, probabilityhigh accessibility = 23.1%;  = 
.55, se = .32, p = .090). That is, interdependent participants were somewhat less likely to make a 
choice when their attitude accessibility was high versus low. This effect was not observed in the 
independent condition. Instead, for participants primed with an independent self-construal, 
having more accessible attitudes directionally increased the likelihood of choosing; that is, it 
decreased the likelihood of choice deferral, albeit not significantly (probabilitylow accessibility = 
20.5%, probabilityhigh accessibility = 9.1%;  = -.47, se = .33, p = .149). We also examined whether 
participants’ binary preference for voice assistant data sharing affected choice deferral by 
including it as a covariate. It was a nonsignificant factor (p = .42) and did not affect the 





Figure 2.11 Choice Deferral as a Function of Manipulated Attitude Accessibility and Self-




 Study 5 lent additional evidence that accessible attitudes can affect decision making 
differently across interdependent and independent self-construal. When an interdependent self-
construal was primed, attitude accessibility led to more choice deferral. That is, more accessible 
attitudes were somewhat less likely to be used for making. This was not the case for people with 
a salient independent self-construal. Building on Study 3, this study induced an incongruent 
situational norm across all conditions and revealed that salient norm-incongruity reduced the felt 
readiness to act in a decision context for interdependents, but not for independents. When an 
interdependent self-construal was primed, having more accessible preferences in a context where 
others disagreed increased choice deferral. Next, we examine another downstream consequence 
of our theorization. Specifically, we test the extent to which interdependents with more 




































Study 6: Accessible Attitudes Reduce Word of Mouth for Interdependents 
The objective of Study 6 was to identify a theoretically relevant boundary condition to 
the previous effects. We have suggested that interdependents with more accessible attitudes feel 
less ready to act because they are unsure whether their preferences consider others’ views. If this 
is the case, then reducing the relevance of the situational norms should alleviate their concerns 
and increase their readiness to act. Moderation by norm relevance would help to reconcile the 
current research with prior work that has shown positive effects of attitude accessibility on felt 
readiness to act (Fazio et al., 1989; Fazio & Williams, 1986). Specifically, we aimed to 
demonstrate that having more accessible attitudes in contexts where there is low (vs. high) norm 
relevance can increase the felt readiness to provide a word of mouth (WOM) recommendation. 
Consistent with prior work (Fazio et al., 1992, 1989; Fazio & Williams, 1986), we examined 
participants’ attitude–behavior correspondence. That is, we observed the likelihood that 
participants with more accessible preferences would use their preference to make a WOM 
recommendation. 
Prior research suggests that the accessibility of a product in memory motivates WOM 
about that product (Berger & Schwartz, 2011). However, if interdependents with more accessible 
attitudes feel a lower readiness to act, as we have shown, then they should also be less likely to 
include a preferred option in their recommendation when their preference is more accessible. 
Further, this effect should only be true when there is high norm relevance. In contrast, when 
there is low norm relevance, interdependents should be more likely include a preferred option in 
their recommendation when their preference is more accessible.  
Therefore, we designed this study so that people whose attitude accessibility and 




their accessible preferences. We manipulated norm relevance by asking participants to 
recommend to a group of vegetarian visitors either a lunch option (high norm relevance) or a 
dessert option (low norm relevance). When norm relevance was high, we predicted that 
interdependents with more accessible preferences would be less likely to include their preferred 
option in a WOM recommendation, which would suggest that accessibility makes 
interdependents less likely to act on their attitudes, consistent with the findings of Studies 1 and 
5. In contrast, when norm relevance was low, we predicted that interdependents with more 
accessible preferences would be more likely to include their preferred option in a WOM 
recommendation. This would suggest that, consistent with prior research (e.g., Fazio et al., 
1992), accessibility could make interdependents more likely to act on their attitudes. Thus, this 
study tests the robustness of our effects using actual behavior and seeks process evidence using a 
moderation-of-process approach (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).   
Method 
Participants and Design. One hundred and seventy undergraduates (Mage = 20.6, 68 
males) completed the study for class participation credit. The study used a (accessible attitudes: 
lunch vs. dessert options)  2 (norm relevance: high [lunch recommendation] vs. low [dessert 
recommendation]) between-subjects design. As our focus was on the role of norm relevance, we 
activated an interdependent self-construal for all participants.  
Procedure and Measures. Participants were told that we were conducting market research 
for local restaurants as a cover story. Next, participants were assigned to conditions designed to 
make their personal preferences for either on-campus lunch or dessert options more accessible. 
Those in the lunch condition rated two local restaurants on three 7-point semantic differential 




preference for one over the other (1 = definitely restaurant A, 7 = definitely restaurant B). A 
pretest confirmed that participants were familiar with each restaurant and thought there were 
many vegetarian options at both, suggesting that either would be an appropriate and likely 
recommendation to a vegetarian (see Appendix B.11). In contrast, those in the dessert condition 
rated two local dessert (ice cream) locations three times and then indicated their relative 
preference between them on the same scales.  
Next, an interdependent self-construal was induced for all participants using the 3rd person 
plural pronoun task from prior studies (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Then, we asked participants to 
imagine that they were a part of a student consulting organization on campus and that one of 
their client groups were coming to campus for a meeting. As a part of their visit, the client group 
emailed the participant requesting a food recommendation. The email request manipulated norm 
relevance. Participants in the high norm relevance condition read that the client group was 
vegetarian and requested a lunch recommendation. We expected that this would make attitudes 
toward lunch restaurants relevant to the situational norm because lunch offerings may or may not 
fit in with a vegetarian diet. In contrast, those in the low norm relevance condition read that the 
client group was vegetarian and requested a dessert recommendation. We expected that attitudes 
toward dessert restaurants would not pose a threat to fitting into the situational norm because 
desserts are usually vegetarian (see Appendix B.12 for a summary of the conditions and 
predictions in this study). 
Participants wrote their email reply on the next screen. The instructions permitted them to 
either make a recommendation or refer the client to another member of their team. Afterwards, 
participants rated how salient were the norms in the situation (“There were strong norms within 




norms were of high relevance to their decision making (“The client group’s dietary concerns 
were relevant when writing your email reply,” 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Finally, we took several demographic measures including participants’ personal dietary 
concerns.  
Results 
Manipulation Check. First, to ensure that norms were equally salient across conditions, 
we conducted an accessibility  norm relevance ANOVA on the norm salience item. The 
analysis yielded no significant effects (Fs < 1, ns), suggesting that norms were equally salient 
across conditions. Furthermore, the grand mean of norm salience was above the midpoint (M = 
4.66, t(167) = 7.61, p < .001).  
Next, we confirmed that, although norms were equally salient across conditions, norms 
were more relevant in the lunch recommendation condition. An accessibility  norm concerns 
ANOVA on the norm relevance item revealed the expected main effect of norm condition (Mhigh 
concern = 5.7, Mlow concern = 4.9; F(1, 164) = 12.52, p = .001).  
Preference–Recommendation Correspondence. We expected that more accessible 
preferences would be more likely to yield a word of mouth recommendation when norm 
relevance was low (vs. high). We dummy-coded participants’ email responses to represent 
whether it included one of the target restaurants (1 = included one of the target restaurants, 0 = 
did not include). Target restaurants varied by norm condition. In the low norm relevance 
condition, we were interested in whether participants mentioned two focal dessert places. In the 
high norm relevance condition, we were interested in whether participants mentioned two focal 
lunch places. Thus, participants who had rehearsed lunch (dessert) preferences and 




baseline frequency for word of mouth. A binary logistic regression revealed main effects of the 
accessibility ( = -1.5, Wald  (1) = 9.1, p = .003) and norm relevance ( = -2.1, Wald (1) = 
13.4, p < .001) conditions that, as expected, were qualified by a significant accessibility  norm 
relevance interaction on whether participants spontaneously recommended a focal restaurant (= 
2.42, Wald (1) = 10.07, p = .002; see Figure 2.12).  
Figure 2.12 Recommendation as a Function of Attitude Accessibility and Norm Relevance in 
Study 6 
 
Note: Recommendation as a function of attitude accessibility and norm relevance in Study 6. Dessert locations 
were the target restaurants in the low norm relevance condition. Lunch locations were the target restaurants in the 
high norm relevance condition. 
 
Follow-up analyses further supported our theorizing. When the clients requested a dessert 
recommendation (i.e., low norm relevance), having more accessible dessert preferences 
increased the use of their preference to make the recommendation. Participants were more likely 
to recommend one of the focal places when their preferences had been made more accessible 
(Pmore accessible = 54% vs. Pless accessible = 21%, p = .003). In contrast, when the clients requested a 
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decreased the use of their preference to make the recommendation. That is, there was no 
significant difference in the likelihood of recommending a focal lunch place when their 
preferences had been made more accessible (Pmore accessible = 28% vs. Pless accessible = 13%, p = 
.111). It is important to note that, when participants recommended one of the focal restaurants in 
either condition, their recommendation corresponded with their preference in the earlier task. Put 
another way, participants with more accessible personal preferences were more likely to use their 
preference to recommend one of the focal restaurants when norm relevance was low (Pdessert = 
54%) rather than high (Plunch = 28%, p = .011). Participants with less accessible preferences were 
equally likely to use their preference recommend one of the focal restaurants (Pdessert = 21% vs. 
Plunch = 13%, p = .356). 
Discussion 
Study 6 provided further support that accessible attitudes can reduce interdependents’ felt 
readiness to act using actual word of mouth recommendation behavior. People were more likely 
to recommend a restaurant based on an accessible preference when their audience’s dietary 
concerns were less relevant in their decision making (i.e., low norm relevance). People were less 
likely to do so when the audience’s dietary concerns were relevant in their decision making (i.e., 
high norm relevance). These results also provided moderation-of-process evidence that the need 
to consider others’ views influenced the readiness to act on accessible personal preferences. This 
study built on Studies 3 and 5 by manipulating the relevance of the situational norm to reveal 
that more accessible personal preferences corresponded with word-of-mouth behavior when the 
situational norm had low relevance. When the situational norm had high relevance, more 
accessible personal preferences were less likely to correspond with a word of mouth 





The reported studies converge on the idea that accessible attitudes serve different roles in 
decision making for people with different cultural self-construals. For participants whose 
interdependent self-construals were chronically salient or situationally activated, the more 
accessible their preferences were, the less they felt ready to act (Studies 1, 2, and 3), the less they 
recommended their preference (Study 6), and the more they deferred choice (Study 5). For 
interdependents, relative to independents, accessible attitudes appeared to increase the 
consideration of others’ views via increasing their attention to others (Study 2) and spending 
more time on a recommendation to others (Study 4). For interdependents, this increased 
consideration of others’ views mediated the relationship between attitude accessibility and 
readiness to act. Moreover, this process was moderated when the situation had low norm 
relevance (Study 6). The same effects were not observed for those with a salient independent 
self-construal.  
Our research makes contributions in several areas. First, we are the first to address the 
function of attitude accessibility in cross-cultural contexts. In independent cultural contexts, 
accessible attitudes are functional because they reduce the effort to decide (Blascovich et al., 
1993; Fazio et al., 1992, 1989; Fazio & Powell, 1997; Fazio & Williams, 1986; Katz, 1960; 
Smith et al., 1956). Our research suggests that, in interdependent cultural contexts, accessible 
preferences may not increase the readiness to act when accessibility also increases the 
consideration of others’ views. In situations where it is less necessary to consider others’ views, 
such as when attitudes were less likely to interfere with situational norms, accessible attitudes 




A second contribution of our research pertains to the costs of accessible attitudes. 
Research has suggested that having accessible attitudes can impair one’s ability to notice that the 
attitude object has changed (Fazio et al., 2000). Fazio and his colleagues concluded that the 
functional value of accessible attitudes depends “on whether the attitude object remains stable 
over time” (p. 209). Thus, accessible attitudes can leave the attitude holder fairly closed-minded 
and inflexible (Cooper & Aronson, 1992; DeBono, Green, Shair, & Benson, 1995; Schuette & 
Fazio, 1995). Consistent with this, we suggest that accessible attitudes may also make 
interdependents feel inflexible in social settings where the attitude may conflict with situational 
norms. In these contexts, we found that accessible attitudes can reduce felt readiness to cope with 
decision demands (Study 6).  
More generally, the reported findings are consistent with recent research emphasizing the 
need expand the focus of attitude theory from a “primary focus on the individual to the 
individual-responding-to-a-specific environment” (Riemer et al., 2014, p. 640). We advance that 
theorizing by demonstrating that attitude accessibility can function differently than previously 
understood in contexts where interdependent self-construals are salient. For example, we showed 
that accessible attitudes do not always function to drive attitude-consistent behavior (Study 6). 
Indeed, sometimes accessible attitudes can reduce the likelihood of such actions and, instead, 
highlight the need to be accountable to others. Thus, our findings also expand the perspective 
adopted in past attitude accessibility research which emphasized the role of attitudes in serving 
personal goals (e.g., object-appraisal; Blascovich et al., 1993; Fazio, 2000; Fazio et al., 1992).  
Conclusion 
The present research highlights a novel cost of attitude accessibility. We demonstrate that 




aligned with situational norms. As a result, people with a salient interdependent self-construal 
may exert greater effort to consider others’ views and, as a result, feel less ready to act. Thus, 
this research provides a unique theoretical contribution to the attitudes and cross-cultural 
literatures by identifying distinct roles of accessible attitudes in decision making across levels of 
cultural self-construal. 
Several studies in Appendix B provide additional support of our theorization. For 
example, the study in Appendix B.13 showed that for Americans, but not Indians, the 
accessibility of autonomous car preferences was associated with greater readiness to discuss 
autonomous cars. The study in Appendix B.16 showed that for Asians and Latinos, but not 
Caucasians, the simple act of evaluating (vs. unscrambling) objects can decrease self-focus and 
increase group-focus. The studies in appendices B.2 and B.14 demonstrated that for more 
interdependent people, attitude accessibility was associated with greater readiness to act when 
the salient norm was irrelevant (vs. relevant; B.2) and when others’ preferences were known (vs. 
unknown; B.14). The studies in appendices B.15 and B.17 further demonstrated the moderating 
effect of norm relevance using willingness to pay (B.15) and preference latencies in multiple 





CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL SELF-CONSTRUAL AND ATTITUDINAL VS. 
BEHAVIORAL CONSENSUS CUES 
Batiste, a global cosmetic brand, has claimed in separate advertisements that, “96% of 
women agree” and that Batiste is the “best-selling dry shampoo.” Does the subtle difference 
between communicating others’ attitudes or behaviors have the same impact on product 
evaluation? Despite widespread use and research on consensus cues (Bearden & Etzel, 1982; 
Burnkrant & Cousineau, 1975; Hellofs & Jacobson, 1999; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; West 
& Broniarczyk, 1998), scant research has considered the effects of different consensus cue types. 
We distinguish attitudinal (81% of consumers prefer) from behavioral consensus (81% of 
consumers purchase) and propose that cultural differences in the informational value of others’ 
attitudes versus others’ behaviors produce different responses to attitudinal and behavioral 
consensus cues.  
The assumption that attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues have uniform effects on 
product evaluation has theoretical validity in Western cultural contexts, where an independent 
self-construal is typically salient. In these contexts, people often perceive behavior as a reflection 
of internal attributes such as preferences, beliefs, and values (Bem, 1972), suggesting that 
behaviors follow attitudes. Indeed, for independent people, information about others’ behaviors 
could also signal others’ revealed preferences and therefore be a more diagnostic guide to one’s 
own evaluation (White & Simpson, 2013).   
In contrast, a number of cross-cultural differences in the use and expression of attitudes 
suggests that, for people with a salient interdependent self-construal, others’ behaviors are less 
likely to follow attitudes. Compared to independents, interdependents have more experience 




1999; Miller et al., 2011) and inferring that others’ choices are driven by factors other than their 
preferences (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Morris & Peng, 1994; Savani et al., 2008, 2012). In 
addition, interdependents (vs. independents) tend to resist self-expression in their personal 
choices (Kim & Sherman, 2007) and word-of-mouth behaviors (Fong & Burton, 2008; Lai, He, 
Chou, & Zhou, 2013), suggesting that their personal opinions are more closely held. For 
interdependents, therefore, normative information about attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus 
may have more informational value because it is more confidently associated with what others 
approve compared to what others do (Jacobson et al., 2011). As a result, interdependents, but not 
independents, may evaluate products more favorably when they are shown with attitudinal (vs. 
behavioral) consensus cues.  
This research contributes to the consensus information and persuasion literature as well 
as the cross-cultural literature. We are the first to test the role of consensus cue type on product 
evaluations. We show that the assumption that all consensus information is processed in the 
same way may need to be culturally qualified. Across five studies, we show a culturally-
contingent relationship between consensus cue type and product evaluation. Further, we 
demonstrate that, for interdependents, more effortful processing of additional information after 
viewing attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus underlies product evaluations. These findings 
advance theory and practice by illustrating the importance of a cultural perspective in predicting 








CONSENSUS CUES AND PRODUCT EVALUATION 
  
Consensus cues often improve product evaluation. Many firms opt to communicate that 
an item is the “most loved” or a “best seller” because these cues can indicate pervasive consumer 
interest and validate product quality (Griskevicius, et al. 2009; Wu and Lee 2016). Past research 
outlined the boundaries of the positive effect of consensus cues on product evaluation by 
focusing on consumer factors such as the personal relevance of the product (Petty, Cacioppo, and 
Schumann 1983), consumer expectations (West and Broniarczyk 1998), product category 
knowledge (Ratneshwar and Chaiken 2002), and connectedness to others (Aaker and 
Maheswaran 1997; Griskevicius et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2012; Wu and Lee 2016). However, 
prior research has mostly focused on consensus cues that communicate information about others’ 
preferences (e.g., 80% of consumers liked their purchase; Wang, Zhu, and Shiv 2012) because 
there was little theoretical reason to expect differences as a function of type of consensus cue. In 
contrast, we suggest that consumers’ cultural self-construal can predict distinct responses to 
attitudinal versus behavioral consensus cues.  
Self-Construal and Consensus Cues 
We suggest that self-construal moderates the effect of attitudinal (vs. behavioral) 
consensus cues on product evaluation because, compared to interdependents, independents are 
more likely to infer that others’ behaviors reflect their attitudes. In independent cultures (e.g., 
U.S.), people are socialized to develop preferences that are stable across contexts, express 
preferences to establish uniqueness from others, and behave in ways that are consistent with 
personal preferences (Kim & Drolet, 2003, 2009; Kim & Sherman, 2007; Savani et al., 2008). In 




personal preferences and behave in ways that yield to group norms (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Morris & Peng, 1994; Savani et al., 2012). Therefore, in interdependent contexts, one’s 
behaviors may not reflect one’s internal preferences. Indeed, compared to more independent 
people, more interdependent people are more likely to attribute overt behaviors to situational 
factors instead of dispositional factors (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 
2000; Knowles et al., 2001; Miller, 1984).  
We first address the implications of this theorizing for responses to behavioral consensus 
cues as a function of cultural factors, before turning to comparisons of the effectiveness of 
attitudinal versus behavioral cues in each cultural context. Taken together, the literature reviewed 
above leads to the hypothesis that compared to independents, interdependents should infer less 
information about others’ preferences from a behavioral consensus cue.  
 
H1:  For interdependents (vs. independents), behavioral consensus information 
leads to weaker inferences about others’ underlying preferences  
 
The Persuasiveness of Others’ Preferences versus Behaviors 
If, to more interdependent (vs. independent) people, others’ behaviors are less likely to 
reflect preferences, then the next question is whether interdependents infer more or less 
informational value from attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues. Several pieces of evidence 
suggest that for more interdependent consumers, information about others’ preferences (vs. 
behaviors) is more persuasive. For example, seminal research showed how, compared to the 
U.S., Korean advertisements emphasized attending to others’ views (Han and Shavitt 1994; Kim 




opinions. Similarly, consumers from Hong Kong (i.e., more interdependent consumers) 
evaluated products more favorably when the products were shown with high attitudinal 
consensus (e.g., 81% of consumers were extremely satisfied; Aaker and Maheswaran 1997). 
Finally, Park (2001) found that more interdependent people indicated that it was important to 
consider others’ opinions when forming their own opinions, whereas more independent people 
did not share this belief. 
Another stream of research suggests that, for interdependents, information about others’ 
preferences (vs. behaviors) is more persuasive because they perceive others’ behaviors to be 
influenced by external factors. For instance, the causal attribution literature has shown that, 
compared to people from Western cultures (e.g., the U.S.), people from East Asian cultures (e.g., 
Japan) are more likely to attribute the cause of another’s actions to situational factors (Choi et al., 
1999; Ji et al., 2000; Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994). Relatedly, 
numerous findings suggest that more interdependent people are more likely to adjust their 
choices as opposed to their preferences across situations. For example, when people from an 
interdependent culture (i.e., India) were primed to think about workplace authority figures (vs. 
not) and shown a set of professional development course options, their choices differed between 
conditions, but their preferences did not (Savani et al., 2012, Study 3), suggesting that the 
situational norm may have influenced how Indians acted, without changing their preferences 
(Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Similarly, people primed with an interdependent self-
construal adjusted their joint consumption choices to others’ preferences, but did not adjust 
personal preferences others’ preferences (Wu, Moore, and Fitzsimons 2019). Taken together, 




information about others’ preferences may be more persuasive than information about others’ 
behaviors.  
Consistent with this reasoning, evidence suggests that, in general, consumers rate 
products better when they associate consensus with internal factors (e.g., consumers’ desires) 
compared to when they associate consensus with external factors (e.g., availability; Freling & 
Dacin, 2010). To the extent that interdependents are more likely to associate attitudinal (vs. 
behavioral) consensus cues with internal factors, attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues 
should lead to more favorable product evaluations. Existing evidence provides indirect support 
for our hypothesis. For example, in a gift giving context, when a product was shown with a 
behavioral consensus cue (i.e., best-seller), consumers who perceived high (vs. low) self–other 
overlap (i.e., interdependent vs. independent self-construal) evaluated the gift less favorably (Wu 
& Lee, 2016, Study 3). In addition, when fear, an emotion that prompts group-cohesive 
processes (Griskevicius et al., 2006), was made salient, consumers indicated higher product 
evaluations for products shown with attitudinal consensus cues (e.g., “The museum that millions 
are talking about”) compared to behavioral consensus cues (e.g., “Visited by over a Million 
People”; Griskevicius et al., 2009).  
For independents, in contrast, the effect of attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues on 
product evaluation is less clear. One stream of literature suggests that there should be no 
difference in product evaluation as a function of attitudinal versus behavioral consensus cues. 
This is because, in general, social information, such as information on social consensus, is less 
likely to be personally relevant to independents (vs. interdependents) because they are 
predominantly self-focused (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Consistent with this, research has 




consensus cues when motivation is high (vs. low; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). Therefore, all 
else equal, independents’ (vs. interdependents’) product evaluations may be less sensitive to 
consensus cue type.  
As previously mentioned, another stream of literature suggests that people in culturally 
independent (vs. interdependent) contexts are more likely to assume that behaviors follow 
attitudes (Bem, 1972), suggesting that behavioral consensus might be more reliable indicators of 
internal factors such as users’ preferences and product value (see Appendices C.4 and C.6 for 
supplementary studies supporting this point). Indeed, some evidence suggests that independents 
may be more persuaded by behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus because they perceive others’ 
actions as more indicative of others’ ‘true’ preferences and thus as more diagnostic (White & 
Simpson, 2013). The authors found that for people primed with an independent self-construal, 
descriptive (vs. injunctive) norms improved attitudes and intentions toward unfamiliar 
sustainable behaviors (e.g., composting). This suggests that it is unclear whether consensus cues 
will influence independent consumers’ product evaluations at all. However, if anything, 
behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus may be more persuasive. Taken together, we hypothesize 
that: 
 
H2:  For interdependents, but not independents, products shown with attitudinal 
(vs. behavioral) consensus cues receive higher product evaluations  
 
Self-Construal, Consensus Cues, and Information Processing 
The dual process models of persuasion, the Elaboration-Likelihood Model (ELM) and the 




evaluation in three ways (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1986). Consensus cues can 
serve as arguments, providing information pertaining to the central merits of the product. They 
can serve as peripheral cues, allowing attitude formation without diligent consideration of the 
merits of the product. Finally, consensus cues can influence the extent to which the individual is 
motivated to evaluate the central merits of the product (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Lord, 
Lee, & Sauer, 1995; Mackenzie, Lutz, & Belch, 1986; Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, & Cacioppo, 
1987). Therefore, consensus information can serve as an argument, peripheral cue, or driver of 
elaboration likelihood.  
In independent cultural contexts, social consensus information tends to serve as a 
peripheral cue because information about others is external to the self. This information is 
therefore less personally relevant and has less informational value. For example, in an 
experiment where consumers learned about a new product launch in a nearby (vs. distant) region, 
thereby manipulating high (vs. low) personal relevance, consensus cues only influenced 
American consumers’ evaluations of the product in the low personal relevance condition because 
the cues provided a shortcut that did not require processing the information carefully 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991).  
In contrast, in interdependent cultural contexts, consensus cues may influence the 
motivation to evaluate central arguments because information about others is incorporated in the 
self and is thus more personally relevant (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Riemer et al., 2014; Shavitt 
et al., 1994; Triandis, 1989). Indeed, for Hong Kong consumers, consensus cues influenced their 
product evaluations regardless of whether the new product was launched in a nearby (vs. distant) 




Similarly, to more interdependent people, norms conveying others' attitudes may attract 
more attention than norms conveying others' behaviors. Supportive evidence comes from 
research distinguishing descriptive norms (i.e., what most people do) from injunctive norms (i.e., 
what most people approve; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; 
Jacobson et al., 2011). For example, compared to people who saw that others chose to volunteer 
(descriptive norm), people who saw that others approved of volunteering (injunctive norm) were 
more likely to include others in their self-descriptions (Jacobson et al., 2011, Study 2), 
suggesting that injunctive norms engaged the interdependent self. The authors argued that 
injunctive but not descriptive norms elicit greater interpersonal focus because they are more 
likely to appeal to one’s concern about social approval.  
Taken together, we propose that for more interdependent people, attitudinal (vs. 
behavioral) consensus cues have more informational value (see Appendices C.1 and C.2 for 
supplemental studies demonstrating this). Therefore, interdependents should more diligently 
process product information shown with attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues. When 
messages are personally relevant, consumers are motivated to effortfully process additional 
information to form an overall judgment (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; 1986). Therefore, for 
interdependents, the informational value of attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues may 
motivate the evaluation of more central merits of the product (i.e., product attributes). In 
contrast, independents should be similarly motivated to evaluate product attributes, regardless of 
cue type, because attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues are both personally irrelevant. 
Ultimately, for interdependents, but not independents, the informational value of a consensus 
cue, as indexed by the tendency to process additional information, should mediate the effect of 





H3:  For interdependents, but not independents, products shown with attitudinal 
(vs. behavioral) consensus cues increase the tendency to process additional 
information 
H4:  For interdependents, but not independents, the tendency to process 
additional information mediates the relationship between consensus cue type 
and product evaluation  
 
Study 1: European Americans (vs. Asians) Spontaneously Inferred Consumers’ Attitudes 
from a Behavioral Consensus Cue 
 Our hypotheses draw from the reasoning that people with chronically salient independent 
(vs. interdependent) self-construal (e.g., Americans) are more likely to infer underlying attitudes 
from observed behavior (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Morris & Peng, 1994). In contrast, 
interdependents might expect behavioral consensus to reflect strong normative or contextual 
factors rather than shared preferences. Accordingly, H1 predicts that, for independents (vs. 
interdependents), a behavioral consensus cue prompts stronger inferences about others’ 
underlying preferences. Thus, Study 1 tests H1 by examining participants’ open-ended 
explanations of consensus in response to a common behavioral consensus cue: a best seller.  
A “best seller” is a behavioral consensus cue because it indicates that a large group of 
consumers performed the same behavior (purchase) toward a product. Many firms opt to 
communicate that an item is a “best seller” because they can indicate pervasive consumer interest 
and provide validation for product quality (Griskevicius et al., 2009; Wu & Lee, 2016). We 




consumers with distinct cultural self-construals make different inferences about a product shown 
with this common behavioral consensus cue. Following past research (Aaker & Williams, 1998; 
Escalas & Bettman, 2005; Lalwani & Shavitt, 2013; Lalwani & Wang, 2019; Torelli, 2006), we 
used participants with European American and Asian ethnicities to operationalize self-construal. 
We predicted that European Americans (vs. Asians and Asian Americans) would be more likely 
to spontaneously infer others’ attitudes when reflecting on the “Best Seller” consensus cue. 
Method 
One hundred and thirty-nine undergraduates participated in this survey for extra credit as 
part of a larger experimental session. Participants who were not European American, Asian, or 
Asian American (N = 48) were excluded, leaving 91 participants (55 females, Mage = 20). Each 
participant was asked to imagine shopping online and seeing a pair of headphones labeled “Best 
Seller.” Then, they were asked to write down all of the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about the 
headphones that came to mind. 
Results and Discussion 
Two research assistants coded the responses for spontaneous mention of other 
consumers’ preferences for the headphones. Responses that included phrases such as “people 
were satisfied,” “most people like,” or “everyone thought it was good” were coded as 1. 
Responses that did not include such a phrase (e.g., “the price is fair”) were coded as 0. 
Agreement between the two coders was high (r = .82, p < .001) and disagreements were resolved 
via a third coder. Consistent with our expectations, the proportion of preference inferences 
differed as a function of culture (see Figure 3.1). Among European American participants, 25.5% 
(13/51) spontaneously mentioned that the headphones were labeled as “Best Seller” because a 




“I feel like if a product is labeled ‘Best Seller,’ a bunch of people must like it.” In contrast, Asian 
students were less likely to infer others’ liking after seeing the behavioral consensus cue (7.5%, 
3/40; t(89) = 2.3, p = .025).  
Figure 3.1 Consumers’ Inferences of Others’ Preferences as a Function of Ethnicity 
  
 
 These results provide support for the reasoning that more independent (vs. 
interdependent) people are more likely to spontaneously infer others’ underlying preferences 
from a common behavioral consensus cue (H1). The next study examined whether, for 
interdependents, attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues lead to more favorable evaluations.  
Study 2: Indians are Willing to Pay More for Products with Attitudinal (vs. Behavioral) 
Consensus Cues 
 Study 2 was designed to provide an initial demonstration of the culturally distinct 
influences of attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues on product evaluations in a controlled 
experiment. We used cues describing consumers’ brand love (e.g., 85% of consumers loved X) 




behavioral consensus cues (e.g., 85% of consumers bought X). This operationalization 
corresponds well with past research on consensus cues (e.g., 81% of consumers were extremely 
satisfied, Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991) and contemporary 
marketing practice (Batra, Ahuvia, & Bagozzi, 2012; Matyszczyk, 2017; Rodas & Torelli, 2015). 
To control for consumers’ preexisting brand familiarity, we used a fictional tablet brand 
as the stimulus. Nationality was used to operationalize self-construal (India vs. U.S.; e.g., 
Lalwani & Shavitt, 2013) and willingness to pay was used to operationalize product evaluation. 
We predicted that, because interdependents are unlikely to infer others’ internal preferences from 
a behavioral consensus cue, Indian consumers (interdependents) would be willing to pay less for 
a product described with behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus cues. In contrast, for American 
consumers (independents), there should be little difference in willingness to pay for a product 
described with attitudinal versus behavioral consensus cues.  
Method 
 Participants and Design. One hundred and one American and 99 Indian adult participants 
were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for payment (Mage = 35, 71% male). One 
participant did not complete the study and was removed from analyses, leaving a usable sample 
of 199 participants. The study used a 2 (country: U.S. vs. India)  2 (consensus type: attitudinal 
vs. behavioral) between-subjects design. 
 Procedures and Measures. Participants read a brief description of a new tablet brand that 
doubled as a laptop. The description included a statement from an independent market research 
firm about the popularity of the item. We used this information to manipulate consensus type. 




few months in the US/India market, 85% of consumers who didn’t own a tablet and learned 
about Laplet, loved (bought) the brand.  
 Next, participants were asked to indicate their willingness to pay for the Laplet by 
dragging a numbered slider anchored from $0 on the left end to USD $1,000 (INR 50,000 for 
Indian participants) on the right end. We set the price ranges by referencing the prices found on 
consumer websites that sell tablets in each country (Amazon.com, Amazon.in). 
Results 
 We predicted that Indians would be willing to pay more for a product described with 
attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues, but that Americans’ willingness to pay would not be 
affected by consensus cue type. We tested this hypothesis using a country  consensus cue type 
ANOVA on willingness to pay (WTP). Following prior work (Batra et al., 2017), WTP was 
standardized within country (ipsatized) to control for differences in the distributions of different 
currencies. The analysis revealed the expected interaction (F(1, 196) = 4.27, p = .040). Follow-
up analyses supported our predictions. We report raw WTP amounts to simplify the 
interpretation. Indians indicated higher WTP for the product associated with attitudinal (vs. 
behavioral) consensus (Mattitudinal = 22,554.80, Mbehavioral = 17,608.02, F(1, 196) = 8.41, p = .004), 
supporting H2. In contrast, for Americans, WTP was similar across consensus cue type (Mattitudinal 









 Study 2 demonstrated the culturally distinct influences of attitudinal and behavioral 
consensus cues on evaluation. We showed that consumers from a traditionally interdependent 
cultural context (i.e., Indians) were willing to pay more for products shown with attitudinal (vs. 
behavioral) consensus cues (see Appendix C.5 for a study with similar findings). In contrast, for 
consumers from a traditionally independent cultural context (i.e., Americans), there was no 
difference in willingness to pay as a function of consensus cue type. These findings extend work 
by others (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Griskevicius et al., 2009; Maheswaran & Chaiken 1991; 
Wu & Lee, 2016) by showing for the first time that, in an interdependent cultural context, 




Study 3: Interdependents Spend More Time Processing Attributes for Products with 
Attitudinal (vs. Behavioral) Consensus Cues, Processing Time Mediates Evaluations 
Study 3 makes three improvements to Studies 1 and 2. First, we examine the role of the 
perceived informativeness of the consensus cue in the relationship between the consensus cue 
type and product evaluation. Our theorizing predicts that, for interdependents, attitudinal 
consensus cues are more personally relevant than behavioral ones because behaviors often reflect 
norms, not personal preferences (Savani et al., 2012). Further, for interdependents, attitudinal 
(vs. behavioral) consensus cues are more likely to appeal to the concern for social approval 
(Jacobson et al., 2011). Thus, as a result of the higher perceived informativeness of attitudinal 
(vs. behavioral) consensus cues, interdependent consumers, when they see an attitudinal 
consensus cue, may be motivated to process more effortfully the central merits of the product 
(i.e., product attributes) to form an overall judgment (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; 1986). Therefore, 
we predict that, for interdependent consumers, a product shown with attitudinal (vs. behavioral) 
consensus cues will elicit a greater tendency to process attribute information (H3), and this 
tendency will mediate the relationship between consensus cue type and product evaluation (H4). 
In contrast, we predict that, for independents, consensus cue type should not affect the tendency 
to process attribute information or mediate evaluations because consensus cues are less 
personally relevant in general.  
Second, Study 3 improves upon the first two studies by measuring self-construal at the 
individual level as opposed to operationalizing it at the country level (Singelis, 1994), enhancing 
the internal validity of the design. Third, we included a control condition to observe how self-
construal and consensus cue type influence product evaluations compared to no presentation of a 





 We conducted a pretest to assess the inferences that consumers make about others’ 
attitudes and behaviors in response to different consensus cues. Twenty-eight undergraduates 
from the same population as those in the main study were asked to read six scenarios. Each 
scenario prompted participants to, “Imagine seeing a product shown with the label, ‘___.’ For 
example, ‘X is a _____ product.” Each of the six scenarios contained a different label. In the four 
focal scenarios, participants read that the product was “Top Rated,” “Most Loved,” “Best Seller” 
or “#1.” In the two filler scenarios, participants read that the product was “Trending” or a “New 
Arrival.” After each description, participants rated whether the label meant that many people 
chose the product (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so) and whether the label meant that many 
people preferred the product (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). As expected, paired samples t-
tests revealed that “Most Loved” and “Best Seller” elicited different inferences about other 
consumers’ attitudes and behaviors (see Table 3.1). We used these labels to manipulate 
attitudinal and behavioral consensus cue types in the main study.  
Table 3.1 Inferences from Different Cues 
 







 Participants and Design. One hundred and ninety-two undergraduate students at a large 
Midwestern university participated in the experiment for participation credit. The experiment 
used a 3 (consensus cue: attitudinal vs. behavioral vs. no consensus control)  2 (measured self-
construal: independent vs. interdependent) between-subjects design.  
 Procedure and Measures. Participants were told that a large-scale electronics 
manufacturer needed consumer opinions about a product launching in their area. Then, all 
participants saw a new product, the ENZO headphones. Participants in the attitudinal 
(behavioral) consensus condition saw the headphones with the label, “Buyer’s Choice,” (“Best 
Seller”) and ostensible test-market results that read, “An independent marketing research agency 
found that 81% of 300 college-aged consumers shopping for headphones online loved 
(purchased) the ENZOs.” Participants in the no-consensus control condition saw the headphones 
without a label or test-market results. 
Next, all participants were free to review product information about the ENZO as they 
wished. The page listed several attributes including, “up to 8 hours playback,” “sweat proof,” 
and “tangle resistant cable.” Note, the attributes were identical across conditions. Following past 
work (Coleman, Williams, & Morales, 2018; Torelli, 2006; Torelli & Kaikati, 2009; Yang, 
Cutright, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2014), we collected participants’ time spent on this page to 
capture the tendency to process additional information. Because we only manipulated consensus 
cue type across condition, any difference in time spent processing additional information 
suggests different elaborative processing as a function of consensus cue type. 
After viewing the ENZO’s attributes, we asked participants how much they were willing 




the amount of response variance and to guard against outliers (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). 
Participants were asked to report their WTP on a 12-point scale, where 1 = 10% of the retail 
price of the item, 2 = 20% of the retail price of the item and increasing intervals of 10% per scale 
point up to 12 = 120% of the retail price. Product attitudes were measured on four 7-point items 
anchored by very unfavorable/very favorable, bad/good, unappealing/appealing, and 
undesirable/desirable, with higher numbers indicating more positive evaluation ( = .91; 
Campbell & Goodstein, 2001). Willingness to pay and attitudes were standardized and averaged 
to create an overall index of product evaluation (r = .51, p < .001). For simplicity, the results 
below use this overall index; the results were similar when the analyses were conducted on 
willingness to pay and attitudes separately (see Appendix C.3). 
As a manipulation check, we asked participants in the consensus conditions to complete 
the sentence, “81% of 300 college-aged students shopping for headphones online ______ the 
ENZOs.” Finally, we measured self-construal using a validated scale (Singelis, 1994) and created 
a single index by subtracting the independent subscale ( = .76) from the interdependent 
subscale ( = .84), following past work (Riemer & Shavitt, 2011). Higher (lower) scores on this 
index reflect a predominantly interdependent (independent) self-construal. 
Results 
 Manipulation Check. We coded participants’ open-ended responses to the manipulation 
check item as 1 if they were attitudinal words (e.g., “loved” or “favored”), 2 if they were 
behavioral words (e.g., “purchased” or “bought”), and 0 if they did not reflect attitudinal or 
behavioral words (e.g., “for” or “in”). Remember that only participants in the attitudinal and 
behavioral consensus conditions saw this manipulation check. A chi square test revealed that a 




attitudinal consensus condition (77.5%) compared to the behavioral consensus condition 
(22.5%), and a greater proportion of participants completed the sentence with a behavioral word 
in the behavioral consensus condition (63.8%) compared to the attitudinal consensus condition 
(36.2%, (2) = 17.55, p < .001). Hence, we concluded that the manipulation was successful. 
 Product Evaluation. We analyzed product evaluations with multiple regression. Given 
that cue type has 3 levels (no consensus cue, attitudinal, and behavioral), we created two dummy 
variables, with attitudinal consensus serving as the comparison condition. Thus, the independent 
variables in the regression equation were no consensus (coded: 0/1), behavioral consensus 
(coded: 0/1), self-construal (mean-centered), the no consensus  self-construal interaction, and 
the behavioral consensus  self-construal interaction. The analysis revealed significant effects of 
self-construal ( = .46, t = 3.38, p = .001), a significant no consensus cue (vs. attitudinal 
consensus)  self-construal interaction ( = -.54, t = -2.61, p = .010), and, importantly, a 
significant behavioral consensus (vs. attitudinal consensus)  self-construal interaction ( = -.55, 
t = -3.00, p = .003). See Figure 3.3. 







 Participants with a predominantly interdependent self-construal (+1SD) gave higher 
product evaluations when the headphones were shown with a attitudinal consensus cue (M = .41) 
than when the headphones were shown with an behavioral consensus cue (M = -.18,  = -.59, t = 
- 2.82, p = .005), consistent with H2. In contrast, participants with a predominantly independent 
self-construal (-1SD) gave product evaluations that were not affected by consensus cue type 
(Mattitudinal = -.31, Mbehavioral = -.04;  = .27, t = 1.29, p = .20). The Johnson–Neyman (Spiller, 
Fitzsimons, Lynch, & McClelland, 2013) procedure revealed that the effect of behavioral (vs. 
attitudinal) consensus cues on product evaluation was negative and significant when the self-
construal index was at or above .28 (slightly more interdependent than independent; 
approximately 33% of the sample was above this threshold). The effect was positive and 
significant when the self-construal index was at or below -1.31 (more independent than 
interdependent; approximately 6% of the sample was below this threshold).  
 Analyses of the no consensus cue (vs. attitudinal consensus cue)  self-construal 
interaction revealed that interdependents gave more favorable product evaluations when the 
headphones were shown with an attitudinal consensus cue (M = .41) than when they were shown 
with no cue (M = -.17,  = -.58, t = -2.66, p = .008). In contrast, independents’ product 
evaluations were not affected by the presence of an attitudinal consensus cue (vs. no cue; 
Mattitudinal = -.04, Mcontrol = -.30;  = .26, t = 1.17, p = .243). The Johnson–Neyman procedure 
revealed that the effect of no cue (vs. attitudinal cue) on product evaluation was negative and 
significant when the self-construal index was at or above .29 (slightly more interdependent than 




positive and significant when the self-construal index was at or below -1.72 (more independent 
than interdependent, approximately 2% of the sample was below this threshold). 
 Tendency to Process Additional Information. We predicted that, for more interdependent 
people, attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues increase the tendency to process additional 
information. For more independent people, by contrast, the tendency to process additional 
information would not vary as a function of consensus cue type. We tested these predictions with 
the same multiple regression detailed above to predict the time spent processing attribute 
information (see Figure 3.4). The analysis revealed a marginal effect of the no consensus dummy 
variable ( = -1.86, t = -1.83, p = .069) and, importantly, the expected behavioral consensus  
self-construal interaction ( = -3.28, t = -2.65, p = .009). Spotlight analyses revealed that more 
interdependent people (+1SD) spent more time processing the attribute information when the 
headphones were shown with attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues (Mattitudinal = 11.16 
seconds, Mbehavioral = 6.93 seconds;  = -4.23, t = -2.98, p = .003), supporting H3. In contrast, 
independents’ (-1SD) processing time was unaffected by consensus cue type (Mattitudinal = 9.27 
seconds, Mbehavioral = 10.18 seconds; t < 1, ns), further supporting H3. The Johnson-Neyman 
procedure revealed that the effect of consensus cue type on processing time was significant when 
the self-construal index reached .12 or higher (slightly more interdependent than independent; 









Figure 3.4 Time Spent Processing Product Attribute Information as a Function of Measured 




Moderated Mediation. We predicted that the tendency to process attribute information 
would mediate the relationship between consensus cue type and product evaluation for 
interdependents, but not independents (H4). We tested this hypothesis using Hayes (2018) 
PROCESS macro Model 7 with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. Consensus cue type was the 
independent variable (dummy-coded: 0 = attitudinal, 1 = behavioral), mean-centered self-
construal was the moderator, time spent processing product attributes was the mediator, and the 
product evaluation index was the dependent variable. As expected, the analyses revealed that 
consensus type and self-construal interacted to predict time spent processing attribute 
information ( = -3.28, t = -2.71, p = .008). Participants with a predominantly interdependent 
self-construal spent more time processing additional information when the product was shown 
with an attitudinal consensus cue (M = 11.84) compared to a behavioral consensus cue (M = 




Importantly, the time spent processing product attributes was positively and significantly 
associated with product evaluation ( = .03, t = 2.65, p = .009). Conditional indirect effect tests 
revealed that the time spent processing product attributes mediated the relationship between 
consensus type and perceived product value for interdependents ( = -.15, Boot SE = .08, 95% 
CI: -.34, -.01), but not independents ( = .04, Boot SE = .05, 95% CI: -.06, .16). The index of 
moderated mediation was significant ( = -.11, Boot SE = .07, 95% CI: -.26, -.01). These results 
are consistent with the hypotheses that the time spent processing product attributes mediates the 
effect of consensus cue type on product evaluation for interdependents, but not independents 
(H4, see Figure 3.5). 




 Building on prior studies, Study 3 showed that interdependents evaluated products more 
favorably when the product was shown with attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues. 
Moreover, the results from Study 3 are consistent with the notion that, to interdependents, 
attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues have more informational value because they are more 
personally relevant. For interdependents, the increased time spent processing product attributes 
led to more favorable product evaluations, suggesting that the attitudinal (vs. behavioral) 
consensus information was more valuable. As expected, this process was not observed for 
Consensus Cue Type 







independents, presumably because neither attitudinal nor behavioral consensus cues are 
personally relevant to them.  
In addition, including the control condition revealed two important findings in light of 
extant research (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). First, past 
research showed that Hong Kong consumers gave more favorable product evaluations when they 
saw positive (vs. negative) attitudinal consensus cues (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997). In our 
study, interdependents more favorably evaluated the product when it was shown with an 
attitudinal (vs. no) consensus cue. These findings suggest that the persuasive effects of attitudinal 
consensus hold when compared to negative consensus or no consensus information.  
Second, in our study, independents’ product evaluations did not depend on the presence 
of an attitudinal (vs. no) consensus cue. This is consistent with Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) 
who found that American consumers’ product evaluations did not depend on positive (vs. 
negative) attitudinal consensus cues when personal relevance was high (i.e., the product would 
be launched in their area). This suggests that, for more independent participants in our study, the 
consensus information was not personally relevant and may thus have been disregarded in favor 
of the attribute information (which was constant across conditions). Therefore, for independents, 
product evaluations did not differ as a function of consensus cue presence or type. 
Finally, and extending prior work, interdependents spent less time processing attribute 
information when the product was shown with a behavioral consensus cue compared to no cue, 
suggesting that, in this study, behavioral consensus cues were less informative than having no 
social consensus information. Taken together, these findings support the theorizing that 




differences between them have distinct effects for their information processing and product 
evaluations.  
Study 4: Attitudinal Consensus Cue Predicts Interdependents’ Willingness to Enter a Gift 
Card Lottery, Behavioral Consensus Cue Predicts Independents’ Willingness 
 Study 4 tested the findings from Studies 1-3 in a field experiment. We measured cultural 
self-construal and manipulated consensus cue type by showing that Starbucks products were 
either the “top rated” or the “best-selling.” In addition, we tracked whether people were willing 
to sacrifice their remuneration to enter a lottery for a Starbucks gift card. We predicted that 
interdependent people would be more willing to enter the gift card lottery when they were shown 
attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues. In contrast, independent people’s willingness to enter 
the gift card lottery should not differ as a function of consensus cue type, but if anything, they 
may be more willing to enter when they were shown behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus cues 
(White & Simpson, 2013).  
Method 
Participants and Design. One hundred and ninety-four participants took part in the study 
at the student union of a large university, near its Starbucks café. Participants were paid $5. 
Responses from 14 participants were incomplete and thus we removed their data, leaving 180 
participants (Mage = 20.10, 61.1% female). The experiment used a 2 (consensus cue: attitudinal 
vs. behavioral)  2 (measured self-construal: independent vs. interdependent) between-subjects 
design.  
 Procedure and Measures. Two research assistants and the author recruited participants in 
the student union. The study was a part of two surveys. The first survey, conducted by another 




survey, participants first completed a brief questionnaire about their beverage preferences. For 
example, participants indicated whether they have bought coffee from the following cafes in the 
past year: Starbucks, Dunkin Donuts, Café Paradiso, Espresso Royale, and Einstein Bros. Next, 
they were told that a well-known beverage company was interested in consumer opinions about 
its products before reading a short description of Starbucks beverages. We manipulated 
consensus cue type on the same page as the description of Starbucks beverages by showing an 
image of Starbucks cups with the slogan “Best Seller” or “Top Rated” at the top. These slogans 
were validated in the pretest for Study 3. In addition, after the beverage description, participants 
read that, “An independent marketing research agency looking for best-selling beverages 
(beverages that people love) found that Starbucks is one of the most purchased (most loved) 
brands by college-aged consumers.”  
 Next, participants read that as an added token of appreciation for completing the survey, 
they could win one of four $25 Starbucks gift cards by entering a lottery. They further read that 
each lottery entry costs $1 and indicated how many entries they wanted to purchase. This was the 
main dependent variable.  
 To capture the tendency to process additional information, we asked participants how 
interested they would be to read additional information about Starbucks. They rated their level of 
interest (1 = not at all, 5 = very interested) in seven topics (e.g., New beverages on the menu). 
Next, they rated on two items how familiar (1 = not at all familiar to 5 = very familiar) and 
knowledgeable (1 = not at all knowledgeable to 5 = very knowledgeable) they were about 
Starbucks beverages before taking the survey. Finally, as a manipulation check, participants 






 Manipulation Check. In a linear regression, the perceived consensus item was regressed 
on consensus cue type (-1 = attitudinal, 1 = behavioral), mean-centered self-construal index 
(interdependent minus independent), and their interaction. The analysis yielded no significant 
effects (all ts < 1), suggesting that participants thought the consensus information was equally 
credible. In addition, a one-sample t-test revealed that the grand mean of perceived consensus 
was significantly higher than the midpoint between 0 and 100 (test value = 50; t(179) = 12.5, p < 
.001), suggesting that participants thought the consensus was equally high. 
Willingness to Enter Lottery. In a logistic regression, willingness to enter the lottery was 
regressed on consensus cue type (-1 = attitudinal, 1 = behavioral), mean-centered self-construal 
index (interdependent minus independent), and their interaction (Wald = 4.28, (1) = -.47, p = 
.039). Floodlight analysis revealed one significant and one marginally significant region. Those 
who were relatively more interdependent (i.e., those with a self-construal score of 2.55 or higher) 
were somewhat more likely to enter the lottery in the attitudinal (25%) than behavioral consensus 
cue condition (1%; JN = -1.12, Z = -1.83, p = .067). In contrast, those who were relatively more 
independent (i.e., those with a self-construal score of -2.03 or lower) were more likely to enter 
the lottery when in the behavioral (29%) than attitudinal consensus cue condition (7%; JN = 
1.01, Z = 1.96, p = .05). The results did not significantly differ when consumer knowledge of 
Starbucks beverages (2 items, r = .71, p < .001) was included as a covariate (consensus cue type 







Figure 3.6 Consensus Cue Field Study Results 
 
 
Note: Shaded region indicates Johnson-Neyman region of significance (p < .05) 
 Lottery Amount. Following previous research, the data were log-transformed because 
they were positively skewed and contained a number of zeros (Simpson et al., 2017). There was 
a marginal interaction between self-construal and consensus cue type on lottery amount (b = -.06, 
se = .31, p = .067). Floodlight analysis on log-transformed lottery amount revealed one 
significance region. More independent people (i.e., those with a self-construal score at -.70 or 
below) were willing to pay more to enter the gift card lottery in the behavioral consensus cue 




 Interest in Additional Information. We predicted that, for more interdependent people, 
attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues increase the tendency to process additional 
information. In contrast, for more independent people, the tendency to process additional 
information would not vary as a function of consensus cue type. We tested these predictions with 
the same regression detailed above to predict participants’ interest in additional information. The 
items capturing interest in additional information hung together reliably ( = .82) and were 
averaged to form an index. Analysis of the beverage interest index revealed no significant effects 
(interaction coefficient = .01, t(176) = 1.39, p = .167).  
Discussion 
 Using a naturalistic field experiment, Study 4 replicated the consensus cue by self-
construal interaction observed in earlier studies. People with a more interdependent self-
construal were more persuaded to enter a risky lottery to win a gift card when products were 
advertised with attitudinal consensus cues. We also observed significant effects of consensus cue 
type among more independent consumers such that they were more likely to enter the lottery 
when shown products with behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus cues (White & Simpson, 2013; 
see Appendix C.6 for a study with similar findings). In the next study, we test the implications of 
our theory for brand equity. 
Study 5: Behavioral Popularity Negatively Predicts Brand Asset Value (BAV) in 
Interdependent Countries, Positively Predicts BAV in Independent Countries 
We have predicted that, for more interdependent people, attitudinal (vs. behavioral) 
consensus cues are more persuasive. In contrast, for more independent people, behavioral (vs. 
attitudinal) consensus cues can be more persuasive. Studies 2-4 found support for these 




How might culture moderate the effects of actual levels of attitudinal and behavioral 
consensus on the brand equity of known brands? Brand equity represents the outcomes that 
accrue to a branded product compared to the outcomes that would accrue if the same product was 
unbranded (Ailawadi, Lehmann, & Neslin, 2003). Brand equity is rooted in the minds of 
consumers and is therefore influenced by attitudinal consensus (e.g., shared preferences; D. A. 
Aaker, 1996; Keller, 1993; Keller & Lehmann, 2003) and behavioral consensus (e.g., market 
share; Datta, Ailawadi, & van Heerde, 2017; C. S. Park & Srinivasan, 1994; Sriram, 
Balachander, & Kalwani, 2007). In some cases, such as in a database where actual brand 
preferences and brand usage are collected (Batra et al., 2017), attitudinal and behavioral 
consensus information is simultaneously available. Our theory suggests that in more 
interdependent cultures, high attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus may be a stronger predictor 
of brand equity because attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus is more likely to be attributed to 
the internal qualities of the brand (Dacin & Freling, 2010; Morris & Peng, 1994). In contrast, in 
more independent cultures, high behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus may be a stronger 
predictor of brand equity because behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus is more likely to be 
associated with others’ true preferences (Bem, 1972; White & Simpson, 2013).   
However, the use of an actual brand equity database requires consideration of the full 
range of consensus that may exist across multiple brands. So far, the consensus cues in our 
experiments have provided only favorable and high-consensus information (e.g., “top rated” or 
“most loved”). But sometimes the information about overall consumer preferences may not be so 
favorable (e.g., 15% of consumers preferred X). In such a case, we expect the valence of actual 
attitudinal consensus to be a boundary condition to our previously observed effects. Brands that 




unbranded. For example, if few people preferred Xtra detergent then, by definition, Xtra would 
not have measurable brand equity beyond that of an unbranded detergent. The same is not 
necessarily true for the level of behavioral consensus. For instance, few brand buyers could 
signal that the brand commands a price premium that only a select audience can afford. 
Therefore, we expect that, when attitudinal consensus is above an acceptable threshold, 
behavioral consensus might have different relations with brand equity across cultures. For 
interdependents, behavioral consensus may not predict brand equity when attitudinal consensus 
is above an acceptable threshold. For interdependents, attitudinal consensus is more likely to be 
attributed to the brand’s internal factors and therefore be a stronger predictor of brand equity. For 
independents, behavioral consensus might predict brand equity when attitudinal consensus is 
above an acceptable threshold because behavioral consensus is more likely to be associated with 
others’ true preferences.  
In contrast, when many people buy a brand but very few people prefer it, brand equity is 
likely to suffer regardless of culture. Consumer loyalty to these brands is spurious because 
consumers cannot differentiate among alternatives and tend to purchase based on situational cues 
such as availability or deals (Dick & Basu, 1994). Given that brand differentiation and price 
premium are positive drivers of brand equity (Keller, 2003), we expect that, regardless of culture, 
when attitudinal consensus is below a certain threshold, more (vs. less) behavioral consensus is 
associated with lower brand equity.   
In Study 5, these predictions were tested using a large and unique Brand Asset Valuator 
(BAV) dataset from 2014-2015 that spans over 8,000 brands, 28 industry sectors, and eight 
countries. These data are collected by Young & Rubicam and used to assess brand equity via 




measures of brand equity, Young & Rubicam’s Brand Asset Valuator (BAV) is the largest and 
best known (Keller, 2008). Accordingly, researchers have begun testing theory-based hypotheses 
using BAV datasets (Batra et al., 2017; Bronnenberg, Dhar, & Dube, 2017; Lehmann, Keller, & 
Farley, 2008; Mizik & Jacobson, 2008; Stahl, Heitmann, Lehmann, & Neslin, 2012). Although 
the BAV instrument is administered at the individual level, the data we had access to were 
summarized at the brand level. Next, we outline how we prepared the key independent and 
dependent variables. 
Brand Asset Valuator Data Preparation 
Self-Construal. Data for 8 countries were selected and made available to us because they 
represented cultures with different levels of individualism and economic development. The 8 
countries were Argentina, Canada, Denmark, Germany, India, Mexico, South Korea and the 
United Kingdom. We used Hofstede’s (Hofstede, 1990; hofstede-insights.com) individualism 
score to operationalize self-construal. Canada (IND = 80, nbrands = 1,069), Denmark (IND = 74, 
nbrands = 801), Germany (IND = 67, nbrands = 1,155), and the U.K. (IND = 89, nbrands = 1,357) were 
the independent countries and were recoded as 1. Argentina (IND = 46, nbrands = 1,161), India 
(IND = 48, nbrands = 1,418), Mexico (IND = 30, nbrands = 1,470), and South Korea (IND = 18, 
nbrands = 1,357) represented the interdependent countries and were recoded as -1.  
Consensus Information. The focal data for our hypotheses are aggregated preference and 
usage ratings for each brand. For example, survey respondents saw four check boxes for “the one 
I’d prefer to buy/use,” “one of several I’d buy/use,” “only buy/use if no convenient alternative,” 
and “would never buy/use.” Attitudinal consensus was summarized by adding the percentages of 
respondents who checked “the one I’d prefer to buy/use” or “one of several I’d buy/use” because 




of Koreans selected the option that the Energizer battery brand was “the one I’d prefer to 
buy/use” and 21.2% of Koreans selected the option that the Energizer brand was “one of several 
I’d buy/use”, then the Energizer brand in Korea had a value of 72.3, indicating positive 
attitudinal consensus. Although the available attitudinal consensus information contains 
behavioral language (e.g., prefer to buy), it still seems relatively more attitudinal than the 
available behavioral consensus information because it captures respondents’ greater liking for 
one alternative over others.  
The data preparation was similar for behavioral consensus information. Survey 
respondents saw each brand listed with four check boxes for “buy or use regularly/often,” “buy 
or use occasionally,” “have bought/used but don’t anymore,” and “never bought or used.” 
Behavioral consensus was summarized with the total percentage of respondents who checked 
“buy or use regularly/often” because this represents respondents’ recalled purchase behavior 
regarding each brand. For instance, if 15.3% of Mexicans selected the option that the Duracell 
battery brand was the one that they “buy or use regularly/often,” then the Duracell brand in 
Mexico had a value of 15.3, indicating low behavioral consensus. The data were not made 
available to us at the individual level, so the discrete responses could not be analyzed. 
BAV. Brand Asset Value (BAV) was the dependent variable. BAV is an index developed 
by Y&R that combines consumers’ ratings of their brand awareness, knowledge/familiarity, 
regard, relevance, and perceived brand image attributes such as innovativeness and quality into 
an overall indicator of brand equity. To correct the proportions for cultural differences in 
response style and scale usage, we performed within-country ipsatization on the predictors and 
the dependent variable. This procedure also makes the data suitable for regression analyses 





 We tested the hypothesis that in interdependent (vs. independent) cultural contexts, 
behavioral consensus has different relations with brand equity when attitudinal consensus is 
above an acceptable threshold of attitudinal consensus. Ipsatized BAV was the dependent 
variable in the analysis. BAV was regressed on the attitudinal consensus predictor (e.g., the % of 
people who preferred the brand), the behavioral consensus predictor (e.g., the % of people who 
used the brand), self-construal (contrast coded: 1 = independent countries, -1 interdependent 
countries), all possible two- and three-way interactions, and industry sector as a covariate.  
The regression estimates were obtained with OLS regression analysis. We further 
analyzed the data using industry sector as a fixed effect. A Hausman test rejected the null 
hypothesis, suggesting that a fixed effects model is preferable (2(7) = 50.72, p < .001). The 
results of the Hausman test suggest that it is important to fix the effect of culture on brand use 
and preference. Nevertheless, the results of the fixed effects model were substantively similar to 
the OLS model. We summarize the results from both models in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates from Study 5   
Variable OLS  Fixed Effects  
1. Intercept -.06* (.04)  
2. Behavioral consensus .20** (.03) .20** (.03) 
3. Attitudinal consensus .43** (.02) .43** (.02) 
4. Self-construal .13** (.02) .13** (.02) 
5. Behavioral consensus  Self-construal -.10** (.04) -.10** (.04) 
6. Attitudinal consensus  Self-construal .34** (.03) .34** (.03) 
7. Behavioral consensus  Attitudinal consensus .18** (.01) .19** (.01) 
8. Behavioral consensus  Attitudinal consensus  Self-construal -.14** (.01) -.14** (.01) 
9. Sector -.00 (.00) N/A 
*p < .05, **p < .001 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 8,769 brands. OLS R2 = .55 with 8,735 d.f., Fixed Effects R2 = .52 with 
8,735 d.f. 
 
The significant three-way interaction coefficient in both models (#8 in Table 3.2) 




consensus BAV in independent and interdependent cultures (see Figure 3.7). In independent 
countries, when there was positive attitudinal consensus (+1SD above the mean), behavioral 
consensus was associated with higher BAV ( = .20, se = .02, p < .001), consistent with our 
expectations. In contrast, for interdependent countries, when there was positive attitudinal 
consensus, behavioral consensus was associated with lower BAV ( = -.22, se = .03, p < .001).  
Further, when there was negative attitudinal consensus (-1SD below the mean), higher 
behavioral consensus was associated with lower BAV regardless of culture (interdependent countries: -
.45, se = .04, p < .001; independent countries: -.40, se = .03, p < .001). The Johnson–Neyman 
procedure revealed that the interaction between behavioral consensus and culture on brand equity 
was significant when attitudinal consensus was at or above -1.73 standard deviations below the 
mean percentage of people who preferred the brand in each country (approximately 98.76% of 
the sample of brands was above this threshold). In other words, above a minimal threshold of 
attitudinal consensus, the effect of behavioral consensus depended on culture. 










Analyses of data from a multinational commercial dataset including over 8,000 brands in 
8 countries support the hypothesis that, in interdependent (vs. independent) cultural contexts, 
behavioral consensus has distinct relations with brand equity. These data identified negative 
attitudinal consensus as a logical boundary condition such that, for all cultures, when many 
people bought a brand but very few people preferred it, brand equity suffered. When attitudinal 
consensus was above an acceptable threshold in independent cultural contexts (e.g., Canada), 
behavioral consensus was associated with higher predicted brand equity. This means that the 
brands with the highest brand equity are those that a lot of people prefer and buy. This pattern is 
consistent with notion that, for independents, behavioral consensus is more likely to be 
associated with others’ true preferences and influence brand evaluation (Bem, 1972; White & 
Simpson, 2013).  
We expected that, for interdependent cultures, behavioral consensus would not be a 
strong predictor when attitudinal consensus was above an acceptable threshold. However, we 
found that, in interdependent countries such as India and South Korea, behavioral consensus was 
associated with lower predicted brand equity. This means that the brands with the highest brand 
equity are those that many people prefer but few people buy. It is possible that, for 
interdependents, behavioral consensus lowers perceptions of brand status. If behavioral 
consensus lowers interdependents’ status perceptions, then brands that many people prefer but 
few people buy may appeal to interdependents’ concern for external and social attributes (Kim & 
Drolet, 2009).  
Thus, Study 5 builds on the first four studies in two important ways. First, we further 




that span numerous sectors and cultural contexts. Second, by examining attitudinal and 
behavioral consensus information simultaneously, Study 5 shows that the interactive influence of 
attitudinal and behavioral consensus information on brand equity depends on culture. Taken 
together, the five studies suggest that there are culturally distinct effects of consensus 
information type on product evaluations. 
General Discussion 
Consensus cues are widely used by marketers to influence product evaluations. The 
current research provides initial evidence that all consensus cues are not equally persuasive, and 
that a common consensus cue type (i.e., behavioral consensus cues) can convey less about 
consumers’ preferences in some cultures. Study 1 found that European American (vs. Asian and 
Asian American) consumers were more likely to spontaneously infer others’ liking for an 
unbranded pair of headphones shown with a behavioral consensus cue (i.e., Best Seller). Studies 
2 and 3 compared the influence of attitudinal or behavioral consensus cues on product 
evaluation. Consumers from India, but not the United States, were willing to pay more for a 
tablet shown with attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues (Study 2). Interdependents, but not 
independents, spent more time processing attribute information after seeing attitudinal (vs. 
behavioral) consensus cues and processing time drove product evaluations (Study 3). Using a 
naturalistic field experiment, Study 4 found that interdependents (independents) were more 
willing to enter a gift card lottery when they saw attitudinal (behavioral) consensus cues. Using a 
large and unique database, Study 5 found that for over 98% of brands in interdependent countries 
(e.g., India), behavioral consensus—the % of people who bought or used a brand regularly—was 
associated with lower brand equity. In contrast, for over 98% of brands in independent countries 




This research can contribute to several streams of literature. For example, prior research 
showed that attitudinal consensus cues can have direct effects on product evaluations (Bearden & 
Etzel, 1982; Burnkrant & Cousineau, 1975), and that several consumer variables influence the 
effectiveness of consensus cues (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997; Chaiken, 1980; David, 2016; 
Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Wang, Xu, & Shiv, 2012). Yet, the extant persuasion literature 
does not make predictions on why or for whom attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues can be 
more personally relevant. Although prior research acknowledges that consensus cues can be 
processed centrally or systematically (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and conceptually 
distinguishes preference from choice (Simonson, 1990), we are the first to conceptually 
distinguish attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues on the basis of their informational value to 
the message recipient.  
More broadly, this research suggests that behavior may not always be the ultimate signal 
that one has been persuaded. Seminal information processing theory suggests that behavioral 
consensus cues should provide more informational value for product evaluations (McGuire, 
1968). The theory, developed in an independent cultural context (i.e., U.S.), assumes that 
behavior (e.g., buying, voting) is the ultimate measure of an effective persuasion attempt. In our 
research, we provide initial evidence that this assumption may need to be culturally qualified. In 
an interdependent cultural context, where behaviors often conform to social norms and external 
pressures, behaviors may provide less meaningful information about whether the individual’s 
attitudes have changed (e.g., Savani et al., 2012). 
Our research also contributes to the cross-cultural literature by further distinguishing the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviors in interdependent cultural contexts. Recent 




the individual, preferences don’t have to be personal (Riemer et al., 2014). In interdependent 
contexts, preferences are more likely to be shaped by norms and contextual constraints. Our 
research advances this notion and suggests that, although preferences may not be personally 
meaningful, information about others’ preferences may be more meaningful than information 
about others’ behaviors. Moreover, our findings for cultural interdependence are consistent with 
findings for related variables that cultivate interpersonal harmony (e.g., fear appeals; 
Griskevicius et al., 2009; Stephens et al., 2011; L. Wu & Lee, 2016). 
In practical terms, this research can have significant implications for managers, given the 
prevalence of consensus cues in the marketplace. Marketers decide whether and how to 
communicate a product’s popularity. Thus, they can benefit from an understanding of how and 
when to use a particular consensus cue, given the consumer’s cultural context. For instance, 
managers of popular brands in India may be better off by communicating other consumers’ 
preferences instead of consumers’ purchase behaviors. Our analyses of the multinational Brand 
Asset Valuator dataset add more nuance to this notion. Although attitudinal consensus can be 
persuasive to interdependent consumers, brands with attitudinal and behavioral consensus can 
can be perceived as low status (Kim & Drolet, 2009) and therefore have brands with lower  
brand equity.  
In closing, this research theorizes and demonstrates cultural differences between 
attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues. We argue that, for interdependents, because people are 
not expected to behave according to their attitudes, attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues 
are more informative. Thus, compared to people in independent cultural contexts, our findings 
show that people in interdependent cultural contexts evaluate products and brands more 





Aaker, D. A. (1996). Measuring Brand Equity Across Products and Markets. California 
Management Review, 38(3), 102–120. https://doi.org/10.2307/41165845 
Aaker, J. L. (1999). The Malleable Self: The Role of Self-Expression in Persuasion. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 36(1), 45–57. https://doi.org/10.2307/3151914 
Aaker, J. L., & Maheswaran, D. (1997). The Effect of Cultural Orientation on Persuasion. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 24(3), 315–328. https://doi.org/10.1086/209513 
Aaker, J. L., & Sengupta, J. (2000). Additivity Versus Attenuation: The Role of Culture in the 
Resolution of Information Incongruity. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 9(2), 67–82. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327663JCP0902_2 
Aaker, J. L., & Williams, P. (1998). Empathy Versus Pride: the Influence of Emotional Appeals 
Across Cultures. Journal of Consumer Research, 25(3), 241–261. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/209537 
Ailawadi, K., Lehmann, D., & Neslin, S. (2003). Revenue Premium as an Outcome Measure of 
Brand Equity. Journal of Marketing, 67(4), 1–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.67.4.1.18688 
Ajzen, I. (1988). Attitudes, personality, and behavior. Chicago: Dorsey Press. 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behaviour. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Allport, G. (1935). Attitudes. In C. Murchison (Ed.), A handbook of social psychology (pp. 798–
844). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press. 
Bassili, J. N. (1993). Response Latency Versus Certainty as Indexes of the Strength of Voting 





Bassili, J. N., & Fletcher, J. F. (1991). Response-Time Measurement in Survey Research A 
Method for CATI and A New Look at Nonattitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly, 55, 331–
346. 
Batra, R., Ahuvia, A., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2012). Brand Love. Journal of Marketing, 76(2), 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1509/jm.09.0339 
Batra, R., Zhang, Y. C., Aydinoğlu, N. Z., & Feinberg, F. M. (2017). Positioning Multicountry 
Brands: The Impact of Variation in Cultural Values and Competitive Set. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 54(6), 914–931. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.13.0058 
Baumgartner, H., & Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M. (2001). Response Styles in Marketing Research: A 
Cross-National Investigation. Journal of Marketing Research, 38(2), 143–156. 
https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.2.143.18840 
Bearden, W. O., & Etzel, M. J. (1982). Reference Group Influence on Product and Brand 
Purchase Decisions. Journal of Consumer Research. https://doi.org/10.1086/208911 
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 6, 1–62. 
Berger, I. E. (1992). The Nature of Attitude Accessibility and Attitude Confidence. Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, 1(2), 103–123. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327663jcp0102_01 
Berger, I. E., & Mitchell, A. A. (1989). The Effect of Advertising on Attitude Accessibility, 
Attitude Confidence, and the Attitude-Behavior Relationship. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 16(3), 269. https://doi.org/10.1086/209213 
Berger, J. (2013). Contagious: Why things catch on. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Bettman, J. R., Luce, M. F., & Payne, J. W. (1998). Constructive Consumer Choice Processes. 




Blascovich, J., Ernst, J. M., Tomaka, J., Kelsey, R., Salomon, K., & Fazio, R. H. (1993). Attitude 
accessibility as a moderator of autonomic reactivity during decision making. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 64(2), 165–176. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.64.2.165 
Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using 
Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 111–137. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.111 
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this “We”? Levels of collective identity and self 
representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1), 83–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.1.83 
Briley, D. A., Morris, M. W., & Simonson, I. (2000). Reasons as Carriers of Culture: Dynamic 
versus Dispositional Models of Cultural Influence on Decision Making. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 27(2), 157–178. 
Briley, D. A., Rudd, M., & Aaker, J. L. (2017). Cultivating Optimism: How to Frame Your 
Future during a Health Challenge. Journal of Consumer Research, 44(4), 895–915. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucx075 
Bronnenberg, B. J., Dhar, S. K., & Dube, J.-P. (2017). Consumer Packaged Goods in the United 
States : National Brands , Local Branding. Journal of Marketing Research, 44(1), 4–13. 
Bullock, J. G., Green, D. P., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Yes, But What’s the Mechanism? (Don’t Expect 
an Easy Answer). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(4), 550–558. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018933 
Calder, B. J., & Burnkrant, R. E. (1977). Interpersonal Influence on Consumer Behavior: An 





Campbell, M. C., & Goodstein, R. C. (2001). The moderating effect of perceived risk on 
consumers’ evaluations of product incongruity: Preference for the norm. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 28(3), 439–449. 
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source 
Versus Message Cues in Persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5), 
752–766. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.39.5.752 
Chaiken, S., & Maheswaran, D. (1994). Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: 
Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity and Task Importance on Evaluation 
Judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(3), 460–473. 
Chan, R. Y. K., & Lau, L. B. Y. (2001). Explaining Green Purchasing Behavior : A Cross-
Cultural Study on American and Chinese Consumers. Journal of International Consumer 
Marketing, 14(2/3), 9–40. https://doi.org/10.1300/J046v14n02 
Chang, C. (2012). Effectiveness of Consensus Information in Advertising: The Moderating Roles 
of Situational Factors and Individual Differences. Journal of Business and Psychology, 
27(4), 483–494. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-012-9258-5 
Chang, H. H., & Hung, I. W. (2018). Mirror, Mirror on the Retail Wall: Self-Focused Attention 
Promotes Reliance on Feelings in Consumer Decisions. Journal of Marketing Research, 
55(4), 586–599. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.15.0080 
Chen, H. (Allan), Ng, S., & Rao, A. R. (2005). Cultural Differences in Consumer Impatience. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 42(3), 291–301. 
https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.2005.42.3.291 




Correspondence Bias and Actor-Observer Bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
24(9), 949–960. 
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal Attribution across Cultures: Variation 
and Universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125(1), 47–63. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.1.47 
Cialdini, R. B., Kallgren, C. A., & Reno, R. R. (1991). A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: 
A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24(C), 201–234. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60330-5 
Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. a. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: 
Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 58(6), 1015–1026. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015 
Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity and 
compliance. The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2. 
Cialdini, R. B., Wosinska, W., Barrett, D. W., Butner, J., & Gornik-Durose, M. (1999). 
Compliance with a Request in Two Cultures: The Differential Influence of Social Proof and 
Commitment/Consistency on Collectivists and Individualists. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 25(10), 1242–1253. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167299258006 
Coleman, N. V., Williams, P., & Morales, A. C. (2018). Identity Threats , Compensatory 
Consumption , and Working Memory Capacity : How Feeling Threatened Leads to 
Heightened Evaluations of Identity-Relevant Products. Journal of Consumer Research, 
46(1), 99–118. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucy060 




Nonattitudes. The American Politcal Science Review, 68(2), 650–660. 
Conway, M. M. (1981). Political Participation in Midterm Congressional Elections. American 
Politics Quarterly, 9(2), 221–244. 
Cooper, J., & Aronson, I. M. (1992). Attitudes and consistency theories: Implications for mental 
health. In The social psychology of mental health: Basic mechanisms and applications (pp. 
279–300). New York: Guilford Press. 
Cox, G. W., & Munger, M. C. (1989). Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. 
House Elections. The American Political Science Review, 83(1), 217–231. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000566 
Datta, H., Ailawadi, K. L., & van Heerde, H. J. (2017). How Well Does Consumer-Based Brand 
Equity Align with Sales-Based Brand Equity and Marketing-Mix Response? Journal of 
Marketing, 81(3), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1509/jm.15.0340 
David, M. E. (2016). The Role of Attachment Style in Shaping Consumer Preferences for 
Products Shown in Advertisements that Depict Consensus Claims. Journal of Advertising, 
45(2), 227–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/00913367.2016.1142405 
Dawson, P. A., & Zinser, J. E. (1976). Political Finance and Participation in Congressional 
Elections. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 425, 59–73. 
DeBono, K. G., Green, S., Shair, J., & Benson, M. (1995). Attitude accessibility and biased 
information processing: The moderating role of self-monitoring. Motivation and Emotion, 
19(4), 269–277. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02856515 
Descheemaeker, M., Spruyt, A., Fazio, R. H., & Hermans, D. (2017). On the generalization of 
attitude accessibility after repeated attitude expression. European Journal of Social 




Dhar, R. (1996). The effect of decision strategy on deciding to defer choice. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 9(4), 265–281. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0771(199612)9:4<265::AID-BDM231>3.0.CO;2-4 
Dhar, R. (1997). Context and Task Effects on Choice Deferral. Marketing Letters, 8(1), 119–130. 
Dhar, R., & Nowlis, S. M. (1999). The Effect of Time Pressure on Consumer Choice Deferral. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 25(March), 369–384. 
Dhar, R., & Simonson, I. (2003). The effect of forced choice on choice. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 40(2), 146–160. 
Dick, A. S., & Basu, K. (1994). Customer Loyalty: Toward an Integrated Conceptual 
Framework. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 22(2), 99–113. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0092070394222001 
Downing, J. W., Judd, C. M., & Brauer, M. (1992). Effects of repeated expressions on attitude 
extremity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(1), 17–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.1.17 
Duclos, R., & Barasch, A. (2014). Prosocial Behavior in Intergroup Relations: How Donor Self-
Construal and Recipient Group-Membership Shape Generosity. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 41(1), 93–108. https://doi.org/10.1086/674976 
Eagly, A. H. (1992). Uneven progress: Social psychology and the study of attitudes. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 63(5), 693. 
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1995). Attitude strength, attitude structure, and resistance to 
change. Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences, 4, 413–432. 
Eom, K., Kim, H. S., Sherman, D. K., & Ishii, K. (2016). Cultural Variability in the Link 




Science, 27(10), 1331–1339. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616660078 
Escalas, J. E., & Bettman, J. R. (2005). Self‐construal, reference groups, and brand meaning. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 32(3), 378–389. 
Fazio, R. H. (1990). A practical guide to the use of response latency in social psychological 
research. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 11, 74–97. 
Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determinants, consequences, 
and correlates of attitude accessibility. Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences, 4, 
247–282. 
Fazio, R. H. (2000). Accessible attitudes as tools for object appraisal: Their costs and benefits. In 
G. R. Maio & J. M. Olson (Eds.), Why we evaluate: Functions of attitudes (pp. 1–36). 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Fazio, R. H., Blascovich, J., & Driscoll, D. (1992). On the Functional Value of Attitudes: The 
Influence of Accessible Attitudes on the Ease and Quality of Decision Making. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(4), 388–401. https://doi.org/0803973233 
Fazio, R. H., Chen, J., McDonel, E. C., & Sherman, S. J. (1982). Attitude accessibility, attitude-
behavior consistency, and the strength of the object-evaluation association. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 18(4), 339–357. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-
1031(82)90058-0 
Fazio, R. H., Herr, P. M., & Olney, T. J. (1984). Attitude accessibility following a self-
perception process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(2), 277–286. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.47.2.277 
Fazio, R. H., Ledbetter, J. E., & Towles-Schwen, T. (2000). On the costs of accessible attitudes: 




Psychology, 78(2), 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.2.197 
Fazio, R. H., & Powell, M. C. (1997). On the Value of Knowing One’s Likes and Dislikes: 
Attitude Accessibility, Stress, and Health in College. Psychological Science, 8(6), 430–436. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00456.x 
Fazio, R. H., Powell, M. C., & Williams, C. J. (1989). The Role of Attitude Accessibility in the 
Attitude-to-Behavior Process. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(3), 280–288. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2489509 
Fazio, R. H., & Williams, C. J. (1986). Attitude accessibility as a moderator of the attitude-
perception and attitude-behavior relations: an investigation of the 1984 presidential election. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(3), 505–514. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.3.505 
Fejfar, M. C., & Hoyle, R. H. (2000). Effect of private self-awareness on negative affect and 
self-referent attribution: A quantitative review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
4(2), 132–142. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0402_02 
Feldman, J. M., & Lynch, J. G. (1988). Self-Generated Validity and Other Effects of 
Measurement on Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
73(3), 421–435. 
Fischer, R. (2004). Standardization to account for cross-cultural response bias: A classification 
of score adjustment procedures and review of research in JCCP. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 35(3), 263–282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022104264122 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1974). Attitudes towards objects as predictors of single and multiple 
behavioral criteria. Psychological Review, 81(1), 59–74. 




country-of-origin effects. Journal of Business Research, 61(3), 233–242. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.06.015 
Freling, T. H., & Dacin, P. A. (2010). When consensus counts: Exploring the impact of 
consensus claims in advertising. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20(2), 163–175. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2009.12.001 
Froming, W. J., Walker, G. R., & Lopyan, K. J. (1982). Public and private self-awareness: When 
personal attitudes conflict with societal expectations. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 18(5), 476–487. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(82)90067-1 
Gardner, W. L., Gabriel, S., & Lee, A. Y. (1999). " I " Value Freedom , but " We “ Value 
Relationships : Self-Construal Priming Mirrors Cultural Differences in Judgment.” 
Psychological Science, 10(4), 321–326. 
Gibbons, F. X. (1990). Self-Attention and Behavior: a Review and Theoretical. In Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 249–303). Academic Press. 
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 
21–38. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.1.21 
Gilliam, F. D. (1985). Influences on Voter Turnout for U. S. House Elections in Non-Presidential 
Years. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 10(3), 339. https://doi.org/10.2307/440035 
Goukens, C., Dewitte, S., & Warlop, L. (2009). Me, Myself, and My Choices: The Influence of 
Private Self-Awareness on Choice. Journal of Marketing Research, 46(5), 682–692. 
https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.46.5.682 
Govern, J. M., & Marsch, L. A. (2001). Development and Validation of the Situational Self-





Greenwald, A. G., & Pratkanis, A. R. (1984). The Self. In R. S. J. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), 
Handbook of social cognitio (pp. 129–178). Mahwah, PA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Publishers. 
Griskevicius, V., Goldstein, N. J., Mortensen, C. R., Cialdini, R. B., & Kenrick, D. T. (2006). 
Going along versus going alone: When fundamental motives facilitate strategic 
(non)conformity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(2), 281–294. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.2.281 
Griskevicius, V., Goldstein, N. J., Mortensen, C. R., Jill, M., Cialdini, R. B., & Kenrick, D. T. 
(2009). Fear and Loving in Las Vegas : Evolution , Emotion , and Persuasion. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 46(3), 384–395. 
Hamilton, R. W., & Biehal, G. J. (2005). Achieving Your Goais or Protecting Their Future ? The 
Effects of Seif-View on Goais and Choices. Journal of Consumer Research, 32(September). 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: 
A Regression-Based Approach. New York, NY: Guilford. 
Hayes, A. F. (2018). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis 
second edition: A regression-based approach. New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
He, S. X., & Bond, S. D. (2015). Why Is the Crowd Divided? Attribution for Dispersion in 
Online Word of Mouth. Journal of Consumer Research, 41(6), 1509–1527. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/680667 
Hellofs, L. L., & Jacobson, R. (1999). Market Share and Customers’ Perceptions of Quality: 
When Can Firms Grow Their Way to Higher versus Lower Quality? Journal of Marketing, 
63(1), 16–25. https://doi.org/10.2307/1251998 




Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Holland, R. W., Verplanken, B., & van Knippenberg, A. (2003). From repetition to conviction: 
Attitude accessibility as a determinant of attitude certainty. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 39(6), 594–601. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00038-6 
Hong, J., & Chang, H. H. (2015). “I” Follow My Heart and “We” Rely on Reasons: The Impact 
of Self-Construal on Reliance on Feelings versus Reasons in Decision Making. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 41(6), 1392–1411. https://doi.org/10.1086/680082 
Hormuth, S. E. (1982). Self-awareness and drive theory: Comparing internal standards and 
dominant responses. European Journal of Social Psychology, 12, 31–45. 
Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Kitayama, S., & Lackenbauer, 
S. (2005). On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of Easterners and 
Westerners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(3), 294–310. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.294 
Houston, D. A., & Fazio, R. H. (1989). Biased Processing as a Function of Attitude 
Accessibility: Making Objective Judgments Subjectively. Social Cognition, 7(1), 51–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1989.7.1.51 
Huber, O., & Seiser, G. (2001). Accounting and convincing: The effect of two types of 
justification on the decision process. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14(1), 69–85. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0771(200101)14:1%3C69::AID-
BDM366%3E3.0.CO;2-T 
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (1999). Rethinking the value of choice: a cultural perspective on 
intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(3), 349. 




American Political Science Review, 72(2), 469–491. 
Jacobson, R. P., Mortensen, C. R., & Cialdini, R. B. (2011). Bodies obliged and unbound: 
Differentiated response tendencies for injunctive and descriptive social norms. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 100(3), 433–448. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021470 
Ji, L.-J., Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture, control, and perception of relationships in 
the environment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(5), 943. 
Kacen, J. J., & Lee, J. A. (2002). The Influence of Culture on Consumer Impulsive Buying 
Behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 12(2), 163–176. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327663JCP1202_08 
Kallgren, C. A., Reno, R. R., & Cialdini, R. B. (2000). A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: 
When Norms Do and Do Not Affect Behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
26(8), 1002–1012. 
Katz, D. (1960). The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
24(2), 163–204. 
Keller, K. L. (1993). Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer-Based Brand Equity. 
Journal of Marketing, 57(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/1252054 
Keller, K. L. (2008). Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring and Managing. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Keller, K. L., & Lehmann, D. R. (2003). How do brands create value? Marketing Management, 
12(3), 26–31. 
Kim, H. S., & Drolet, A. (2003). Choice and self-expression: a cultural analysis of variety-





Kim, H. S., & Drolet, A. (2009). Express your social self: cultural differences in choice of brand-
name versus generic products. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(12), 1555–
1566. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167209348641 
Kim, H. S., & Markus, H. R. (1999). Deviance or Uniqueness, Harmony or Conformity? A 
Cultural Analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(4), 785–800. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.4.785 
Kim, H. S., & Sherman, D. K. (2007). “Express yourself”: culture and the effect of self-
expression on choice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(1), 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.1.1 
Kitayama, S., Snibbe, A. C., Markus, H. R., & Suzuki, T. (2004). Is there any “free” choice? Self 
and dissonance in two cultures. Psychological Science, 15(8), 527–533. 
Knowles, E. D., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C.-Y., & Hong, Y. (2001). Culture and the Process of 
Person Perception: Evidence for Automaticity Among East Asians in Correcting for 
Situational Influences on Behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(10), 
1344–1356. 
Kuhn, M. H., & McPartland, T. S. (1954). An empirical investigation of self-attitudes. American 
Sociological Review, 68–76. 
Lai, J., He, P., Chou, H.-M., & Zhou, L. (2013). Impact of national culture on online consumer 
review behavior. Global Journal of Business Research, 7(1), 109–115. 
Lalwani, A. K., & Shavitt, S. (2009). The “me” I claim to be: cultural self-construal elicits self-
presentational goal pursuit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 88–102. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014100 




Price-Quality Judgments. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(2), 255–267. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/670034 
Lalwani, A. K., Shavitt, S., & Johnson, T. (2006). What is the relation between cultural 
orientation and socially desirable responding? Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90(1), 165–178. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.1.165 
Lalwani, A. K., & Wang, J. J. (2019). How Do Consumers ’ Cultural Backgrounds and Values 
Influence Their Coupon Proneness?: A Multi-Method Investigation. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 45(5), 1037–1050. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucy033/4969824 
Lam, A. G., & Zane, N. W. S. (2004). Ethnic differences in coping with interpersonal stressors: 
A test of self-construals as cultural mediators. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35(4), 
446–459. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022104266108 
Lee, A. Y., Aaker, J. L., & Gardner, W. L. (2000). The pleasures and pains of distinct self-
construals: the role of interdependence in regulatory focus. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78(6), 1122–1134. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.6.1122 
Lehmann, D. R., Keller, K. L., & Farley, J. U. (2008). The Structure of Survey-Based Brand 
Metrics. Journal of International Marketing, 16(4), 29–56. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Lord, K. R., Lee, M., & Sauer, P. L. (1995). The Combined Influence Hypothesis : Central and 
Peripheral Antecedents of Attitude toward the Ad. Journal of Advertising, 24(1), 73–85. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00913367.1995.10673469 
Mackenzie, S. B., Lutz, R. J., & Belch, G. E. (1986). Competing Explanations The Role of 
Attitude Toward the Ad as a Mediator of Advertising Effectiveness: A Test of Competing 




Maheswaran, D., & Chaiken, S. (1991). Promoting systematic processing in low-motivation 
settings: Effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 61(1), 13–25. 
Maheswaran, D., & Shavitt, S. (2000). Issues and New Directions in Global Consumer 
Psychology. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 9(2), 59–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327663JCP0902_1 
Mandel, N. (2003). Shifting Selves and Decision Making: The Effects of Self-Construal Priming 
on Consumer Risk-Taking. Journal of Consumer Research, 30(1), 30–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/374700 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, 
and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224–253. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2003). Culture, Self, and the Reality of the Social. Psychological 
Inquiry, 14(3–4), 277–283. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2003.9682893 
Masuda, T., & Kitayama, S. (2004). Perceiver-induced constraint and attitude attribution in 
Japan and the US : A case for the cultural dependence of the correspondence bias q. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 409–416. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2003.08.004 
Masuda, T., & Nisbett, R. E. (2001). Attending holistically versus analytically: comparing the 
context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(5), 922–934. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.922 
Matyszczyk, C. (2017). Facebook named the world’s most loved brand. Retrieved November 19, 
2017, from https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-named-the-worlds-most-loved-brand/ 




Psychological Foundations of Attitudes, 171–196. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-1-4832-
3071-9.50013-1 
Milbrath, L. W. (1965). Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics? 
Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Miller, J. G. (1984). Culture and development of everyday social explanation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 46(5), 961–978. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.46.5.961 
Miller, J. G., Bersoff, D. M., & Harwood, R. L. (1990). Perceptions of Social Responsibilities in 
India and in the United States: Moral Imperatives or Personal Decisions? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 58(1), 33–47. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.58.1.33 
Miller, J. G., Das, R., & Chakravarthy, S. (2011). Culture and the role of choice in agency. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(1), 46–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023330 
Mizik, N., & Jacobson, R. (2008). The Financial Value Impact of Perceptual Brand Attributes. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 45(1), 15–32. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.1.15 
Monga, A. B., & John, D. R. (2007). Cultural Differences in Brand Extension Evaluation: The 
Influence of Analytic versus Holistic Thinking. Journal of Consumer Research, 33(4), 529–
536. https://doi.org/10.1086/510227 
Morling, B., Kitayama, S., & Miyamoto, Y. (2002). Cultural Practices Emphasize Influence in 
the United States and Adjustment in Japan. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
28(3), 311–323. 




social and physical events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 949–971. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.949 
Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: 
holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108(2), 291–310. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.2.291 
Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W.-S. (2007). Priming “Culture”: Culture as Situated Cognition. In S. 
Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of Cultural Psychology (1st ed., pp. 255–281). 
New York: Guilford. Retrieved from http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2007-12976-010 
Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. S. (2008). Does Culture Influence What and How We Think ? 
Effects of Priming Individualism and Collectivism. Psychological Bulletin, 134(2), 311–
342. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.311 
Park, C. S., & Srinivasan, V. (1994). A Survey-Based Method for Measuring and Understanding 
Brand Equity and Its Extendibility. Journal of Marketing Research, 31(2), 271–288. 
Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/felix/OneDrive/Dokumente/Citavi 
5/Projects/Bachelorarbeit/Citavi Attachments/Park, Srinivasan 1994 - A Survey-Based 
Method for Measuring.pdf%5Cnfile:///C:/Users/felix/OneDrive/Dokumente/Citavi 
5/Projects/Bachelorarbeit/Citavi Attachments/ 
Park, H. S. (2001). Self–construals as motivating factors in opinion shifts resulting from 
exposure to majority opinions. Communication Reports, 14(2), 105–116. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08934210109367742 
Parker, J. R., Lehmann, D. R., & Xie, Y. (2016). Decision comfort. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 43(1), 113–133. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucw010 




York: Bloomsbury Press. 
Petrocelli, J. V., Tormala, Z. L., & Rucker, D. D. (2007). Unpacking attitude certainty: attitude 
clarity and attitude correctness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(1), 30–
41. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.1.30 
Petrova, P. K., Cialdini, R. B., & Sills, S. J. (2007). Consistency-based compliance across 
cultures. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43, 104–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.04.002 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979). Issue involvement can increase or decrease persuasion by 
enhancing message-relevant cognitive responses. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 37(10), 1915. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral 
Routes to Attitude Change. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Schumann, D. (1983). Central and Peripheral Routes to 
Advertising Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Involvement. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 10(2), 135–146. https://doi.org/10.2307/2488919 
Petty, R. E., Kasmer, J. A., Haugtvedt, C. P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1987). Source and message 
factors in persuasion: A reply to stiff’s critique of the elaboration likelihood model Richard. 
Communication Monographs, 54(3), 233–249. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758709390229 
Petty, R. E., & Krosnick, J. A. (1995). Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Posavac, S. S., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., & Fazio, R. H. (1997). Considering the best choice: effects 
of the salience and accessibility of alternatives on attitude--decision consistency. Journal of 





Powell, M. C., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). Attitude Accessibility as a Function of Repeated 
Attitudinal Expression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 10(1), 139–148. 
Ratneshwar, S., & Chaiken, S. (2002). Comprehension’s Role in Persuasion: The Case of Its 
Moderating Effect on the Persuasive Impact of Source Cues. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 18(1), 52. https://doi.org/10.1086/209240 
Riemer, H., & Shavitt, S. (2011). Impression management in survey responding: Easier for 
collectivists or individualists? Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21(2), 157–168. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2010.10.001 
Riemer, H., Shavitt, S., Koo, M., & Markus, H. R. (2014). Preferences Don’t Have to Be 
Personal: Expanding Attitude Theorizing With a Cross-Cultural Perspective. Psychological 
Review, 121(4), 619–648. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037666. 
Rocklage, M. D., & Fazio, R. H. (2018). Attitude Accessibility as a Function of Emotionality. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(4), 1–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217743762 
Rodas, M., & Torelli, C. J. (2015). The Self-Expanding Process of Falling in Love With a Brand. 
In K. Diehl & C. Yoon (Eds.), NA - Advances in Consumer research (Vol. 43, pp. 181–
185). Duluth, MN: Association for Consumer Research. https://doi.org/43008804 
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1994). Attitude importance as a function of repeated attitude 
expression. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1994.1002 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R., & Fazio, R. H. (1992). On the orienting value of attitudes: attitude 




Personality and Social Psychology, 63(2), 198–211. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.63.2.198 
Rucker, D. D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Desire to acquire: Powerlessness and compensatory 
consumption. Journal of Consumer Research, 35(2), 257–267. 
Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2004). When Resistance is Futile: Consequences of Failed 
Counterarguing for Attitude Certainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(2), 
219–235. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.2.219 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic 
Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Beng. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jsfa.2740050407 
Savani, K., Markus, H. R., & Conner, A. L. (2008). Let your preference be your guide? 
Preferences and choices are more tightly linked for North Americans than for Indians. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(4), 861–876. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0011618 
Savani, K., Morris, M. W., & Naidu, N. V. R. (2012). Deference in Indians’ decision making: 
Introjected goals or injunctive norms? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
102(4), 685–699. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026415 
Savani, K., Wadhwa, M., Uchida, Y., Ding, Y., & Naidu, N. V. R. (2015). When norms loom 
larger than the self: Susceptibility of preference–choice consistency to normative influence 
across cultures. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 129, 70–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.09.001 
Schuette, R. A., & Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitude Accessibility and Motivation as Determinants of 




Bulletin, 21(7), 704–710. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167295217005 
Shavitt, S., & Barnes, A. J. (2019). Cross‐cultural consumer psychology. Consumer Psychology 
Review, 2(1), 70–84. https://doi.org/10.1002/arcp.1047 
Shavitt, S., Swan, S., Lowrey, T. M., & Wänke, M. (1994). The interaction of endorser 
attractiveness and involvement in persuasion depends on the goal that guides message 
processing. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 3(2), 137–162. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1057-7408(08)80002-2 
Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1956). An outline of social psychology. New York: Harper. 
Sia, T. L., Lord, C. G., Blessum, K. A., Thomas, J. C., & Lepper, M. R. (1999). Activation of 
exemplars in the process of assessing social category attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 76(4), 517–532. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.517 
Simonson, I. (1989). Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise Effects. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 16(2), 158. https://doi.org/10.1086/209205 
Simonson, I. (1990). The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking Behavior. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 27(2), 150–162. 
Simpson, B., White, K. M., & Laran, J. (2017). When Public Recognition for Charitable Giving 
Backfires: The Role of Independent Self-Construal. Journal of Consumer Research, 44(6), 
1257–1273. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucx101/4237396 
Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(5), 580–591. 
Smith, E. R., Fazio, R. H., & Cejka, M. A. (1996). Accessible Attitudes Influence Categorization 





Smith, M. B., Bruner, J. S., & White, R. W. (1956). Opinions and personality. New York, NY: 
Wiley. 
Snyder, M., & Kendzierski, D. (1982). Acting on one’s attitudes: Procedures for linking attitude 
and behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 18(2), 165–183. 
Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., & Fong, G. T. (2005). Establishing a causal chain: Why 
experiments are often more effective than mediational analyses in examining psychological 
processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 845–851. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.845 
Spiller, S. A., Fitzsimons, G. J., Lynch, J. G., & McClelland, G. H. (2013). Spotlights, 
Floodlights, and the Magic Number Zero: Simple Effects Tests in Moderated Regression. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 50(2), 277–288. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.12.0420 
Sriram, S., Balachander, S., & Kalwani, M. U. (2007). Monitoring the Dynamics of Brand 
Equity Using Store-Level Data. Journal of Marketing, 71(April), 61–78. 
Stahl, F., Heitmann, M., Lehmann, D. R., & Neslin, S. A. (2012). The Impact of Brand Equity on 
Customer Acquisition, Retention, and Profit Margin. Journal of Marketing, 76(4), 44–63. 
https://doi.org/10.1509/jm.10.0522 
Stayman, D. M., & Kardes, F. R. (1992). Spontaneous Inference Processes in Advertising: 
Effects of Need for Cognition and Self-Monitoring on Inference Generation and Utilization. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1(2), 125–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-
7408(08)80053-8 
Stephens, N. M., Fryberg, S. A., & Markus, H. R. (2011). When Choice Does Not Equal 
Freedom : A Sociocultural Analysis of Agency in Working-Class American Contexts. 





Suh, E., Diener, E., Oishi, S., & Triandis, H. C. (1998). The Shifting Basis of Life Satisfaction 
Judgments Across Cultures : Emotions Versus Norms. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74(2), 482–493. 
Suh, E. M. (2002). Culture, Identity Consistency, and Subjective Well-Being. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1378–1391. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-
3514.83.6.1378 
Tetlock, P. E., & Boettger, R. (1994). Accountability amplifies the status quo effect when change 
creates victims. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 7(April), 1–23. 
Tetlock, P. E., & Kim, J. I. (1987). Accountability and judgment processes in a personality 
prediction task. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(4), 700–709. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.4.700 
Torelli, C. J. (2006). Individuality or Conformity? The Effect of Independent and Interdependent 
Self-Concepts on Public Judgments. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 16(3), 240–248. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327663jcp1603_6 
Torelli, C. J., & Kaikati, A. M. (2009). Values as predictors of judgments and behaviors: the role 
of abstract and concrete mindsets. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(1), 
231–247. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013836 
Torelli, C. J., & Shavitt, S. (2010). Culture and concepts of power. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 99(4), 703–723. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019973 
Tormala, Z. L., & Rucker, D. D. (2007). Attitude Certainty: A Review of Past Findings and 





Trafimow, D., Triandis, H. C., & Goto, S. G. (1991). Some tests of the distinction between the 
private self and the collective self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(5), 
649. 
Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. Psychological 
Review, 96(3), 506–520. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.96.3.506 
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism & collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Triandis, H. C. (1996). The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. American 
Psychologist, 51(407–415). 
Triandis, H. C. (2012). Culture and Conflict. In L. A. Samovar, R. E. Porter, & E. R. McDaniel 
(Eds.), Intercultural communication: A reader (13th ed., pp. 34–45). Boston, MA: 
Wadsworth. 
Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical 
individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(1), 118–
128. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.1.118 
Tu, Y., & Fishbach, A. (2015). Words Speak Louder: Conforming to Preferences More Than 
Actions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(2), 193–209. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000031 
Tversky, A., & Shafir, E. (1992). Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of the Deferred 
Decision. Psychological Science, 3(6), 358–361. 
Van Baaren, R. B., Maddux, W. W., Chartrand, T. L., De Bouter, C., & Van Knippenberg, A. 
(2003). It Takes Two to Mimic: Behavioral Consequences of Self-Construals. Journal of 





van Prooijen, J. W., & van den Bos, K. (2009). We blame innocent victims more than i do: Self-
construal level moderates responses to just-world threats. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 35(11), 1528–1539. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167209344728 
Vandello, J. a., & Cohen, D. (1999). Patterns of individualism and collectivism across the United 
States. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(2), 279–292. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.279 
Wang, J., Zhu, R. (Juliet), & Shiv, B. (2012). The Lonely Consumer: Loner or Conformer? 
Journal of Consumer Research, 38(6), 1116–1128. https://doi.org/10.1086/661552 
West, P. M., & Broniarczyk, S. M. (1998). Integrating Multiple Opinions: The Role of 
Aspiration Level on Consumer Responses to Critic Consensus. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 25(June), 38–51. 
White, K. M., Hogg, M. A., & Terry, D. J. (2002). Improving Attitude – Behavior 
Correspondence Through Exposure to Normative Support From a Salient Ingroup. Basic 
and Applied Social Psychology, 24(2), 91–103. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15324834BASP2402 
White, K. M., & Simpson, B. (2013). When Do (and Don’t) Normative Appeals Influence 
Sustainable Consumer Behaviors? Journal of Marketing, 77(March), 78–95. 
Wood, W., Christensen, P. N., Hebl, M. R., & Rothgerber, H. (1997). Conformity to Sex-Typed 
Norms , Affect , and the Self-Concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(3), 
523–535. 
Wu, E. C., Cutright, K. M., & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2011). How Asking “Who Am I?” Affects What 
Consumers Buy: The Influence of Self-Discovery on Consumption. Journal of Marketing 




Wu, E. C., Moore, S. G., & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2019). Wine for the Table: Self-Construal, Group 
Size, and Choice for Self and Others. Journal of Consumer Research. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucy082 
Wu, L., & Lee, C. (2016). Limited Edition for Me and Best Seller for You: The Impact of 
Scarcity versus Popularity Cues on Self versus Other-Purchase Behavior. Journal of 
Retailing, 92(4), 486–499. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2016.08.001 
Yang, L. W., Cutright, K. M., Chartrand, T. L., & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2014). Distinctively 
Different: Exposure to Multiple Brands in Low-Elaboration Settings. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 40(5), 973–992. https://doi.org/10.1086/673522 
Ybarra, O., & Trafimow, D. (1998). How Priming the Private Self or Collective Self Affects the 
Relative Weights of Attitudes and Subjective Norms. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 24(4), 362–370. 
Young, A. I., & Fazio, R. H. (2013). Attitude accessibility as a determinant of object construal 
and evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(3), 404–418. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.12.009 
Zanna, M. P., & Fazio, R. H. (1982). The attitude behavior relation: Moving toward a third 
generation of research. In M. P. Zanna, E. T. Higgins, & C. P. Herman (Eds.), Consistency 
in social behavior: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 2, pp. 283–301). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Zhang, Y., Feick, L., & Price, L. J. (2006). The Impact of Self-Construal on Aesthetic Preference 
for Angular Versus Rounded Shapes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(6), 
794–805. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206286626 











APPENDIX A: CAMPAIGN SPENDING INCREASED VOTER TURNOUT IN 
INDEPENDENT, BUT NOT INTERDEPENDENT, DISTRICTS IN THE 2016 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 
Political campaigns invest to make candidates salient in the minds of consumers. 
Campaign expenditures increase awareness so that voters remember the candidate at the polls. 
Indeed, campaign expenditures buy nonincumbent candidates’ the necessary name recognition 
that incumbents already enjoy (Jacobson, 1978). Moreover, campaign spending has been 
considered the most important congressional contextual variable that affects turnout (Gilliam, 
1985). Every $1,000 of campaign expenditures increases voter turnout by 1-2% (Conway, 1981; 
Dawson & Zinser, 1976). Thus, similar to attitudes research in social psychology, political 
science research suggests that campaign spending increases the accessibility of attitudes toward 
political candidates and helps voters cope via increased turnout.  
Drawing on recent attitude theory suggesting a normative-contextual model of attitudes 
(Riemer et al., 2014), we propose that campaign spending affects turnout as a function of the 
voters’ independent and interdependent self-construals. The model suggests that for 
interdependents, attitudes are grounded in and shaped by social norms instead of driven by 
personal preferences. One implication of the model is that, for interdependents, increasing the 
accessibility of an attitude may only ease decision making if the attitude aligns with 
contextualized norms. In contrast, increasing the accessibility of independents’ attitude should 
ease decision making because the accessibility makes the attitude more personal and diagnostic.  
Therefore, we propose that having accessible political preferences would only increase 
readiness to cast a vote (indexed by voter turnout) in more independent districts. Past research 




Competition is often specified by the margin of victory in past races and can therefore 
communicate a clear voting norm. In one study of midterm congressional elections, a high 
competition in the previous race (i.e., low norm clarity) increased voter interest and turnout in 
the current election (Milbrath, 1965). In light of this stream of research, we expected campaign 
spending to increase turnout in competitive (vs. non-competitive) independent districts because 
(a) increasing the accessibility of one’s political preferences in independent districts might make 
preferences more personal and diagnostic and (b) people in independent districts may be 
motivated to vote in contexts of low norm clarity because they perceive personal agency in their 
vote. In contrast, we expected campaign spending to decrease turnout in competitive (vs. non-
competitive) interdependent districts because increasing the accessibility of one’s political 
preferences in interdependent districts might make preferences more personal, but not clearly 
aligned with the relevant norm because of the low norm clarity in competitive elections. 
Method 
First, we acquired the voter turnout results in each U.S. congressional district for the 
2017 election (www.clerk.house.gov). Turnout was calculated as the proportion of total votes to 
the voting age population. This resulted in a dataset of 433 out of the 436 possible congressional 
districts.  
Second, we collected spending data for each district (www.fec.gov). We aggregated the 
total disbursements from all candidates running in the 2016 election. Then, following past work 
(Gilliam, 1985), we divided total spending by the district’s voting age population to create a 
proportion of campaign expenditures per eligible voter. The spending per eligible voter was the 




 Third, we calculated an interdependence score for each district using a validated 
approach (Vandello & Cohen, 1999). The method uses indicators from the U.S. Census that 
theoretically correspond the concepts of independent and interdependent self-construals. For 
example, districts with more people who carpool to work are relatively more interdependent than 
districts where more people drive to work alone. In contrast, districts with higher (vs. lower) 
percentages of people living alone are relatively more independent (for more detail on the 
methodological approach and potential shortcomings, see the Supplemental Material available 
online). There were three collectivism indicators and three individualism indicators. We reverse-
scored the independent self-construal indicators and averaged them with the interdependent self-
construal indicators, creating a single score where higher (lower) numbers indicated more 
interdependent (independent) districts ( = .78).  
 Fourth, we used the margin of victory in the previous congressional election to determine 
the norm clarity in the district (Gilliam, 1985). High margin of victory thus represented high 
norm clarity. We subtracted the margin of victory from one so that positive coefficients 
described a positive relationship between competitiveness and turnout, as observed in prior 
research (Milbrath, 1985). Finally, we used ordinary least squares regression to examine the 
interactive relationship between campaign spending, collectivism, and competitiveness on voter 
turnout, controlling for the percentage of spending attributable to the incumbent, the percentage 
of people with a bachelor’s degree, and the district’s partisan leaning (Cook Partisan Voting 
Index [PVI]). 
Results 
A three-way interaction indicated that norm clarity moderated the relationship between 




moderator (norm clarity) was continuous, we looked for the turning points for where exactly, in 
absolute terms of the moderator, the interactive effect of spending and self-construal turns from 
positive to negative (Spiller et al., 2013). The figure below illustrates the effect of spending on 
turnout for independent and interdependent districts in races with high and low norm clarity. 
Figure A.1 Turnout as a Function of Campaign Spending, Culture, and Race Competitiveness 
 
For districts with high norm clarity, those with approximately 70% margin of victory or 
more in the last race (e.g., values at or below Z = -1.435), the interaction between spending and 
interdependent self-construal was positive (p < .05). As spending increased, turnout decreased in 
independent (Z = 1) districts (p = .015), but not interdependent (Z = -1) districts (p = .634). On 
the other hand, for districts with low norm clarity, those with approximately 5% margin of 
victory or less in the last race (e.g., values at or above Z = 1.25), the interaction between 
spending and interdependent self-construal was negative and marginally significant (p < .07). As 
spending increased, turnout tended to increase in independent districts (p = .115), but not 
High norm clarity 
>70 % margin of victory 
Low norm clarity 




interdependent districts (p = .556). Conceptually, these findings suggest that, in independent 
districts, more accessible preferences increased readiness to act when contexts of low voter norm 
clarity, more accessible preferences decreased (directionally increased) readiness in contexts of 
high (low) norm clarity. For interdependent districts, accessibility was not significantly related 
with the readiness to act in contexts of high or low norm clarity. 
Table A.1 Regression Results from 2016 Congression Election Data 
 
Three-way interaction model 
 
b SE p 
Intercept -.008 .032 .807 
PVI -.257 .038 < .001 
Incumbent % -.134 .036 < .001 
Bachelor’s % 29.27 3.05 < .001 
Spending -.028 .048 .556 
Collectivism -.56 .032 < .001 
Spending  Collectivism .04 .052 .444 
Spending  Competition .055 .047 .237 
Collectivism  Competition -.01 .03 .739 







 The results from this study help generalize the implications of our previous experiments 
to real world voting behavior. The main studies demonstrated that cultural self-construal 
moderated the relationship between attitude accessibility and the readiness to act. In the current 
study, a significant interaction between accessibility, self-construal, and norm clarity suggest that 
norm clarity further moderates the relationship between accessibility, self-construal, and 




district campaign spending per eligible voter) directionally improved voter turnout for 
independent (vs. interdependent) congressional districts. This result was observed in districts 
with low norm clarity. In contrast, when there was high norm clarity (i.e., the race was less 
competitive), campaign spending had the opposite effect; increased expenditures decreased 
turnout for independent (vs. interdependent) districts. Importantly, we observed these 
relationships controlling for several factors, extending prior political science research by 







APPENDIX B: MEASURES, STIMULI, PRETESTS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES 
FOR CHAPTER 2 
Appendix B.1 
Readiness and Discomfort Measures in Studies 1-3 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.  
Indicate to what extent you would feel each emotion as the conversation continued about 
autonomous cars. 
Use the following scale to record your answers. 
   Not at all      Very much 













 Accessible Preferences Increased Readiness for Interdependents When an Irrelevant (vs. 
Relevant) Norm was Salient 
 There were two primary goals of this study. First, we aimed to replicate the basic finding 
from past literature that accessible preferences increase readiness. Second, we aimed to moderate 
this effect for interdependents when a relevant norm was made salient. Attitude accessibility was 
measured. Self-construal and norm salience were manipulated. We predicted that for 
independents, more accessible preferences would be associated with greater readiness regardless 
of which norm was salient. In contrast, we predicted that for interdependents, more accessible 
preferences would be associated with greater readiness when an irrelevant norm, but not when a 
relevant norm was salient. 
Method 
Pretest. We pretested two articles to manipulate norm salience. Seventy-nine 
undergraduates  were assigned to read an article about soft drinks or salty snacks. The article in 
the relevant norm condition was titled, “Fewer consume sugary drinks, but decline is even across 
US, study says.” The article in the irrelevant norm condition was titled, “Fewer consume salty 
snacks, but decline is even across US, study says.” After reading the article, participants rated 
how much the article made soda drinking norms salient on three items (“The article made me 
think about whether drinking soda/pop is,” inappropriate/appropriate, the wrong/right thing to 
do, a bad/good thing to do). As expected, participants in the relevant (vs. irrelevant) norm 
condition indicated that the article made drinking norms salient (Mrelevant norm = 3.05, Mirrelevant norm 
= 3.94, t(77) = 2.13, p = .037). Follow-up one-sample t-tests within each condition confirmed 




midpoint (t < 1, ns). In contrast, perceived norm salience was significant below the midpoint in 
the relevant norm condition (t(42) = -3.38, p = .002). 
Main Study Method 
Two hundred and thirty-seven undergraduates completed the study for research 
participation course credit. The study used a measured accessibility  2 (self-construal: 
independent vs. interdependent)  2 (salient norm: relevant vs. irrelevant) between-subjects 
design. 
Participants first completed a brief survey about their prior soft drink consumption. Next, 
they rated their relative preferences for six soft drink pairs after three filler preferences to 
calibrate their response latencies. Their preference for Coca-Cola versus Pepsi was the focal 
attitude (i.e., 1 = definitely prefer Coke, 7 = definitely prefer Pepsi). We captured their response 
latency on all preference measures to indicate attitude accessibility.  
Next, we randomly assigned participants to self-construal prime conditions. All 
participants were asked to read a short story and count the number of pronouns (Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996). Participants in the independent condition counted the number of first-person 
singular pronouns (e.g., I, me, my). Those in the interdependent condition counted the number of 
third-person plural pronouns (e.g., we, us, our).  
Following the self-construal prime, we manipulated norm salience with news articles. 
Participants in the relevant norm condition read an article about how fewer people were drinking 
sugary beverages. Those in the irrelevant norm condition read a similar article about how fewer 
people were eating salty snacks.  
Finally, all participants were asked to imagine that they were buying a soft drink for their 




Pepsi. They also rated the importance of six factors intended to measure responsiveness concerns 
(e.g., being flexible, 1 = not at all important, 7 = very important).  
Results 
Instead of indexing attitude accessibility with each participant’s linear transformed 
latency to a single item, we computed participants’ relative attitude accessibility using their own 
distribution of latencies. Following past research (Fazio et al., 1989), we calculated a z-score of 
the response latency to the focal preference (i.e., Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi) relative to that subject’s 
average and standard deviation of the latencies to soft drink preferences.  
Previous research has found a relation between attitude accessibility and attitude 
extremity (Fazio et al., 1989; Fazio & Williams, 1986; Powell & Fazio, 1984). We observed a 
similar correlation in the present data (r = .162, p = .013). Given prior empirical support for an 
accessibility–extremity correlation and the absence of such a correlation in the current data, we 
conducted analyses with extremity as a covariate to ensure that the effects of attitude 
accessibility were not due to attitude extremity. 
Soft Drink Readiness. We predicted that for independents, more accessible preferences 
would be associated with greater readiness to act regardless of which norm was salient. In 
contrast, we predicted that for interdependents, more accessible preferences would be associated 
with greater readiness when an irrelevant norm, but not when a relevant norm was salient. A 
regression model predicting soft drink readiness ( = .81) with the accessibility z-score, self-
construal, norm salience, and all possible interactions revealed a three-way interaction ( = -.31, 
se = .10, p = .015). We conducted follow-up analyses to test our specific predictions.  
The analyses in the interdependent condition matched our expectations. More accessible 




.27, p = .02), but not in the relevant norm condition (p = .57). However, the analyses in the 
independent condition did not match our expectations. More accessible preferences did not 
significantly affect readiness to act in either norm conditions (ps > .13).  
Discussion 
 The results of this study provide partial support for our theorization. The overall 3-way 
interaction and significant effects in the interdependent condition suggest that the relationship 






Accessible Preferences Influenced Decision Making Tendencies for Interdependents (vs. 
Independents) 
Overview 
 The main goal of the following series of studies was to show that having more accessible 
preferences can influence interdependents’ downstream decision making. The logic is that if 
having accessible preferences elicits some need to consider others’ views among 
interdependents, then they might show increased effort in a task that calls upon their accessible 
preference and tend to follow decision making strategies in subsequent contexts that reflects 
consideration of others’ views.  
We considered two possible decision strategies that reflect consideration of others’ 
views: norm-seeking and utility-seeking strategies. On one hand, interdependents with more 
accessible preferences might show norm-seeking decision making strategy. That is, their 
decisions might follow a tendency to select options that dominate on popularity. If having 
accessible attitudes is unsettling to interdependents because they do not know if their preference 
fits in with others, then information that communicates others’ preferences should guide 
interdependents’ decision making tendencies more when attitude accessibility is high (vs. low). 
This is consistent with prior work which has shown (e.g., Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997) and 
theorized (Riemer et al., 2014) that others’ preferences are integral to collectivists’ preferences. 
Therefore, one prediction is that having more accessible preferences increases interdependents’ 
need to consider others’ views and activates a tendency to use a decision making strategy that 




On the other hand, interdependents with more accessible preferences might show a 
utility-seeking decision making strategy. That is, their decisions might follow a tendency to 
select options that dominate on utility. Past work has shown that interdependents’ (vs. 
independents) relative propensity to feel the need to justify their decisions to others manifests in 
decisions that are superior on cognitive or utilitarian attributes instead of affective or hedonic 
attributes (Hong & Chang, 2015). Therefore, a second prediction is that having more accessible 
preferences increases interdependents’ need to consider others’ views and activates a tendency to 
use a decision making strategy that prioritizes more utilitarian attributes. 
 Three studies are reported here. Each uses the same procedure with minor tweaks in each 
subsequent replication. Across studies, the data suggest that more accessible attitudes increase 
effort among interdependents, but do not increase effort among independents. Moreover, the 
studies show that having more accessible attitudes does increase the use of decision making 
strategies that reflect consideration of others’ views, but the specific tendency is different 
between studies. Studies A and B show a tendency for interdependents with more accessible 
attitudes to adopt a norm-seeking decision making strategy. Study C suggests a tendency for 
interdependents with more accessible attitudes to adopt a utility-seeking decision making 
strategy. We will describe the method in detail for Study A and clarify the important changes in 
the replication attempts. 
Method 
Pretest. We conducted a pretest to construct choice scenarios that differed in their 
justifiability. 80 participants saw the tables presented in the figure below and were asked which 
consumer would have to justify their choice more: a consumer who chose option A, B, or C. In 




hedonic attribute, and one option dominated on the popularity attribute. Thus, participants made 
three discrete choices of which consumer would feel the most pressure to justify their choice.  
 We calculated each participant’s tendency to select the utilitarian option, tendency to 
select the hedonic option, and tendency to select the popular option; the scores for each tendency 
could range from 0-3. The results of 3 paired-samples t-tests revealed that participants thought 
consumers who chose the popular option (M = 1.34) would need to justify their choice more than 
consumers who chose the utilitarian option (M = .71; t(79) = 3.11, p = .003) and more than 
consumers who chose the hedonic option (M = .94; t(79) = 1.97, p = .053). The difference 
between consumers who chose the utilitarian versus the hedonic option was not significant (t(79) 
= 1.48, p = .143). 
However, we also conducted a paired-samples t-test between the participants who chose 
the utilitarian option and the participants who chose either the hedonic or the popular option. 
Participants thought that consumers who chose the either the hedonic or the popular option (M = 
2.29) would have to justify their decision more than consumers who chose the utilitarian option 
(M = .71; t(79) = 8.06, p < .001).  






Study A Method 
 Participants and Design. 203 adults (Mage = 37, 103 women) recruited from MTurk 
participated in the study for money. The study used a 2 (attitude accessibility: high vs. low)  2 
(self-construal: interdependent vs. independent) between-subjects design. 27 participants did not 
follow the instructions and were removed from the analyses, leaving a usable sample of 176 
participants. 
Procedure and Measures. The study consisted of three parts. First, participants read that 
the experimenters were interested in their personal opinions about some restaurants. Participants 
were then randomly assigned to rehearse preferences about two lunch restaurants (high 
accessibility) or two coffee shops (low accessibility). Those in the high accessibility condition 
rated Chipotle Mexican Grill and Qdoba Mexican Eats on three, seven-point semantic 
differential scales each (bad/good, dislike/like, disapprove/approve). Then, they rated their 
relative preference between Chipotle and Qdoba (1 = definitely prefer Chipotle, 7 = definitely 
prefer Qdoba) and between Starbucks and Dunkin (1 = definitely prefer Starbucks, 7 = definitely 
prefer Dunkin). Participants in the low accessibility condition rated Starbucks and Dunkin on the 
same semantic differential scales, rated their relative preference between the two coffee shops, 
and rated their relative preference between the two restaurants. We collected the response latency 
on the relative preference between restaurants because it was the focal preference. 
 Second, participants read that the experimenters wanted them to complete a verbal 
processing test to verify their eligibility for the writing task. The verbal processing test 
manipulated self-construal using a validated prime (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). All participants 
were asked to read a story about a visit to the city and were instructed to count the pronouns in 




person singular pronouns (e.g., I, me, my) and the story in the interdependent condition use third-
person plural pronouns (e.g., us, our).  
 Third, participants were told that the next part of the study was meant to examine 
imagination and visualization techniques. On the next page, participants were asked to imagine 
that they were a part of a travel management organization and that a client group emailed a 
request for a lunch recommendation. The email is below. 
Hi there- 
Thanks again for all of your hard work with our 
visit! We really appreciate it and are looking 
forward to exploring the city after our meeting. One 
question remains in our group: where should we go for 
lunch? 





 On the next page, participants were asked to write an email response to Kevin 
recommending Qdoba/Chipotle. The study was programmed to display the restaurant that the 
participant preferred in the relative preference task. Thus, all participants were asked to 
recommend their preference. 
 After writing the email, participants answered completed several self-report measures. 
First, participants rated their readiness (i.e., “As you were writing the email recommendation, did 
you feel: confident, prepared, intelligent” 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Next, participants rated 
their responsiveness (i.e., “At this moment, I feel like I am flexible to others’ needs,” “At this 
moment, I feel like I am accommodating to others’ wishes,” “At this moment, I feel like I am 
able to adjust,” 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Participants also rated whether they felt efficient, 
knowledgeable, and aware of their personal tastes on the same scales. Finally, participants 




interfering, intrusive, forced upon you, unwelcomed” and “How much were you compelled to 
resist the task, ignore the task, dismiss the task,” 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) 
 Following the self-report measures, participants read about the second part of the 
imagination study. They read that they would see three options of common consumer goods and 
that they should imagine themselves in the market for these items. Then, participants saw the 
pretested decision tables and were asked to decide the one they would be mostly likely to 
purchase in each set. Recall that one option dominated on utility, one option dominated on 
hedonism, and one option dominated on popularity. After making their three decisions, 
participants provided demographic information, were debriefed, and paid. 
Results 
 Following prior work (Fazio et al.), attitude accessibility was computed as 1/(1+x) where 
x was the response latency on the relative preference between Chipotle and Qdoba. Higher 
values on this transformed value indicate faster response latency. As expected, an independent 
samples t-test on the transformed preference latency revealed that the manipulation was 
successful (Mmore accessible preferences = .23, Mless accessible preferences = .18; t(175) = 3.58, p < .001). 
Attitude extremity was computed by taking the absolute value of the relative preference value 
minus the scale midpoint (4). These two values were not correlated (r = .038, p = .589). 
However, the raw latency and attitude extremity were correlated (r = -.417, p < .001), as in prior 
research (Fazio et al., 1986). Therefore, analyses are reported with and without attitude extremity 
as a covariate.  
 Reasons. Reasons are a common indicator of the effort reflected in a need to justify 
(CITES). Therefore, two independent research assistants analyzed the content of the emails and 




reliability was high (r = .924, p < .001) and disputes were resolved through a third judge. 
Consistent with expectations, an accessibility by self-construal two-way ANOVA on the total 
number of reasons revealed a marginal interaction (F(1, 173) = 3.18, p = .077).  
Follow up analyses provided directional support for our predictions. Consistent with prior 
findings, those with a salient independent self-construal exerted less effort as proxied by 
directionally fewer reasons when their preferences were more accessible (Mmore accessible preferences = 
1.58, Mless accessible preferences = 1.96; p = .264). In contrast, those with a salient interdependent self-
construal exerted more effort as proxied by directionally more reasons when their preferences 
were more accessible (Mmore accessible preferences = 1.82; Mless accessible preferences = 1.32; p = .165). The 
results were similar when attitude extremity was included as a covariate. Extremity was not a 
significant covariate (p = .438) and the interaction remained marginal (p = .086).  




 Email Task Latency. Time spent writing the email is another potential indicator of 
participants’ exerted effort (Fazio et al., 1992, Study 4). We performed the same linear 





















this value with the same two-way ANOVA. The analysis revealed an insignificant interaction 
(F(1, 173) = 2.53, p = .114), but the follow-up analyses suggest a supportive pattern. 
Independents had significantly quicker latencies on the email task when they had more 
accessible preferences (Mmore accessible preferences = .029, Mless accessible preferences = .017; F(1, 173) = 
5.12, p = .025). In contrast, interdependents had similar latencies on the email task regardless of 
attitude accessibility (Ms = .021 vs. .021; F < 1, ns). Attitude extremity was not a significant 
covariate (p = .176) and the interaction was largely unchanged when included in the model (p = 
.134).  
 Decision Making Tendency. Next, we analyzed whether participants showed an 
observable tendency in their subsequent decision making. First, we coded each of the 
participants’ decisions as 1 if they chose the most popular option and 0 if they chose one of the 
other options. The decision making tendencies for the three products were correlated (rshoes-cars = .40, 
rshoes-restaurant = .35, rcars-restaurant = .29, all ps < .001). Therefore, we summed them (min = 0, max = 3) 
to reflect a norm-seeking tendency. We analyzed norm-seeking tendency with the same two-way 
ANOVA as above. The analysis revealed a marginal effect of accessibility (F(1, 173) = 3.23, p = 
.074) that was qualified by a marginal accessibility  self-construal interaction (F(1, 173) = 3.56, 
p = .061). 
 Follow-up analyses suggest that having accessible preferences influenced 
interdependents’, but not independents’, subsequent decision making. For participants primed 
with interdependent self-construal, having more accessible preferences increased a norm-seeking 
decision making tendency (Mmore accessible preferences = 1.11, Mless accessible preferences = .52; F(1, 173) = 
6.48, p = .012). In contrast, participants primed with independent self-construal did not show a 




F < 1, ns). These results were unchanged when attitude extremity was included as a covariate; 
the covariate was not significant (p = .951).  
Figure B.3 Normative Choice Tendency as a Function of Attitude Accessibility and Self-
Construal in Appendix B.3 
 
 
 Explicit Measures. There were no significant effects on readiness ( = .87; all ps > .45), 
responsiveness ( = .77; all ps > .30), or efficiency ( = .83; all ps > .30). However, there was a 
significant accessibility by self-construal interaction on reactance ( = .93; F(1, 173) = 5.3, p = 
.023). Independents with more accessible preferences reported marginally greater reactance to 
the email task (Mmore accessible preferences = 2.79, Mless accessible preferences = 2.18; F(1, 173) = 3.52, p = 
.062). In contrast, interdependents with more accessible preferences reported directionally less 
reactance to the email task (Mmore accessible preferences = 2.52, Mless accessible preferences = 3.00; F(1, 173) = 
1.94, p = .166). 
Discussion 
 The findings from this study suggest that having more attitudes increases the effort spent 
on an attitude-relevant task when interdependent self-construal is salient. The data patterns on 
participants’ listed reasons and task latency advance prior work which found that having more 


























reported findings point to a potential downstream consequence of having accessible preferences. 
That is, interdependents with more accessible preferences tended show a norm-seeking decision 
making tendency in subsequent, yet unrelated, choice contexts. We sought to replicate these 
findings in the next two studies. 
Study B Method (Malfunction) 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
Study B was intended to directly replicate Study A with two improvements. First, we 
removed the explicit measures except for reactance, which was moved to after the decision 
making task. Second, we captured task latencies in the decision making scenarios to assess effort 
in the downstream decision making (e.g., Fazio et al., 1992, Study 4). However, there was a 
programming malfunction that failed to present pertinent information about the participants’ role 
in the travel management organization. Therefore, when participants saw the prompt to 
recommend their preferred lunch restaurant to Kevin, they knew neither who Kevin was nor their 
relationship to him. Despite this, 147 out of the 312 total participants completed the email ask as 
if they understood what we were asking of them. The analyses below are on these 147 
participants. 
Results 
 We performed the same linear transformation on the relative preference response latency 
(1/[1+x]). As expected, an independent samples t-test on the transformed preference latency 
revealed that the manipulation was successful (Mmore accessible preferences = .22, Mless accessible preferences = 
.18; t(146) = 2.87, p = .005). Extremity was calculated in the same way as prior studies (| x – 4 |). 




 Email task latency. After performing the linear transformation (1/[1+x]) on participants’ 
task latency, an accessibility by self-construal ANOVA revealed no significant effects (all ps > 
.26).  
 Decision making tendency. The decision making tendencies for the three products were 
again correlated (rshoes-cars = .22, rshoes-restaurant = .17, rcars-restaurant = .23, all ps < .05). First, we summed 
the choices of options that dominated on popularity to assess whether participants’ norm-seeking 
decision making tendency was affected by our manipulation. An accessibility by self-construal 
ANOVA on the norm-seeking decision making index revealed no significant effects (all ps > 
.19). 
 Next, we recoded the decisions to reflect the number of choice options that dominated on 
utility. This permitted the assessment of whether participants utility-seeking decision making 
tendency was affected by our manipulation. Note that a utility-seeking tendency is the inverse of 
the tendency to seek social or normative attributes.  An identical ANOVA on the norm-seeking 
decision making index revealed an accessibility  self-construal interaction (F(1, 144) = 4.09, p 
= .045). Follow-up analyses revealed that when interdependent self-construal was salient, more 
accessible preferences decreased participants’ utility-seeking decision making (Mmore accessible 
preferences = 1.66, Mless accessible preferences = 2.23; F(1, 144) = 6.63, p = .011). In contrast, when 
independent self-construal was salient, utility-seeking decision making was not affected by 
attitude accessibility (Ms = 1.85 vs. 1.75; F < 1, ns).  
 Decision making latency. The ANOVA on the transformed (1/[1+x]) sum of decision 
making latencies yielded no significant effects (all ps > .23). 
 Reactance. The ANOVA on the reactance measure ( = .946) yielded no significant 





 One should take caution when drawing conclusions from this study. There was a 
significant malfunction across all participants, limiting the usable sample to less than half of 
those collected. Despite this, we still observed a decision making tendency that is somewhat 
consistent with Study A. Interdependents with more accessible preferences showed a greater 
tendency to choose normative or socially-dominant options (or avoid utilitarian options) in 
subsequent decisions. As in Study A, independents’ downstream decision making was unaffected 
by attitude accessibility.  
Study C Method 
 This study was conducted to replicate the effects from the study in the main text (Study 
X) with cleaner decision making options. One could argue that presenting participants with three 
choice options that differed on three different attributes introduced unnecessary noise into the 
results. Moreover, it is unclear whether the popular options were taking choice shares from the 
utilitarian option or the hedonic option. 
Pretest. We conducted a pretest to recalibrate the choice options. We used two options 
instead of three and configured them so that one dominated on the utilitarian attribute (e.g., 
performance) and one dominated on the hedonic attribute (e.g., appearance).  
50 participants saw the three choice scenarios and were asked if choosing either option 
was a justifiable decision (1 = not justifiable at all, 4 = somewhat justifiable, 7 = very 
justifiable). They were also asked if they would feel the need to explain themselves if they 
choice either option (1 = definitely no, 4 = maybe, 7 = definitely yes [reverse-coded]). The two 
items were collected for each option in the three choice sets. Given the high internal reliabilities, 




items for the three hedonic options (six total;  =  .769) to create justification indices for the 
utilitarian and hedonic options (Bellezza et al., 2016). As expected, a paired t-test revealed that 
participants felt the utilitarian choices (M = 5.42) were easier to justify than their hedonic 
counterparts (M = 4.87; t(49) = 4.45, p < .001). 
Figure B.4 Choice Options in Appendix B.3 
 
Main Study Method 
Participants, Design, and Procedure. 304 adults from MTurk participated in the study for 
money. The study used the same design as the other studies in this appendix. The procedure was 
also identical to Study 4 in the main text and Study B in this series of appendix studies, except 
we replaced the choice sets with those in the above pretest. Participants rehearsed lunch or coffee 
preferences, read a story with 3rd person or 1st person pronouns, and made three choices in 







 We performed the same linear transformation on the relative preference response latency 
(1/[1+x]). As expected, an independent samples t-test on the transformed preference latency 
revealed that the manipulation was successful (Mmore accessible preferences = .22, Mless accessible preferences = 
.18; t(302) = 4.68, p < .001). Extremity was calculated in the same way as prior studies (| x – 4 |). 
It was correlated with raw latency (r = -.46, p < .001), but not the transformed latency (r = -.06, p 
= .329). 
 Email Task Latency. After performing the linear transformation (1/[1+x]) on participants’ 
task latency, an accessibility by self-construal ANOVA revealed no significant effects (all ps > 
.28). When extremity was included in the model, it was an insignificant covariate (F < 1, ns), and 
the effects were unchanged. 
 Decision Making Tendency. The decision making tendencies for the three products were 
again correlated (rshoes-cars = .24, rshoes-restaurant = .16, rcars-restaurant = .12, all ps < .05). Thus, we summed 
the choices of options that dominated on utility to assess whether participants’ utility-seeking 
decision making tendency was affected by our manipulation. Note that in this study, a utility-
seeking tendency is the inverse of a hedonic-seeking tendency. The accessibility  self-construal 
ANOVA on utility-seeking decision making revealed insignificant effects (all ps > .14). Follow-
up analyses on the interaction (F(1, 300) = 2.17, p = .142) revealed that interdependents with 
more accessible preferences showed a directionally greater utility-seeking (Mmore accessible preferences 
= 2.31, Mless accessible preferences = 2.12; F(1, 300) = 1.91, p = .168). In contrast, independents with 
more accessible preferences showed less of difference across accessibility conditions (Ms = 2.30 
vs. 2.39; F < 1, ns). When extremity was included in the model, it was an insignificant covariate 




 Decision Making Latency. The ANOVA on the transformed (1/[1+x]) sum of decision 
making latencies yielded no significant effects (all ps > .11). Follow-up analyses on the 
interaction (F(1, 300) = 2.51, p = .114) revealed that interdependents with more accessible 
preferences showed slower latencies when making decisions (Mmore accessible preferences = .044, Mless 
accessible preferences = .054; F(1, 300) = 4.24, p = .040). In contrast, independents with more 
accessible preferences showed no difference across accessibility conditions (Ms = .049 vs .048; 
F < 1, ns). When extremity was included in the model, it was an insignificant covariate (F < 1, 
ns), and the effects were unchanged. 
 Reactance. The ANOVA on the reactance measure ( = .953) yielded no significant 
effects (all ps > .31). 
Discussion 
 Taken together, the three studies in this appendix converge on the notion that more 
accessible preferences induce greater effort to consider others’ views when an interdependent 
self-construal is salient. Behavioral evidence suggests that interdependents with more accessible 
preferences used more reasons to justify their preference (Study A) and spent more time crafting 
the recommendation of their preference (Studies A and C). The additional effort expended on an 
attitude-relevant task spilled over into attitude-irrelevant tasks and led to prolonged decision 
making for interdependents (Study C). These findings help support our argument that accessible 
preferences induce greater consideration of others’ views among interdependents (as indexed by 
greater expended effort).  
 Moreover, these data suggest that the additional need to consider others’ views brought 
on by accessible personal preferences can affect interdependents’ downstream decision making. 




making. In Studies A and B, interdependents chose more options that dominated on popularity. 
In Study C, interdependents chose more options that dominated on utility. Prior research 
suggests that both choice tendencies (i.e., norm-seeking and utility-seeking) can reflect 





Self-Construal Pretest and Conditions for Study 2 
 To validate the self-construal manipulation, we conducted a pretest with 60 participants 
from the same population as those in the main study. Participants in the independent condition 
were asked to imagine a gathering with close friends and to think about what snacks they would 
bring for themselves to enjoy. In contrast, participants in the interdependent condition imagined 
what snacks they would bring for the group to enjoy. Then, participants indicated the extent to 
which they were thinking about snacks that they usually like, snacks that were appropriate for 
them, snacks that their friends usually like, and snacks that would be appropriate for their 
friends. To assess whether the manipulation also made participants feel uncomfortable, we 
measured whether they felt judged or self-conscious (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so).  
A 2 (self-construal: independent vs. interdependent)  2 (thoughts: self vs. friends) mixed 
ANOVA was used to analyze the effectiveness of the manipulation. As expected, the analysis 
revealed a self-construal  thoughts interaction (F(1, 58) = 7.218, p = .009). Follow-up contrasts 
confirmed that those in the interdependent (vs. independent) condition thought more about 
others’ preferences (Mindependent = 4.81, Minterdependent = 5.66; F(1, 58) = 7.326, p = .009), whereas 
those in the independent (vs. interdependent) condition thought more about their personal 
preferences (Mindependent = 5.72, Minterdependent = 5.66; F < 1, ns), although not significantly so. 
Consistent with prior work (e.g., Gardner et al., 1999), the manipulation was successful for 
effectively making the interdependent self-construal more accessible between conditions. A 
separate independent t-test revealed that, as expected, the manipulation did not create differences 
in feeling self-conscious or judged (r = .611, p < .01; Mindependent = 2.02, Minterdependent = 2.18; t < 





Independent self-construal condition 
Please imagine that you have planned to get together with a group of your close friends this 
weekend. It's a casual get-together where you all do what you normally do when you hang out.  
 
Think about the snacks you would bring for yourself to enjoy. 
 
Interdependent self-construal condition 
Please imagine that you have planned to get together with a group of your close friends this 
weekend. It's a casual get-together where you all do what you normally do when you hang out.  
 







 Focal Attitude Object Pretest and Stimuli in Study 3 and Appendix B.13 
A pretest with 181 Americans and Indians confirmed that the two topics were perceived 
similarly. Responses were recorded on three seven-point semantic differential scales 
(negative/positive, very undesirable/very desirable, not innovative at all/very innovative, 
bad/good) and were anchored from -3 to 3 (Mautonomous cars = 1.75, Mbrain implants = 2.01; t(179) = 
1.636, p = .104).  
 
An autonomous car (also known as a driverless car, auto, self-driving car, robotic car) is a 
vehicle that is capable of sensing its environment and navigating without human input. 
 
How positive are autonomous cars? 
  Very negative      Very positive 
   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How desirable are autonomous cars?   
Very undesirable     Very desirable 
   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How innovative are autonomous cars? 
 Not innovative at all      Very innovative 





Consider a situation in which the passengers of an autonomous car and pedestrians' lives are at 
stake. The car must either swerve to A) save the lives of the passengers or B) save the lives of 
the pedestrians. 
 
Autonomous cars that are programmed to always save the pedestrians are: 
 Not a good idea      A good idea 
   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Autonomous cars that are programmed to always save the passengers are: 
 Not a good idea      A good idea 






Self-Construal Pretest and Conditions in Study 3 and 4 
To validate the independent and interdependent primes used in this study, 62 participants 
from the same population as the main study participated in a pretest. Self-construals were made 
salient by asking participants to read a paragraph about a weekend in the city that varied in its 
usage of 1st person singular pronouns (independent) versus 3rd person plural (interdependent) 
pronouns (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). A successful manipulation would yield a significant 
interaction such that participants who viewed the interdependent (vs. independent) prime report 
an increased relative focus on others compared to the self. This priming technique has been 
validated in numerous studies (Lee et al., 2000; van Prooijen & van den Bos, 2009).  
Nevertheless, we checked the prime’s effectiveness by asking participants to indicate the 
extent to which the story made them think of themselves (“To what extent did the scenario make 
you think about yourself?” 1 = not at all, 7 = very much so) and their family and friends (“To 
what extent did the scenario make you think about your family and friends?” 1= not at all, 7 = 
very much so). The results from a 2 (self-construal: independent vs. interdependent; between-
subjects factor)  2 (thought type: self vs. other; within-subjects factor) mixed ANOVA revealed 
the expected interaction (F(1, 60) = 10.9, p = .002). Participants primed with an independent 
self-construal thought more about themselves than interdependents (Mindependent = 5.80, 
Minterdependent 4.53; F(1, 60) = 10.78, p = .002). In contrast, interdependents thought about others 
directionally more than independents, although not significantly so (Minterdependent 4.50, Mindependent 







Self-Construal Pretest and Conditions in Study 5 
The manipulation was validated in a pretest with 134 participants. After exposure to 
either the independent or interdependent prime, pretest subjects completed 10 statements 
beginning with “I am ___” (Ten-Statement Task; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954; Mandel, 2003). 
Prior work has used this task to measure interdependent versus independent self-cognitions 
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner et al., 1999; Trafimow et al., 1991). Two independent judges 
coded these self-cognitions as idiocentric (personal qualities, attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors that 
do not relate to others, such as “I am tall”), group (membership in demographic groups or 
categories with a common fate, such as “I am Catholic”), or allocentric (relationships or 
sensitivity to others, such as “I am helpful to others”). For the manipulation to be effective, there 
should be evidence of an interaction, such that respondents in the independent (vs. 
interdependent) condition have a higher number of idiocentric thoughts and fewer allocentric 
thoughts (Trafimow et al., 1991).  
A repeated measures ANOVA supported this prediction (idiocentric thoughts: Nindependent 
= 6.75, Ninterdependent = 5.75; allocentric thoughts: Nindependent = 1.03, Ninterdependent = 1.67; F(1, 132) 
= 45.15, p = .010). Follow-up analyses revealed that participants primed with an independent 
self-construal wrote more idiocentric thoughts (M = 6.75) than those primed with an 
interdependent self-construal (M = 5.75; F(1, 132) = 4.66, p = .033). In contrast, participants 
primed with an interdependent self-construal wrote more allocentric thoughts (M = 1.67) than 






Independent self-construal condition 
Next, please recall something nice that you recently purchased for yourself. 
 
In the space below, please write how YOU BENEFITTED from buying this product. 
__________________ 
 
In the space below, please describe YOU FELT about buying the gift for yourself. 
__________________ 
 
Interdependent self-construal condition 
Next, please recall something nice that you recently purchased for your family member or friend. 
 
In the space below, please write how THE RECIPIENT BENEFITTED from this product. 
__________________ 
 









Focal Attitude Object in Study 5 
A voice assistant is a digital assistant that uses voice recognition, natural language processing, 
and speech synthesis to provide aid to users through phones and voice recognition applications. 
Voice assistants are used in service phone lines, smartphones, and other places to assist users 
with a wide variety of tasks. 
How positive are voice assistants? 
  Very negative      Very positive 
   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How desirable are voice assistants?   
Very undesirable     Very desirable 
   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How innovative are voice assistants? 
 Not innovative at all      Very innovative 
   -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Imagine a scenario when personal data collected from voice assistant could be used to save the 
lives of the user or others. In this case, such data should only be available to the user. 
Autonomous cars that are programmed to always save the pedestrians are: 
 Not a good idea      A good idea 





Instead, personal data collected from voice assistants that could save the lives of the user or 
others should also be available to the appropriate authorities. 
 Not a good idea      A good idea 







Voice Assistant Pretest and Stimuli in Study 5 
 A pretest (n = 99) confirmed that the three alternatives were perceived to be equally 
attractive (“How would you rate this voice assistant?” 1 = not attractive at all, 9 = very 
attractive; F(2, 96) < 1, ns). 
 
 







Focal Attitude Objects in Study 6 
Lunch options 
The Bread Company 
Disapprove  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Approve 
Dislike  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Like 
Bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
 
Sakanaya 
Disapprove  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Approve 
Dislike  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Like 
Bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
 
The Bread Company vs. Sakanaya 
Definitely  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely  




Disapprove  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Approve 
Dislike  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Like 






Disapprove  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Approve 
Dislike  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Like 
Bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
 
Cocomero vs. Cold Stone 
Definitely  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Definitely  







Restaurant and Self-Construal Pretests for Study 6 
36 undergraduates participated in the pretest. Participants first completed the 
interdependent pronoun task (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Then, they rated their familiarity with 
each restaurant (1 = unfamiliar, 7 = very familiar). They also rated whether the thought there 
were many vegetarian options at each restaurant (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Finally, they completed Triandis and Gelfand’s (1998) measure of individualism and 
collectivism as an interdependent self-construal induction check. 
Participants were equally familiar with Sakanaya (M = 4.92) and Bread Company (M = 
4.11, t(35) = 1.4, p = .170). They also thought Sakanaya (M = 5.31) and Bread Company (M = 
5.03) had similar amounts of vegetarian options (p = .343). An analysis of the culture measure 
revealed that the induction made interdependent self-construal salient (Mcollectivism = 5.58, 








































Accessible Attitudes Increase Readiness for Americans, Not Indians 
This study was designed to demonstrate that the functional value of an accessible 
personal attitude depends on one’s cultural self-construal. We manipulated accessibility with a 
repeated attitude expression paradigm based on previous research (Fazio et al., 1992, 1982; 
Powell & Fazio, 1984). We used nationality to operationalize interdependent (India) and 
independent (U.S.) self-construal. Past work suggests that, compared to Americans, Indians are 
more interdependent and attentive to norms (Lalwani & Shavitt, 2013; Monga & John, 2007; 
Savani et al., 2015). Thus, we expected attitude accessibility to predict readiness for U.S. 
participants, but not Indian participants.  
 One novel aspect of the current research is that we examine the functional value of 
attitude accessibility in social contexts. After manipulating attitude accessibility, we induced a 
social context by asking all participants to imagine an upcoming group conversation about a 
topic. In this context, in which others were made salient without inducing specific social norms, 
we expected that accessible attitudes would offer benefits to those who were more likely to 
spontaneously reference their personal preferences because such preferences are highly relevant 
to the goals of the independent self. Therefore, in line with past research in Western cultural 
contexts that has found that attitude accessibility can improve coping outcomes (Fazio et al., 
1992; Fazio & Powell, 1997), we expected that highly accessible personal attitudes would 
enhance emotional readiness for U.S. participants. In contrast, and extending past work, we did 
not expect attitude accessibility to be associated with a sense of readiness for Indians because 






Participants and Design. Two hundred and forty-two participants (122 in U.S., Mage = 
35.9, 49% male; 120 in India, Mage = 32.3, 67% male) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and completed the study for money. The experiment was administered in English because 
all Indian respondents were proficient in English. The study used a 2 (attitude accessibility: high 
vs. low)  2 (country: US vs. India) between-subjects design. 
Procedure and Measures. Participants began the study by completing a brief survey 
about an emerging technological innovation. This survey was used to manipulate attitude 
accessibility. The manipulation was modeled after prior work that randomly assigned 
participants to express preferences once versus multiple times (Fazio et al., 1982; Powell & 
Fazio, 1984; Schuette & Fazio, 1995). Also in line with past work that used public policies as 
focal attitude objects (e.g., death penalty, Powell & Fazio, 1984; Schuette & Fazio, 1995), we 
used product policies as attitude objects. Autonomous car policy (focal) and brain implant policy 
(filler) were selected as the attitude objects stimuli after a pretest (see Appendix B.5).  
In order to manipulate attitude accessibility, participants reported five general and 
specific attitudes toward one of two product policies, either for the focal object or the filler 
object. Half of the participants (high attitude accessibility) rated their opinions about whether an 
autonomous car should swerve to save its passengers or to save pedestrians when both were in 
danger (e.g., Autonomous cars that are programed to always save the pedestrians are, -3 = not a 
good idea, 3 = a good idea). The other half of participants (low attitude accessibility) rated their 
opinions about whether policy should favor the doctor or patient when brain implants have side 
effects. Attitudes were recorded on 7-point scales (negative/positive, very undesirable/very 




All subjects then rated their views on the autonomous car policy using the following instructions:  
Consider a situation in which the passengers of an autonomous car -- a vehicle that can operate 
itself without human input -- and pedestrians' lives are at stake. Whose lives should be saved? 
Participants rated their opinions on a binary scale (0 = the passengers, 1 = the 
pedestrians). Thus, subjects in the low attitude accessibility condition expressed their attitudes 
toward the autonomous car policy this single time. In contrast, participants in the high 
accessibility condition expressed their attitudes a total of five times. To validate the effectiveness 
of the manipulation, the response latency on this single item served as the attitude accessibility 
manipulation check.  
Participants were then asked to imagine a normal gathering with friends where the 
conversation shifted to how autonomous cars should respond in a situation in which pedestrians 
and passengers are both at risk. Participants indicated how they would anticipate feeling as the 
conversation continued, rating their feelings on six items using 7-point scales (“confident,” 
“intelligent,” “prepared,” “defensive,” “uptight,” and “tense”; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). This 
served as the measure of readiness to act. A principal components analysis (varimax rotation) 
revealed that the first three items loaded onto one, readiness component (eigenvalue = 2.87; 
loadings ranged from .89 to .92;  = .90), and the latter three loaded onto another, discomfort 
component (eigenvalue = 1.77; loadings ranged from .76 to .86;  = .75).  
Finally, participants completed Singelis’ (1994) measure of chronic self-construal to 
confirm that Indians were more interdependent than Americans. Following prior work (Lee et al., 
2000; Riemer & Shavitt, 2011; Wu, Cutright, & Fitzsimons, 2011), we created a self-construal 




their mean on the interdependent subscale ( = .865). Higher (lower) values represented more 
dominant interdependent (independent) self-construal.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks. As in past research (I. E. Berger, 1992; Fazio et al., 1982; Powell 
& Fazio, 1984), the raw response latencies were positively skewed. Thus, as recommended 
(Fazio, 1990), we performed reciprocal transformation (1/[1+x]) on the latencies from the 
attitude accessibility manipulation check. Higher (lower) transformed values represented faster 
(slower) responses, indicative of greater (lesser) attitude accessibility. We then conducted an 
attitude accessibility condition  country ANOVA on the transformed latencies. The analysis 
revealed the expected main effect of condition (F(1, 238) = 9.72, p = .002) such that participants 
had faster attitudinal responding in the high (M = .091) versus low accessibility condition (M = 
.068), supporting the effectiveness of the attitude accessibility manipulation. An effect of country 
also emerged (F(1, 238) = 9.06, p = .003) such that Americans overall had faster response times 
(M = .090) than Indians (M = .068). Importantly, the interaction of attitude accessibility 
condition and country was not significant (F < 1, ns).  
An attitude accessibility condition  country ANOVA on the self-construal index 
confirmed that Indians were more interdependent than Americans (MIndia = .19, MUS = -.62; F(1, 
238) = 42.13, p < .001). There were no significant effects of accessibility condition on self-
construal either as a main effect or as an interaction (Fs < 1, ns). 
Readiness. We predicted that when personal attitudes were made accessible (vs. not), 
Americans would report a greater sense of readiness, but that accessibility would not enhance 
readiness for Indians. An ANCOVA of readiness controlling for discomfort revealed a main 




.080) that were qualified by a marginally significant interaction (F(1, 237) = 3.29, p = .071). 
Follow-up contrast analyses supported the predictions. For Americans, high attitude accessibility 
was associated with greater readiness (M = 4.29) than was low attitude accessibility (M = 3.68; 
F(1, 237) = 6.45, p = .012). In contrast, for Indians there was no significant difference in 
readiness between high and low accessibility conditions (M = 5.46 and 5.46; F(1, 237) < 1, ns). 
The results were not significantly affected when we removed discomfort as a covariate 
(interaction: p = .074). We also examined whether participants’ binary preference for 
autonomous car safety protocol affected readiness by including it as a covariate. It was a 
nonsignificant factor (p = .849) and did not affect the significance of the focal interaction (p = 
.073). 
Figure B.5 Felt Readiness to Act as a Function of Manipulated Attitude Accessibility and 
Country 
 
The graph is based upon standardized ANCOVA adjusted means controlling for discomfort at the mean. Bars 













































Prior research has demonstrated that attitude accessibility increases the attitude holder’s 
ability to cope with uncertainty (Fazio et al., 1989; Holland et al., 2003; Katz, 1960). The results 
from the current study build upon these findings by demonstrating that the benefit of accessible 
attitudes may depend upon whether the attitude holder is from a cultural context in which there is 
a predominant independent (vs. interdependent) self-construal. U.S. participants represent an 
independent culture in which people are socialized to deploy their personal preferences in the 
service of achieving what they want, and in the process to be less attentive to others’ opinions 
and to norms. In such a context, having ready access to one’s personal preferences is functional 
for pursuing the goals of the independent self. Thus, for these participants, having more 
accessible personal attitudes increased readiness. This is consistent with prior research that has 
shown that having more accessible personal attitudes reduced blood pressure (Fazio et al., 1992). 
In contrast, Indian participants represent an interdependent culture in which adapting to others’ 
preferences and to norms is the focal goal, and who are therefore socialized to be more sensitive 
to others and to social expectations. For these individuals, personal preferences are less 
functional (Riemer, et al., 2014). As expected, therefore, increased attitude accessibility did not 
enhance readiness for Indian participants. These results suggest that the degree to which the 
attitude holder has been socialized to attend to others and to norms may influence the 
relationship between personal attitude accessibility and positive coping outcomes.  
One could argue that the effects emerged as a function of participants’ unfamiliarity with 
the attitude object (e.g., autonomous cars) or the moral implications of choosing which group 
autonomous cars should be programmed to save. In such a domain, asking participants to 




instead of retrieving a previously formed attitude from memory. Despite the use of similar 
morally relevant attitude objects (e.g., capital punishment; Houston & Fazio, 1989) and the use 
of repeated attitude expression in prior attitude accessibility research, we address these potential 
issues in other studies by measuring chronic attitude accessibility to familiar attitude objects such 
as soft drinks (Study 1) and salty snacks (Study 2) which prior attitudes are more likely to exist 
and there are few moral connotations. In summary, Appendix B.13 provides initial evidence that 







Accessible Attitudes Reduce Readiness Under Low (vs. High) Norm Clarity  
Pretest 1. The objective in this pretest was to select attitude domains that differed in 
normative clarity and perceived similarity. We asked 82 adults to rate 1) how well they knew 
their friends’ opinions (1 = not well at all, 5 = extremely well) and 2) how similar their attitudes 
were to their friends’ opinions (1 = not similar at all, 5 = extremely similar) on 7 attitude topics. 
Every participant responded to all 7 topics. 
Participants indicated that they had the greatest clarity of their friends’ opinion toward 
marijuana legalization (M = 2.6) and felt that their attitudes were similar to their friends’ 
opinions (M = 3.2). There were five attitude domains that participants indicated similar 
normative clarity toward (e.g., impeach trump, Ms ~ 2.2). However, participants thought their 
attitudes were the most similar to their friends’ opinions toward gay marriage (M = 3.8). The 
domain with the lowest normative clarity (M = 1.8) and perceived similarity (M = 1.5) was the 
trade embargo with Cuba.  
In the main study, we can confidently manipulate high normative clarity along with 
attitude similarity by using marijuana legalization (high) and the Cuba trade embargo (low). The 
design of the main study would be attitude accessibility (measured)  self-construal (measured) 
 normative clarity (high vs. low). The prediction is that greater (vs. weaker) attitude 
accessibility among independents would lead to high readiness in both norm clarity conditions. 
In contrast, greater (vs. weaker) attitude accessibility among interdependents would lead to 






Table B.1. Pretest Means for Perceived Clarity and Perceived Similarity with Friends 
 Clarity Similarity 
Legalize marijuana 2.6 3.2 
Impeach Trump 2.3 2.8 
Trade embargo with Cuba 1.8 1.5 
Gay marriage 2.2 3.8 
More intense selection for police 2.2 2.5 
Replace fossil fuel with sustainable fuel 2.3 2.8 
Child abortion 2.2 2.7 
 
We have argued for the importance of others in predicting when attitude accessibility can 
become a liability. Yet, our theory hinges on the idea that others affect readiness when people are 
unclear about whether others’ attitudes would oppose their own. When people are clear about the 
normative attitudes and infer that others’ attitudes would align with their opinion, attitude 
accessibility should no longer reduce readiness. Normative clarity is defined as the degree to 
which one can infer a standard of judgment adequate to interpret a given topic (Cialdini & Trost, 
1998). We expect that under conditions of low (vs. high) normative clarity, participants should 
be less likely to expect that their accessible attitude will be similar to close others. As a result, 
the expected dissimilarity will mediate the decrease in readiness. Next, we describe a pretest to 
calibrate the attitude domains that manipulate normative clarity. 
Main Study Method 
The main study used a 2 (accessibility: high vs. low)  2 (normative clarity: high vs. low) 
between-subjects design. 202 American adults from Amazon MTurk were paid to complete the 
study. 
Participants were told that the experimenters were interested in their opinions on a variety 
of social issues in two surveys. In the first survey, participants saw different social issues (e.g., 




disapprove/approve, disadvantageous/advantageous, harmful/beneficial; Fazio & Powell, 1984). 
Each time a given issue was listed, different scale labels were used. Attitude accessibility was 
manipulated by repeating one of the nine issues four times. Thus, participants in the high attitude 
accessibility condition saw one social issue four times and 8 social issues once. Participants in 
the low attitude accessibility condition saw 12 social issues once each. Normative clarity was 
manipulated by making the focal social issue marijuana legalization (high norm clarity) or the 
Cuba trade embargo (low norm clarity; see pretest).  
The second survey served as the manipulation check. Participants were told to simply 
indicate whether a different set of issues were “good” or “bad.” Each trial involved the 
presentation of an issue followed by “Good” and “Bad” buttons. Participants were instructed to 
use the “A” and “L” keys on their keyboard to select the “Good” and “Bad” buttons, 
respectively. The instructions also asked participants to avoid distractions and answer quickly 
and accurately. We programmed the study to record response latencies from page onset to 
response. Before continuing with the focal topics, we ensured participants understood the 
procedure with a series of 3 unrelated practice trials. There were eight focal topics that included 
marijuana legalization and the Cuba trade embargo. Topics were presented in randomized order.  
Next, participants imagined a gathering with close friends where the conversation shifted 
to the topic of marijuana legalization (high normative clarity) or the U.S.’s trade embargo with 
Cuba (low normative clarity).  They indicated their feelings of readiness ( = .88) and 
discomfort ( = .84) on the same scales as in prior experiments. To capture expected attitude 
similarity, we also asked participants, “Compared to the group of friends you imagined, how 
similar would your attitudes to be toward marijuana legalization (the Cuba trade embargo; 




completed a 24-item measure of self-construal (Singelis, 1994). Following prior work (e.g., 
Riemer & Shavitt, 2011), we computed an index of self-construal by subtracting the 12-item 
independent subscale ( = .76) from the interdependent subscale ( = .77). Thus, higher (lower) 
numbers indicated predominant interdependent (independent) self-construal.  
It should be noted that an accessibility  normative clarity interaction on self-construal 
emerged (F(1, 198) = 4.45, p = .036). Under low normative clarity, more accessible attitudes 
were associated with more independent self-construal (Mmore accessible = -.21, Mless accessible = .29, p = 
.031). In contrast, under high normative clarity, attitude accessibility did not affect self-construal 
(Mmore accessible = -.01, Mless accessible = -.19, p = .424). 
Results  
Manipulation Check. We were interested in participants’ response latencies to the 
marijuana legalization (Cuba trade embargo) item in the high (low) norm clarity condition. We 
subjected the two focal response latencies to the same reciprocal transformation as in the prior 
study and earlier work. We regressed the focal latencies on to attitude accessibility condition 
(dummy-coded), normative clarity condition (dummy-coded), the mean-centered self-construal 
index, and all interactions. The analysis revealed the expected main effect of attitude 
accessibility ( = .08, p < .001) and a main effect of normative clarity condition ( = .10, p < 
.001). No other effects were significant (ps > .10), indicating an successful manipulation of 
attitude accessibility.  
Readiness. We used the same regression model to predict feelings of readiness in the 
anticipated discussion. The analysis revealed a main effect of attitude accessibility ( = -.93, p < 
.001), an accessibility  normative clarity interaction ( = 1.33, p < .001), and, as expected, a 




To clarify the nature of the three-way interaction, we conducted follow-up tests. In line 
with the predictions, for participants with a predominant interdependent self-construal (+1SD 
above the mean), the attitude accessibility  normative clarity interaction was significant ( = 
1.99, p < .001). When normative clarity was low, high attitude accessibility reduced readiness ( 
= -.94, p = .01). When normative clarity was high, high attitude accessibility increased readiness 
( = 1.06, p = .008). In contrast, for participants with a predominant independent self-construal (-
1SD below the mean), the attitude accessibility  normative clarity interaction was not 
significant ( = .67, p = .189). In addition, we conducted a floodlight analysis (Spiller et al., 
2013). This analysis identifies the significant regions of the attitude accessibility  normative 
clarity interaction at all levels of the moderating variable: self-construal. The results revealed that 
the attitude accessibility  normative clarity interaction emerged for participants whose self-
construal score was above -.80 (approximately 78% of the sample). When discomfort was 
entered as a covariate, the accessibility  normative clarity interaction held ( = 1.38, p = .< 
.001), but the three-way interaction did not (p = .165).   
Figure B.6 Felt Readiness to Act as a Function of Manipulated Attitude Accessibility and 
Country 
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Expected Attitude Similarity. The same regression analysis on the expected attitude 
similarity item revealed an attitude accessibility  normative clarity interaction ( = .97, p = 
.034) and a normative clarity  self-construal interaction ( = -.59, p = .053). The three-way 
interaction was not significant ( = .59, p = .151).  
We conducted separate follow-up tests to understand the nature of the two interactions. 
First, we conducted contrast analysis on an accessibility  normative clarity ANOVA of attitude 
similarity. As expected, the interaction was significant (F(1, 198) = 4.29, p = .04). The follow-up 
contrast tests suggest that under low normative clarity, participants with more accessible 
attitudes indicated that they would have marginally less similar opinions as their friends (Ms = 
4.98 vs. 5.52, respectively; F(1, 198) = 2.841, p = .093). Under high normative clarity, 
participants with more accessible attitudes indicated that they would have had directionally, but 
not significantly, more similar opinions as their friends (Ms = 5.34 vs. 4.95, respectively; F(1, 
198) = 1.54, p = .216).  
Second, we examined the normative clarity  self-construal interaction, but when attitude 
accessibility was removed from the analysis ( = -.31, p = .121) or when attitude accessibility 
was included as a covariate ( = -.31, p = .129), the interaction was not significant. Thus, we did 
not conduct further tests.  
Moderated Mediation. We tested whether the effect of attitude accessibility and 
normative clarity on readiness was mediated by expected attitude similarity for interdependents 
(Hayes 2018, Model 7). We restricted the sample to participants whose self-construal score was 
greater than -.80 per the results of the floodlight analysis (n = 159). Attitude accessibility was the 




mediator, and readiness was the dependent variable. The analysis revealed that the accessibility  
normative clarity interaction predicted expected similarity ( = 1.26, p = .015) and expected 
attitude similarity predicted readiness ( = .38, p < .001). These results suggest that having more 
accessible attitudes made interdependents unsure that they would share attitudes with others 
under low normative clarity ( = -.71, p = .053), but having more accessible attitudes did not 
significantly affect expected attitude similarity under high normative clarity ( = .55, p = .125). 
Consistent with the expectations, when interdependents were in conditions of low 
normative clarity, expected attitude similarity mediated the relationship between attitude 
accessibility and readiness. Having more accessible preferences reduced attitude similarity, 
which reduced readiness (LL = -.57, UL = -.03). In contrast, expected attitude similarity did not 
mediate the relationship between accessible attitudes and readiness when normative clarity was 
high (LL = -.07, UL = .58). The index of moderated mediation was also significant (LL = .07, 
UL = 1.03).  




These results further indicate the importance of normative clarity regarding the 
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accessibility, compared to low accessibility, raised interdependents’ concern that one’s opinion 
would be dissimilar from a group of close others when the topic had low normative clarity. 
Lower expected similarity mediated participants’ reduction in readiness. In contrast, when the 
normative attitudes of close others were clearer, more accessible attitudes did not raise the 






Attitude Accessibility Increases WTP Under Low (vs. High) Norm Relevance  
 Norm relevance can be described as the extent to which the approved and expected 
values, attitudes, and behaviors of others are important and consequential for the individual 
(Sherif & Sherif, 1956; Wood, Christensen, Hebl, & Rothgerber, 1997). Importantly, past 
research suggests that salient norms only have influence when they are sufficiently relevant to 
the individual (e.g., Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000). Therefore, even in high norm focus 
contexts, attitude accessibility may still provide coping value when the salient norm is not 
consequential. For example, accessible preferences may be more predictive of consumer 
responses (e.g., willingness to pay) when the salient norm involves what to wear for a casual 
night out versus at work.  
In contrast, more accessible personal preferences may not aid in coping when the salient 
norm is more consequential. Past literature has demonstrated that accessible information is not 
always useful when making judgments (Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982; 
Stayman & Kardes, 1992). In one illustrative study, increasing the accessibility of affirmative 
action attitudes only increased corresponding judicial behaviors for low (vs. high) self-
monitoring individuals (Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982). In related work, the accessibility of 
alternatives were only diagnostic of choice when other options were unspecified (Posavac et al., 
1997). Consistent with these findings, we argue that in the presence of a salient and personally 
relevant norm (i.e., options are specified by external standards), an individual’s attention may 
shift away from the self (e.g., accessible personal preference) in order to process the appropriate 




 People cope with decision demands via relying on internal states or adjusting to external 
pressures (e.g., Lam & Zane, 2004). Consequently, self-awareness may be important to consider 
in the benefits of attitude activation. In contrast to public and social awareness, private self-
awareness refers to the awareness of oneself from a personal perspective and heightened private 
self-awareness has been associated with a greater consciousness of personal preferences 
(Goukens, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2009). Moreover, numerous studies suggest that private self-
awareness leads to behaviors that reflect personal attitudes (Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000; Froming, 
Walker, & Lopyan, 1982; Gibbons, 1990; Hormuth, 1982). Thus, private self-awareness may 
permit distinction between those whose focus shifts inward versus elsewhere after attitude 
rehearsal when norms are salient and relevant.  
Integrating these findings with those from attitude and norm theories, we expect attitude 
accessibility to be associated with increased private self-awareness, but only when there is low 
norm relevance. Given that coping can be characterized by reliance on internal states, we 
expected that private self-awareness would mediate the relationship between accessible 
preferences and positive coping outcomes in low norm-relevant contexts. In contrast, attitude 
accessibility should be less likely to increase private self-awareness in contexts of high norm 
relevance. When norm relevance is high, there is a greater possibility that private self-awareness 
receives less attention in favor of other types of awareness. To test this, the following study 
induced norm salience across conditions but manipulated high (vs. low) norm relevance.  
Finally, we measured participants’ willingness to pay for the focal attitude object in 
addition to their feelings of readiness and discomfort. If consumers feel more comfortable 
making choices based on more accessible attitudes as prior research suggests (Blascovich et al., 




pay more for products for which they had more accessible attitudes in low norm-relevant 
contexts. In contrast, consumers might report lower willingness to pay for products for which 
they had more accessible attitudes in high norm-relevant contexts.  
Method 
Pretest. Twenty students from the same population as those in the main study identified 
scenarios that varied in norm relevance. All pretest participants saw several scenarios and 
indicated whether each domain had norms they should follow (1 = does not have norms I should 
follow, 7 = has norms I should follow), if the scenario was important (1 = would not be 
important to me, 7 = would be important to me), and if the scenario would happen to them (1 = 
would not happen to me, 7 = would happen to me). We assumed that scenarios that received 
higher scores on these 3 items had higher normative relevance among the sample. Thus, we 
averaged the 3 items together to create a normative relevance index ( = .865). The results from 
a paired samples t-test revealed that deciding clothes to wear in class (M = 5.37) had higher norm 
relevance than deciding what clothes to wear to a sports bar during an Illini sporting event (M = 
4.07; (t(19) = 6.19, p < .001). Thus, we used these two scenarios to manipulate norm relevance.  
Main Study Method 
Participants and Design. Two hundred and thirty-three undergraduate business majors 
participated in the study for participation credit. The study used a 2 (attitude expression: single 
vs. repeated)  2 (norm relevance: high vs. low) between-subjects design. 
Procedure and Measures. The study consisted of three parts. In the first part, participants 
were told that the experimenters were interested in opinions toward College-branded 
promotional items. All participants evaluated eight objects on nine-point scales anchored from 1 




repeated attitude expression condition evaluated the focal item (e.g., a winter knit hat) three 
times on separate screens with different anchors. Participants in the single attitude expression 
condition evaluated the focal item once and a non-focal item (e.g., a tumbler) three times on 
separate screens with different anchors.  
In the second section, participants were asked to evaluate a second set of eight College-
branded promotional items using two keys to represent “bad” and “good.” The only common 
item between the first and second surveys was the focal attitude object. To manipulate norm 
relevance per the pretest, participants read that they should think about whether the item would 
be good to wear/use in class (high norm relevance) or at a sports bar during an athletic event 
(low norm relevance). The experiment was programmed so that a single item appeared in the 
center of the screen and automatically advanced when the participant pressed the “bad” or 
“good” key. After a series of practice trials, participants evaluated each of the new eight items on 
separate screens in random order. We collected the response latencies on each page to capture 
attitude accessibility. 
Next, we asked participants to complete a brief questionnaire. The question included the 
same readiness and discomfort measures as the earlier studies; private, public, and social self-
awareness scales (Govern & Marsch, 2001); and willingness to pay for the focal item (Rucker & 
Galinsky, 2008). Each self-awareness subscale consisted of three items and had high inter-
reliability (private = .832, public = .786, social = .839).  Sample items include, “Right now, I am 
aware of our innermost thoughts” (private), “Right now, I am concerned about what other people 
think of me” (public), and “Right now, I am conscious of what is going on around me” (social; 
Govern & Marsch, 2001). Finally, willingness to pay for the focal item was collected using 




retail value). Participants also reported their self-construal on a 24-item scale (Singelis, 1994). 
Following prior work (e.g., Riemer & Shavitt, 2011), we computed an index of self-construal by 
subtracting the 12-item independent subscale ( = .77) from the interdependent subscale ( = 
.82). Thus, higher (lower) numbers indicated predominant interdependent (independent) self-
construal. 
It should be noted that an accessibility  norm relevance interaction on self-construal 
emerged (F(1, 229) = 4.17, p = .042). Under high norm relevance, more accessible attitudes were 
associated with marginally more independent self-construal (Mmore accessible = -.11, Mless accessible = 
.18, p = .058). In contrast, under high norm relevance, attitude accessibility did not affect self-
construal (Mmore accessible = .05, Mless accessible = -.10, p = .321). 
Results 
Response Latency. Because we introduced the norm relevance manipulation before the 
manipulation check, we expected attitude expression and norm relevance to interact such that 
repeated (vs. single) attitude expression would increase response latency only when norm 
relevance was low. This effect would be attenuated when norm relevance was high. A 2-way 
attitude expression  norm relevance ANOVA on the reciprocally transformed response latencies 
for the focal item revealed the expected interaction (F(1, 229) = 4.819, p = .029). Follow-up 
contrasts supported predictions. When norm relevance was low, repeated (vs. single) attitude 
expression increased response latency (Mrepeated = .61, Msingle = .57, F(1, 229) = 4.116, p = .044). 
There was no difference in response latency when norm relevance was high (Mrepeated = .57, 
Msingle = .59, p = .289). No other effects were significant. 
Private Self-Awareness. We predicted that if personal attitude expression interferes with 




awareness among participants in the low norm relevance condition. Again, the effect should be 
attenuated when norm relevance was high. A 2-way attitude expression  norm relevance 
ANOVA on private self-awareness revealed a main effect of attitude expression (F(1, 229) = 
5.326, p = .022) that was qualified by the expected interaction (F(1, 229) = 5.821, p = .017). As 
we predicted, participants in the low norm relevance condition reported higher private self-
awareness after repeated (vs. single) attitude expression (Mrepeated = 4.74, Msingle = 3.76, F(1, 229) 
= 10.83, p = .037). There was no difference in private self-awareness when norm relevance was 
high (Mrepeated = 4.36, Msingle = 4.38, F(1, 229) = 4.116, F < 1). No other effects on private self-
awareness were significant and there were no significant effects on public or social self-
awareness (all ps > .10). 
Willingness to Pay. We hypothesized an attitude expression  norm relevance interaction 
such that for participants in the low norm relevance, repeated (vs. single) attitude expression 
should increase WTP. However, this effect should be suppressed when norm relevance was high. 
In support, an attitude expression  norm relevance ANOVA on WTP yielded a significant 
interaction (F(1, 229) = 5.971, p = .015). Follow-up analyses revealed that participants in the low 
norm relevance condition reported higher WTP when they repeated their attitudes (Mrepeated = 
5.72, Msingle = 4.71, F(1, 229) = 3.98, p = .047). In contrast, participants reported similar WTP 
regardless of attitude expression when norm relevance was high (Mrepeated = 4.5, Msingle = 5.21, 
F(1, 229) = 2.109, p = .148). The results remained significant when participants’ beanie 
preferences were entered as a covariate (interaction: F(1, 228) = 6.85, p = .009). The contrast 
effect at high norm relevance also became marginally significant (Mlow accessibility = 5.28, Mhigh 




Moderated-Mediation Analysis. We tested the extent to which private self-awareness 
explained WTP when norm relevance was low (vs. high). We submitted the data to Hayes’ 
(2013) PROCESS macro (Model 7) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples to test these predictions. 
Attitude expression was the independent variable (0 = single, 1 = repeated), norm relevance was 
the moderator (0 = low, 1 = high), private self-awareness was the mediator, and WTP was the 
dependent variable. In support of the proposed underlying process, the analysis revealed that 
private self-awareness mediated WTP when norm relevance was low ( = .216, Boot SE = .13, 
95% CI: .02, .56). The same mediation was not found when norm relevance was high ( = .005, 
Boot SE = .08, 95% CI: -.19, .13). The index of moderated mediation was significant ( = -.22, 
Boot SE = .16, 95% CI: -.67, -.02). 
Readiness. The analyses of readiness yielded insignificant effects (all ps > .10).  
Discussion 
 Collectively, these findings extend those of the previous studies by showing how having 
accessible attitudes in relevant normative contexts can suppress previously documented coping 
outcomes. Specifically, we found that the relationships suggested in prior research (repeated 
attitude expression increasing private self-awareness and willingness to pay) were obtained when 
norm relevance was low, signifying that having accessible attitudes helped participants cope with 
deciding their willingness to pay for the focal item. However, when norm relevance was high, we 
predicted and found that repeated attitude expression did not increase private self-awareness and 
the previous effects were attenuated. These findings further support the notion that highly 







Indicating Preferences Makes Asians/Latinos Less Self-Centered and More Group-Focused 
 In some of our studies, we noticed that making preferences more accessible affected how 
people reported their salient self-construal. We also have encountered the question of whether 
These findings could be explained using our theoretical framework. That is, for people who tend 
to have salient interdependent self-construal (e.g., Asians and Latinos), indicating preferences 
may prompt the consideration of their peers’ preferences or normative constraints instead of their 
internal states (e.g., Riemer et al., 2014). In contrast, one might expect that for people who tend 
to have salient independent self-construal (Caucasian Americans), indicating preferences does 
prompt their internal states. One way to examine the degree to which people focus on themselves 
or others is by measuring their idiocentric, allocentric, and group cognitions (Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954). Idiocentric cognitions refer to personal qualities (e.g., “I am funny”), 
allocentric cognitions refer to a quality of interdependence (e.g., “I am a good friend”), and 
group cognitions refer to group membership (e.g., “I am an APO member”). Therefore, we 
explored whether the act of indicating preferences differentially affected Asians/Latinos’ (vs. 
Caucasians’) cognitions.  
Method 
 Ninety-three undergraduate students participated in a 2 (task: evaluate vs. unscramble)  
2 (ethnicity: Caucasian vs. Asians/Latinos) between-subjects experiment. Participants were 
randomly assigned to indicate preferences toward 10 apparel brands (e.g., Nike) or unscramble 
the same brands (e.g., EKIN = NIKE). This procedure was chosen to manipulate whether 
participants performed an evaluative versus a non-evaluative task and to control participants’ 




& McPartland, 1954). They filled in the blanks to ten statements starting with “I am.” Finally, we 
collected demographic information including the participants’ ethnicities. 
Results and Discussion 
 Two research assistants independently coded participants’ statements as either 
idiocentric, allocentric, or group. There was adequate reliability between their ratings for 
idiocentric (r = .659, p < .01) and group cognitions (r = .421, p < .01), but poor reliability 
between the ratings for allocentric cognitions (r = -.142, p = .164). We therefore tested whether 
rating (vs. not rating) brands would lead to more idiocentric statements for Caucasians, but less 
statements for Asians/Latinos. In addition, we tested whether rating (vs. not rating) brands would 
lead to more group statements for Asians/Latinos, but less statements for Caucasians. We 
conducted two task  ethnicity ANOVAs on the number of idiocentric and group cognitions. The 
analysis of idiocentric cognitions revealed a main effect of ethnicity (F(1, 89) = 10.5, p = .002) 
and a task  ethnicity interaction (F(1, 89) = 5.11, p = .026). Follow-up analyses revealed that, as 
expected, rating (vs. not rating) brands decreased idiocentric statements for Asians/Latinos 
(Mrating = 4.91, Mnot rating = 6.33; p = .03). In contrast, the task did not affect the number of 
idiocentric statements for Caucasians (Mrating = 7.66, Mnot rating = 6.91; p = .298). 
 The analysis of group cognitions revealed a main effect of ethnicity (F(1, 89) = 21.62, p 
< .001) and a marginal task  ethnicity interaction (F(1, 89) = 3.31, p = .072). Follow-up 
analyses revealed that rating (vs. not rating) brands increased group cognitions for 
Asians/Latinos (Mrating = 3.88, Mnot rating = 2.68; p = .014). In contrast, the task did not affect the 





 These findings partially supported our expectations. The findings suggest that the act of 
reporting a preference makes Asians/Latinos think less about themselves and more about groups. 
In contrast, it appears that Caucasians were equally likely to be thinking of themselves and 






A Multi-Trial Investigation of Attitude Accessibility 
 We set out to replicate the main study effects using a study paradigm that more closely 
mirrored prior work (e.g., Fazio et al., 1992). The original studies lacked multiple trials. That is, 
participants in the current studies indicated their readiness to act for one attitude object. Here, we 
tried to replicate the effects across multiple attitude object to reduce the concern that the effects 
stemmed from the stimuli. This new approach required mixed effects modeling to estimate and 
separate the error attributed to stimuli and participants from the effects of the key independent 
variables (Rocklage & Fazio 2018). 
 Colors were selected as the attitude objects for several reasons. Following prior work 
(Fazio et al., 1992) colors are simple for people to evaluate. There are few dimensions to form 
one’s evaluation of a painting or color. In contrast, for example, many dimensions help form 
one’s evaluation of a car model or apparel item. Moreover, given our interest in the influence of 
norms on the function of attitude accessibility, We needed attitude objects to which attitudes 
could be easily modulated across normative contexts. For example, one might have a highly 
accessible preference for blue pants, but may not have as accessible of a preference for a blue 
car.  
 The objective was to test the hypothesis that, for more interdependent people, attitude 
accessibility increases the readiness to act when others’ preferences are less (vs. more) salient. In 
contrast, for more independent people, attitude accessibility might increase the readiness to act 
independent of the salience of others’ preferences. We manipulated the salience of others’ 




accessibility with attitude rehearsal. We operationalized self-construal with participants’ 
ethnicities. 
Pretest 
 We conducted a pretest to identify an appropriate normative context. Twenty-eight 
undergraduates read four descriptions in which they were asked to imagine choosing a color for 
various situations (see table B.2) and rated two how much they would need to consider others 
and how easy the decision would be on eight items. An exploratory factor analysis revealed two 
separate factors that accounted for 61% of the total variance. The ‘consider others’ factor 
included: (a) it would be important that I considered others’ color preferences, (b) I would need 
to think a lot before making this decision, (c) my decision would affect others, and (d) other 
people would care that I made the right decision. The ‘decision ease’ factor included: (a) this 
would be an easy decision and (b) I could confidently make this decision. Questions in each set 
were averaged together to create ‘consider others’ and ‘decision ease’ indices. I selected the 
work reception scenario based on the pretest results (see table B.2).  





Office accent wall 4.97a 4.07b 
Break room painting 4.86a 4.09a 
Work event poster 4.83a 4.32a 
Work reception 5.39a 4.32b 
 
Note: Different superscripts indicate differences within rows at the p < .01 level 
Main Study Method 
 Participants and Design. One hundred and twenty-one undergraduates participated in the 




2 (ethnicity: European American vs. Asian and Asian Americans)  2 (norm context: salient vs. 
control; between-subjects) mixed design.  
 Procedure and Measures. The study was conducted as part of several studies linked 
together with a computer program. To begin this study, participants were randomly assigned to 
rehearse their attitudes to one of two sets of 10 colors (Set A or Set B). Colors were randomly 
generated and fit within 300px  300px constraints using Adobe Photoshop. Participants 
indicated their evaluations four times on four-point scales (like strongly, like, dislike, dislike 
strongly). In the next part, participants read that they were going to indicate preferences between 
two colors. To allow participants to provide their preferences as quickly as possible, participants 
were instructed to place their index fingers on the ‘Z’ and ‘/’ keys to indicate their preference for 
the color on the left or the right, respectively. To practice, participants completed 15 practice 
trails with unrelated object pairs (e.g., Coke–Pepsi, Spotify–Apple Music).  
After the practice trials, participants were assigned to norm salience conditions. Those in 
the norm salient condition were asked to think about where they wanted to work after graduation,  
imagine being assigned to plan a reception hosted by their imagined company, and choosing the 
colors to decorate the venue. Those in the norm control condition did not see this information.  
Next, participants completed the focal pairwise preference task. The colors were 
randomly paired with one other color in its set, forming 10 pairs. Pairs were arranged in blocks 
of 5 pairs from Set A and Set B. Therefore, participants saw 5 pairs of colors to which they had 
rehearsed attitudes and 5 pairs to which they had not rehearsed attitudes. The order of 
presentation was counterbalanced. The counterbalance variable produced no main or interactive 




pairwise task, participants completed demographic information and proceeded to the next study 
in the session. 
Results 
 Preference Latency. Based, on guidance from previous research, all 1,060 latencies were 
log transformed prior to analysis (Rocklage & Fazio, 2016; Savani et al., 2008). We eliminated 
19 observations that were more than three standard deviations above the mean and 24 
observations that were below 300 ms (Savani et al., 2008), leaving 1,017 observations.  
We contrast coded the observations where the participants’ rehearsed set matched with 
their preference set (-1 = less accessible attitudes, 1 = more accessible attitudes). For example, 
observations among participants who rehearsed set A were coded as -1 when they indicated 
preferences toward colors in set B; their observations were coded as 1 when they indicated 
preferences toward colors in set A. Participants were coded as -1 if they indicated being 
European American and they were coded as 1 if they indicated being Asian or Asian American. 
Observations in the norm salient condition were coded as 1 and those in the norm control 
condition were coded -1. 
The predictors of interest were attitude accessibility, ethnicity, norm salience, and all 
possible interactions. Replicating prior literature, there was a significant effect of accessibility 
condition , γ = -.08, t(96.8) = -6.00, p < .001, 95% CI: [-.11, -.05]. People were faster at 
indicating preferences between colors to which they had rehearsed their attitudes versus not. 
There was a marginal effect of norm salience condition , γ = .05, t(99.4) = 1.89, p = .062, 95% 
CI: [-.003, .11]. People were somewhat faster at indicating preferences between colors in the 





Table B.3 Raw Mean Latency Estimates of Marginal and Significant Effects in Appendix Study 
B.17 
 No-Rehearsal Set 
(Low Attitude Accessibility) 
Rehearsal Set 
(High Attitude Accessibility) 
Attitude Rehearsal 1.19*** 1.02*** 
   
 No-Norm Condition Norm-Salient Condition 
Norm Salience 1.04† 1.17† 
   
 European  
Americans 
Asians and  
Asian Americans 
 No-Norm Norm No-Norm Norm 
Norm  Ethnicity 1.09 1.08 .99* 1.26* 
     
Note: ***adjacent pairs are significantly different at p < .001, *adjacent pairs are significantly different at p 
< .05, †adjacent pairs are marginally different at p = .064 
 
Finally, there was a significant norm  ethnicity interaction, , γ = .07, t(99.4) = 2.47, p = 
.015, 95% CI: [.01, .13]. Follow-up analysis revealed that Asians and Asian Americans were 
faster at indicating preferences between colors in the control condition versus the norm salient 
condition, γ = -.11, t(36.6) = 2.28, p = .028, 95% CI: [.01, .20]. In contrast, for European 
Americans, norm condition did not affect the speed of indicating preferences between colors, γ = 
-.02, t(62.9) = -.483, p = .631, 95% CI: [-.08, .05]. There were no other significant effects. 






 The results from this pilot study provide partial support for our theory. People with 
ethnicities traditionally associated with more interdependent self-construal (Asians and Asian 
Americans) were slower at indicating preferences when an important normative context was 
salient (vs. not). In contrast, for people with ethnicities traditionally associated with more 
independent self-construal (European Americans), norm condition had no effect on the speed of 





APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR CHAPTER 3 
Appendix C.1 
Attitudinal (Behavioral) Consensus Cues Were Directionally More Diagnostic to Indians 
(Americans) 
 The objective of this study was to determine the relative diagnosticity of behavioral and 
attitudinal consensus cue types across cultures. Diagnosticity refers to an object’s importance in 
a judgment (Feldman & Lynch, 1988), so it is conceptually similar to the notion of personal 
relevance. We measured diagnosticity with a two-item measure (Aaker & Sengupta, 2000). If, to 
interdependents, attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues are more personally relevant, they 
should indicate that the consensus information was more important and relevant on self-report 
scales.  
Method 
 Participants and Design. Two hundred and one adults (Mage = 35, 61% male, 104 
Americans, 97 Indians) participated in the study for money. The study used a 2 (country: US vs. 
India)  2 (cue type: attitudinal vs. behavioral) between-subjects design. 
 Procedure and Measures. First, participants read a brief description of a new tablet brand 
that doubled as a laptop. The description included a statement from an independent market 
research firm about the popularity of the item. We used this information to manipulate cue type. 
Participants in the attitudinal (behavioral) cue condition read that during the Laplet’s first few 
months in the US/India market, 85% of consumers who didn’t own a tablet and learned about it, 
loved (bought) the brand.  
 Second, participants rated the Laplet’ price premium compared to an unbranded tablet 




asked to rate the Laplet on a 12-point scale, where 1 = 10% of an unbranded tablet’s price, 2 = 
20% of an unbranded tablet’s price, and increasing intervals of 10% per scale point up to 12 = 
120% of an unbranded tablet’s price.  
 Finally, participants rated the diagnosticity of the consensus cue on two 7-point scales 
(“How relevant/important was it that 85% of consumers who don't own a tablet and learn about 
Laplet, buy (love) the brand?” 1 = important/relevant to 7 = extremely important/relevant) 
(Aaker & Sengupta, 2000). We averaged these items to create the diagnosticity index (r = .76, p 
< .001). 
Results 
 Cue Diagnosticity. A country by consensus cue type ANOVA on the diagnosticity index 
revealed a two-way interaction (F(1, 197) = 4.0, p = .047) and no other effects (other Fs < 1). 
Follow-up tests revealed that, for Indians, attitudinal consensus cues were directionally more 
diagnostic (M = 5.57) than behavioral consensus cues (M = 5.21; F(1, 197) = 1.83, p = .178). In 
contrast, for Americans, behavioral consensus cues were directionally more diagnostic (M = 
5.69) than attitudinal consensus cues (M = 5.32; F(1, 197) = 2.18, p = .141).  
























Price Premium. In general, Indians rated the Laplet lower than Americans. An ANOVA 
on price premium revealed an effect of country (MIndia = 6.9, MUS = 7.99; F(1, 197) = 8.18, p = 
.005) and no other significant effects (other Fs < 1, ns). 
Discussion 
 The results from this study suggest that certain types of consensus cues may be more 
diagnostic to some cultural groups than others. In the attitudinal consensus condition, the results 
were directionally consistent with Aaker and Maheswaran’s (1997) finding that attitudinal 
consensus cues are more diagnostic to interdependents (vs. independents). However, the results 
also extend those findings by showing that behavioral consensus cues may be more diagnostic to 





Indians Used More Consensus-Related Language to Describe a Product with Attitudinal 
(vs. Behavioral) Consensus Cues 
 The objective of this study was to examine cross-cultural differences in the relative 
diagnosticity of attitudinal and behavioral consensus cues in a different way. Namely, we 
assessed the degree to which consumers’ written product descriptions mentioned consensus in 
response to behavioral versus attitudinal consensus cues (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997). Personal 
relevance reflects the importance of some element to the individual. A respondent’s written 
product description is likely to include the elements that are personally relevant to him or her. 
We reasoned that if, to interdependents, attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues are more 
personally relevant, their product descriptions should have more consensus-related words.  
Method 
 Participants and Design. One hundred and fifty adult MTurkers (Mage = 33.7, 54% male; 
83 Americans and 67 Indians) participated in the study for money. The study used a 2 (country: 
US vs. India)  2 (consensus cue type: attitudinal vs. behavioral) between-subjects design. 
 Procedure and Measures. Participants read a brief description of a new tablet brand that 
doubled as a laptop. The description included a statement from an independent market research 
firm about the popularity of the item. We used this information to manipulate consensus cue 
type. Participants in the attitudinal (behavioral) consensus cue condition read that during the 
Laplet’s first few months in the US/India market, 85% of consumers who didn’t own a tablet and 
learned about it, loved (bought) the brand.  
 To prepare for the focal writing task, participants provided up to six general thoughts 




We are interested in your thoughts while you read the description. Please list the 
thoughts and feelings that were going through your mind in the boxes below. 
These thoughts may be positive, negative, or neutral – all thoughts are fine. 
Please try and list only one thought (can be a sentence or two) in each box. Do 
not feel you have to fill all the boxes. 
Participants rated the Laplet’s price premium compared to an unbranded tablet using a 
modified interval scale from prior work (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). Participants were asked to 
rate the Laplet on a 12-point scale, where 1 = 10% of an unbranded tablet’s price, 2 = 20% of an 
unbranded tablet’s price, and increasing intervals of 10% per scale point up to 12 = 120% of an 
unbranded tablet’s price. 
 Next, participants completed the focal writing task. They were asked to describe a Laplet 
using as many words as they can think of. We coded these responses for the presence of 
consensus-related cognitions. This was the focal dependent measure to capture the diagnosticity 
of the consensus information. 
 After describing the Laplet, participants rated the Laplet on four 9-point semantic 
differential scales (-4 = would not consider purchasing a Laplet/unfavorable/not useful/bad, 4 = 
would consider purchasing a Laplet/favorable/useful/good). These items were averaged to create 
a product evaluation index ( = .93). Then, they indicated their interest and involvement while 
reading the Laplet description (1 = not interested/involved, 7 = highly interested/involved). These 
were averaged to create an involvement index (r = .64, p < .001). Finally, to ensure that the 
consensus cues were equally positive, they rated the favorability of the market research results (1 







 Cue Diagnosticity. We followed the coding scheme from Aaker and Maheswaran (1997) 
to categorize the thoughts from participants’ Laplet descriptions into consensus and attribute-
related categories. For example, phrases such as, “Laplet is a popular brand,” were categorized as 
a consensus-related cognition. In contrast, phrases such as, “Laplet is easy to use,” were 
categorized as an attribute-related cognition. We computed a proportion of consensus cognitions 
to the total amount of cognitions (consensus + attribute). A country  cue type ANOVA on this 
proportion revealed a significant 2-way interaction (F(1, 146) = 4.4, p = .039). 
 Follow-up tests revealed that Indians used a marginally greater proportion of consensus-
related cognitions in their descriptions when Laplet was described with an attitudinal consensus 
cue (M = .17) compared to a behavioral consensus cue (M = .06; F(1, 146) = 3.49, p = .064). In 
contrast, Americans used a similar proportion of consensus-related cognitions across consensus 
cue type (Mattitudinal = .04, Mbehavioral = .10; F(1, 146) = 1.08, p = .30).  

































































 Price Premium. In general, Indians thought the Laplet had lower price premium than 
Americans. An ANOVA on the estimated price premium compared to unbranded item measure 
revealed an effect of country (MIndia = 7.1, MUS = 8.1; F(1, 146) = 4.02, p = .047) and no other 
significant effects (other Fs < 1, ns). 
 Product Evaluation. In general, Indians rated the Laplet more favorably than Americans. 
An ANOVA on the attitudes index revealed an effect country (MIndia = 7.76, MUS = 6.77; F(1, 
146) = 13.11, p < .001) and no other significant effects (other Fs < 1, ns). 
Involvement. Motivation was equally distributed across the four cells. An ANOVA on the 
motivation index revealed no significant effects (all ps > .19). 
 Favorability of the Consensus Information. The consensus information was equally 
favorable across all cells. An ANOVA on the favorability item revealed no significant effects (all 
ps > .32).  
Discussion 
 The cognitive response data suggest that attitudinal consensus cues prompted Indians, but 
not Americans, to describe the product using more consensus-related language. This finding 
suggests that, to interdependents, attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues are more diagnostic 
and personally relevant (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997). However, the results on price premium 






Separate Analyses of Willingness to Pay and Attitudes as a Function of Self-Construal and 
Consensus Cue Type in Study 3 
 Willingness to Pay. We analyzed willingness to pay (WTP) using multiple regression. 
Given that consensus cue type has 3 levels (no consensus, attitudinal, and behavioral), we 
created two dummy variables, with attitudinal consensus serving as the comparison condition. 
Thus, the independent variables in the regression equation were no consensus (coded: 0/1), 
behavioral consensus (coded: 0/1), self-construal (mean-centered), the no consensus  self-
construal interaction, and the behavioral consensus  self-construal interaction. The analysis 
revealed significant effects of self-construal ( = 1.11, se = .41, p = .007), the no cue  self-
construal interaction ( = -1.27, se = .62, p = .043), and the behavioral cue  self-construal 
interaction ( = -1.33, se = .55, p = .017). 
 Follow-up analyses of the behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus cue  self-construal 
interaction revealed that interdependents (+1SD) were willing to pay less when there was a 
behavioral consensus cue (M = 5.86) compared to an attitudinal cue (M = 7.41;  = -1.55, se = 
.63, p = .016). In contrast, independents (-1SD) were WTP similar amounts regardless of 
consensus cue type (Mbehavioral = 6.21, Mattitudinal = 5.67; p = .39).  
 Follow-up analyses of the no cue (vs. attitudinal consensus cue)  self-construal 
interaction revealed that, consistent with prior work (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997), 
interdependents were willing to pay directionally, but not significantly, more when there was an 
attitudinal consensus cue (M = 7.41) compared to no cue (M = 6.30,  = -.95, se = .66, p = .156). 




was an attitudinal consensus cue (M = 5.51) compared to no cue (M = 6.56;  =  se = .67, p 
= .118).  
 Evaluations. We analyzed evaluations using the same multiple regression model detailed 
above. The analysis revealed significant effects of self-construal ( = .61, se = .19, p = .002), the 
no cue (vs. attitudinal) dummy ( = -.43, se = .21, p = .047), the no cue  self-construal 
interaction ( = -.73, se = .30, p = .015), and the behavioral cue  self-construal interaction ( = -
.72, se = .26, p = .006).  
 Follow-up analyses of the behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus cue  self-construal 
interaction revealed that interdependents (+1SD) gave less favorable product evaluations when 
there was a behavioral consensus cue (M = 5.02) compared to an attitudinal cue (M = 5.75;  = -
.73, se = .30, p = .016). In contrast, independents (-1SD) gave directionally, but not significantly, 
more favorable product evaluations when there was a behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus cue 
type (Mbehavioral = 5.20, Mattitudinal = 4.80;  = .40, se = .30, p = .174).  
 Follow-up analyses of the no cue (vs. attitudinal consensus cue)  self-construal 
interaction revealed that, consistent with prior work (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997), 
interdependents gave more favorable product evaluations when there was an attitudinal 
consensus cue (M = 5.85) compared to no cue and (M = 4.85,   = -1.00, se = .31, p = .002). In 
contrast, independents’ product evaluations were unaffected by consensus cue presentation 
(Mattitudinal = 5.04, Mno cue = 4.90; p = .653). 
 Moderated Mediation. We predicted that the time spent processing attribute information  
would mediate the relationship between consensus cue type and product evaluation for 
interdependents, but not independents (H4). We tested this hypothesis using Hayes (2018) 




independent variable (dummy-coded: 0 = attitudinal, 1 = behavioral), mean-centered self-
construal was the moderator, time spent processing attribute information was the mediator, and 
willingness to pay and product evaluation were the dependent variables in separate models. As 
expected, the analyses revealed that consensus type and self-construal interacted to predict time 
spent processing attribute information ( = -3.28, se = 1.24, p = .008). Participants with a 
predominantly interdependent self-construal spent less time processing additional information 
when the product was shown with a behavioral consensus cue (M = 7.49) compared to an 
attitudinal consensus cue (M = 11.84;  = -4.35, se = 1.42, p = .003).  
Time spent processing attribute information was positively and significantly associated 
with product evaluation ( = .05, se = .02, p = .002), but not willingness to pay ( = .03, se = .03, 
p = .325). Therefore, conditional indirect effect tests revealed that time spent processing attribute 
information mediated the relationship between consensus cue type and product evaluation, but 
not WTP, for interdependents ( = -.20, Boot SE = .10, 95% CI: -.42, -.05), but not independents 
( = .04, Boot SE = .07, 95% CI: -.09, .19). The index of moderated mediation was significant ( 
= -.15, Boot SE = .08, 95% CI: -.33, -.03). These results are consistent with the hypotheses (H4) 
that the tendency to process additional information mediates the effect consensus cue type on 





Behavioral (vs. Attitudinal) Consensus Cues Were More Diagnostic Among Caucasian 
Undergraduates 
 The primary objective of this study was to replicate the results on the relative 
diagnosticity of behavioral and attitudinal consensus cues using an undergraduate sample. A 
secondary objective was to assess whether behavioral and attitudinal consensus cues generated 
different attributions across independents and interdependents. If, to interdependents, attitudinal 
(vs. behavioral) consensus cues are more diagnostic (personally relevant), then they should also 
be attributed to more internal factors (e.g., personal desires).  
Method 
 Participants and Design. Two hundred and twenty-three undergraduates (Mage = 20, 37% 
male) participated in the study for partial course participation credit. The study used a 2 
(ethnicity: Caucasian vs. Asian)  2 (consensus cue type: attitudinal vs. behavioral) between-
subjects design. 22 participants were removed from analyses because they indicated an ethnicity 
other than Caucasian or Asian; this procedure left 204 participants for the analyses. 
 Procedure and Measures. First, participants read a brief description of a new tablet brand 
that doubled as a laptop. The description included a statement from an independent market 
research firm about the popularity of the item. We used this information to manipulate cue type. 
Participants in the attitudinal (behavioral) cue condition read that during the Laplet’s first few 
months in the US/India market, 85% of consumers who didn’t own a tablet and learned about it, 
loved (bought) the brand.  
 Second, participants rated the Laplet’s price premium compared to an unbranded tablet 




Laplet on a 12-point scale, where 1 = 10% of an unbranded tablet’s price, 2 = 20% of an 
unbranded tablet’s price, and increasing intervals of 10% per scale point up to 12 = 120% of an 
unbranded tablet’s price. 
 Third, to assess whether participants attributed attitudinal or behavioral consensus to 
internal or external factors, we asked participants the extent to which they felt people bought 
(loved) the Laplet brand because of 1 = “their own personal feelings or preferences” or 7 = 
“outside influences or pressures” (He & Bond, 2015). Next, we collected measures of 
participants’ perceived cue diagnosticity (two items, r = .80, p < .01) and motivation (two items, 
r = .54, p < .01) (Aaker & Maheswaran, 1997).  
Finally, participants responded to two questions to check the manipulation. First, 
participants rated the favorability of the independent market research results for Laplet from 1 = 
“unfavorable” to 7 = “favorable.” Next, participants were asked to recall the percentage of 
consumers who loved (bought) the brand.   
Results 
 Manipulation Check. Seventy-eight percent of participants correctly recalled that 85% of 
people in the market research results bought (loved) the brand. However, an ethnicity by 
consensus cue type ANOVA on the favorability item revealed a main effect of ethnicity 
(MCaucasian = 5.45, MAsian = 4.60; F(1, 200) = 23.30, p < .001).  
Cue Diagnosticity. An ethnicity by consensus cue type ANOVA on the diagnosticity 
index revealed effects of consensus cue type (F(1, 200) = 3.46, p = .064) and ethnicity (F(1, 200) 
= 15.86, p < .001) that were qualified by a two-way interaction (F(1, 200) = 5.56, p = .019). 
Follow-up tests revealed that, for Caucasians, behavioral consensus cues were more diagnostic 




Asians, the consensus cues were equally diagnostic (Mbehavioral = 4.61, Mattitudinal = 4.70; F < 1, 
ns).  
Figure C.3 Cue Diagnosticity as a Function of Ethnicity and Consensus Cue Type 
 
 
Attribution. An ethnicity by consensus cue type ANOVA on the attribution item revealed 
a two-way interaction (F(1, 200) = 4.09, p = .045). Follow-up tests revealed that Caucasians 
were more likely to attribute behavioral consensus cues to outside influences (M = 4.03) than 
attitudinal consensus cues (M = 3.23; F(1, 200) = 4.69, p = .023). In contrast, Asians made 
similar attributions across consensus cue type (Mbehavioral = 3.85, Mattitudinal = 4.04; F < 1, ns). 
Attribution did not mediate (Model 7, Hayes 2018) consensus cue diagnosticity for Caucasians 
( = -.01, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI: -.05, .04) or Asians ( = .02, Boot SE = .05, 95% CI: -.08, 
.12).  
Price Premium. An ANOVA on the price premium compared to unbranded item measure 

























 The results suggest that behavioral versus attitudinal consensus cues were more 
diagnostic and attributable to external causes among Caucasians in this study. The diagnosticity 
result among Caucasians is consistent with our theorizing (Bem, 1972; White & Simpson, 2013), 
but the attribution result is a departure from our theorizing. We expected behavioral consensus 
cues to be more diagnostic because Caucasians perceive behavioral consensus to reflect otheres’ 
‘true’ preferences. For Asians, we would have predicted greater cue diagnosticity and internal 





Interdependent Indians More Favorably Evaluated Groceries with Attitudinal (vs. 
Behavioral) Consensus Cues 
The objectives of this study were to replicate the basic self-construal  cue type 
interaction using commonly consumed items and different types of attitudinal and behavioral 
consensus cues. Instead of describing a single, potentially unfamiliar product, we used common 
grocery items as stimuli. We operationalized consensus cue type by showing participants grocery 
items that were the “most-consumed” or “most-loved” (Tu & Fishbach, 2015). We 
operationalized product evaluations with participants’ perceived brand equity and purchase 
likelihood (Aaker, 1996). We predicted that more interdependent people would more favorably 
evaluate products associated with attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues. However, 
consensus cue type should not produce different product evaluations among more independent 
people.  
Method 
 Participants and Design. Ninety-six American and eighty-five Indian adults (Mage = 
33.18, 68.5% male) participated in the study for payment. The study used a 2 (consensus cue 
type: attitudinal vs. behavioral)  self-construal (measured) between-subjects design. 
 Procedure and Measures. Participants were told that the study was part of a large 
consumer project in which grocery item information was gathered from a large group of people. 
On the next screen, all participants saw a sample of common grocery items (e.g., chicken, bread, 
cereal, rice, milk, mangos) accompanied with text describing findings from previous research. 




condition read that the items were the most-loved (most-purchased) products based on a large 
sample of consumers who checked the items they liked best (consumed).  
 Next, all participants indicated their perceptions of brand equity for each item. 
Participants rated the extent to which the products were of low (1) to high (7) quality, weak (1) 
or dominant (7), and whether consumers of the products were not loyal at all (1) to very loyal 
(7). Participants were then asked to report their purchase likelihood of each brand on an 
imaginary trip to the grocery store (1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes). The four items had high 
internal reliability ( = .94); thus, we created a product evaluation index with the mean values 
and ipsatized these indices within country.  
 Following the dependent measures, participants answered whether the products they 
viewed were “the most frequently consumed” or the most loved.” This item served as the 
manipulation check. Finally, participants completed Singelis’ 24-item self-construal scale 
(1994). Following past research (e.g., Riemer & Shavitt, 2011), we computed a dominant chronic 
self-construal score by subtracting participants’ mean ratings on the independent items ( = 
.826) from their mean ratings on the interdependent items ( = .807). Higher (lower) scores thus 
indicated a dominant interdependent (independent) self-construal.  
Results 
 Manipulation check. As expected, a high proportion of participants correctly answered 
the manipulation check item according to their assigned condition (grand  = 74 percent) (Aaker 
& Maheswaran, 1997). Also as expected, Indian participants were more predominantly 
interdependent (M = .46) than American participants (M = -.41; t(179) = 6.05, p < .001).  
 Product Evaluation. We predicted that more interdependent participants would more 




However, more independent participants might evaluate products similarly, regardless of 
consensus cue type. We tested these hypotheses with multiple regression. We regressed cue type 
(0 = behavioral, 1 = attitudinal), mean-centered self-construal, and their interaction on the 
product evaluation index. The analysis revealed a significant effect of consensus cue type ( = 
.29, t = 2.15, p = .033) and no other significant effects (all ps > .12). The self-construal  cue 
type interaction was not significant (p = .129), but the patterns were consistent with our 
predictions. For example, predominantly interdependent participants (+1SD above the mean of 
self-construal) rated the grocery items higher when they were marketed with attitudinal 
consensus cues (M = .37) than behavioral consensus cues (M = -.14;  = .51, t = .255, p = .012). 
In contrast, predominantly independent participants (-1SD below the mean of self-construal) 
rated the grocery items similarly regardless of consensus cue type (Ms = -.16 vs. -.18; t < 1, ns).  
 We also analyzed the data including the country variable and all possible two- and three-
way interactions with consensus cue type and measured self-construal as predictors. This 
analysis revealed a marginal effect of consensus cue type ( = .35, t = 1.81, p = .072), a 
significant country  consensus cue type interaction ( = -.83, t = -2.20, p = .030), and a 
significant country  measured self-construal  consensus cue type interaction ( = 1.16, t = 
2.75, p = .007). Follow-up tests revealed that the measured self-construal  consensus cue type 
interaction was significant among Indians ( = 1.27, p = .001), but not Americans ( = .11, p = 
.508). Specifically, Indians with predominantly interdependent self-construal more favorably 
evaluated the grocery items when they were shown with attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus 
cues (Mattitudinal = .42, Mbehavioral = -.44;  = .86, t = 2.93, p = .004). The opposite was true for 




favorably when they were shown with behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus cues (Mattitudinal = -
1.65, Mbehavioral = .20;  = -1.82, t = -2.67, p = .008).  




 The current study did not cleanly replicate our prior findings. However, we did observe 
supportive results among Indian participants as a function of measured self-construal and 

























Caucasians More Favorably Evaluated Service Providers with Behavioral (vs. Attitudinal) 
Consensus Cues 
The objective of this study was to generalize the findings from previous studies using 
services (e.g., cell phone provider) instead of products. We used ethnicity to operationalize self-
construal. We used “Best Selling” and “Top Rated” to operationalize consensus cue type. We 
used brand attitudes to operationalize product evaluations. We expected Asians (interdependents) 
to more favorably evaluate services associated with attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues. 
However, consensus cue type should not affect perceived service evaluation among Caucasians 
(independents), but Caucasians might evaluate the service more favorably when it is shown with 
behavioral (vs. attitudinal) consensus cues.  
Method 
 Participants and Design. One hundred and ninety-one undergraduates (Mage = 20.52, 
41.1% male) participated in the study for partial course participation credit. Participants who did 
not indicate that they were Caucasian or Asian were removed from the sample (n = 58), leaving 
133 participants in the analyses. The study used a 2 (ethnicity: Caucasian [independents] vs. 
Asians [interdependents])  2 (consensus cue type: attitudinal vs. behavioral)  2 (service: 
mobile phone vs. home-energy; within-subjects) mixed-subjects design. 
 Procedure and Measures. Participants read information about large-scale cell phone and 
home electricity providers. To induce personal relevance across all conditions, participants read 
that the product will be marketed in the local area and that their opinions were important. The 
order of service presentation was counterbalanced. Importantly, participants were randomly 




Participants in the attitudinal consensus cue condition read that both the cell phone provider 
(Neutron Mobile) and the home electricity provider (Proton Energy) were “Top Rated” and rated 
positively by 81% of 300 college-aged consumers in the market. In contrast, those in the 
behavioral consensus cue condition read that both providers were a “Best Selling” option and 
that 81% of 300 college-aged consumers in the market signed up for the service. 
 Participants rated each service immediately after reading information about it. They 
indicated their product evaluations on four 7-point scales (e.g., “In terms of how good or bad the 
product is, how would you rate Proton?” 1 = bad, 7 = good) (Campbell & Goodstein, 2001). As a 
manipulation check, participants were asked to recall what kind of information was presented 
based upon what they read (i.e., “Which of the following is true based upon what you read?” 1 = 
81% of students rated the brand positively, 2 = 25% of students loved the brand, 3 = 81% of 
students bought the brand, 4 = 75% of students recommended the brand).  
Results 
 Manipulation Check. 78% of participants correctly answered the manipulation check 
question. Therefore, we considered the consensus cue type manipulation to be effective.  
 Service Evaluation. An ethnicity  consensus cue type  service type repeated measures 
ANOVA on service evaluation revealed a significant ethnicity  consensus cue type interaction 
(F(1, 129) = 5.75, p = .018) and no other significant effects. Follow-up analyses collapsing 
across service type revealed that Caucasians’ service ratings were significantly higher when the 
services were shown with behavioral consensus cues (M = 4.99) than attitudinal consensus cues 
(M = 4.48; F(1, 129) = 5.70, p = .018). In contrast, Asians’ service ratings were directionally, but 
not significantly, higher when the services were marketed with attitudinal consensus (M = 4.67) 




Figure C.5 Service Evaluation as a Function of Ethnicity and Consensus Cue Type 
 
Discussion 
 These significant self-construal by consensus cue type interaction on evaluation 
replicated the findings from previous studies in a service context. Consistent with our theorizing, 
Caucasians gave higher ratings to service providers shown with behavioral (vs. attitudinal) 
consensus cues. Asians gave directionally higher ratings to service providers shown with 
attitudinal (vs. behavioral) consensus cues.   
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